Transnational Capitalism and the Middle East: Understanding the Transnational Elites of the Gulf Cooperation Council by Mirtaheri, Seyed Ahmad
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School
5-6-2016
Transnational Capitalism and the Middle East:
Understanding the Transnational Elites of the Gulf
Cooperation Council
Seyed Ahmad Mirtaheri
Florida International University, ahmad.mirtaheri@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, Political
Economy Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mirtaheri, Seyed Ahmad, "Transnational Capitalism and the Middle East: Understanding the Transnational Elites of the Gulf
Cooperation Council" (2016). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2607.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2607
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
Miami, Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST:  
UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSNATIONAL ELITES OF THE 
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
in 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
by 
Seyed Ahmad Mirtaheri 
 
 
 
 
2016 
 ii 
To:  Dean John Stack           
 Green School of International and Public Affairs      
 
This dissertation, written by Seyed Ahmad Mirtaheri, and entitled "Transnational 
Capitalism and the Middle East:  Understanding the Transnational Elites of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council", having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, 
is referred to you for judgment. 
 
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Mohiaddin Mesbahi 
 
_______________________________________ 
Jin (Julie) Zeng 
 
_______________________________________ 
Benjamin Smith 
 
_______________________________________ 
Ronald W. Cox, Major Professor 
 
 
Date of Defense: May 6, 2016  
 
The dissertation of Seyed Ahmad Mirtaheri is approved. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
       Dean John Stack 
       Green School of International and Public Affairs 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Andrés G. Gil 
Vice President for Research and Economic Development  
and Dean of the University Graduate School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Florida International University, 2016 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2016 by Seyed Ahmad Mirtaheri 
All rights reserved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
To Ronald W. Cox 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
TRANSNATIONAL CAPITALISM AND THE MIDDLE EAST: UNDERSTANDING 
THE TRANSNATIONAL ELITES OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL 
by 
Seyed Ahmad Mirtaheri  
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ronald W. Cox, Major Professor 
In this dissertation, I argue that    transnational elites within the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) have been integrated within a Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) 
economically, militarily and politically through relationships that transcend the boundaries 
of the nation-state.  These relationships exist within the context of a global capitalist 
structure of accumulation that is dependent on the maintenance of a repressive state 
apparatus in the GCC. There have been few attempts to analyze the relationships that 
Middle Eastern political and economic elites have developed with global elite networks.  
This work fills an important gap in the scholarly literature by linking the political and 
economic power of the GCC elites to transnational capitalist class actors in the U.S. and 
Western Europe. 
The TCC is comprised of actors who derive their wealth and power from ownership 
of production or financial activities on a global scale. The embeddedness of GCC elites 
within the TCC came with the de-centralization of capital accumulation occurring from the 
1970s through the present that has linked regional and local capitalists to the ownership 
activities of transnational capitalist firms. The GCC is an important case study for analyzing 
vi 
 
the structure and consequences the current phase of globalization due to its relative 
importance in providing resources and financing for transnational globalization. Therefore 
this project contributes to our assessment of the role played by transnational elites in the 
GCC and the regional and global consequences of their power struggles based in part on a 
theoretical framework derived from Neo-Gramscianism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER                                            PAGE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1 
Introduction .....................................................................................................................1 
Transnational Elite ..........................................................................................................2 
Overview .........................................................................................................................3 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ..............................................................4 
Methodology ...................................................................................................................9 
Data and Sources ...........................................................................................................13 
Case Study .....................................................................................................................13 
Is GCC an Indigenous Institution? ................................................................................20 
The Structure of the Dissertation ..................................................................................24 
References .....................................................................................................................26 
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A TRANSNATIONAL ELITE IN THE GCC ....29 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................29 
The Historical Evolution ...............................................................................................30 
The Emergence of a GCC Transnational Elite ..............................................................35 
GCC Transnational Space .............................................................................................42 
Sovereign Wealth Funds ...............................................................................................43 
GCC Segmented Education System ..............................................................................46 
Labor Market .................................................................................................................55 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................59 
Appendix I .....................................................................................................................63 
References .....................................................................................................................69 
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE GCC                    
TRANSNATIONAL ELITES AND THE TCC CONNECTIONS .................................72 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................72 
Nationalization of Oil and the Emergence of GCC Transnational Elites .....................74 
Forces of Production .....................................................................................................83 
Transnationalization of GCC States ..............................................................................86 
The Financial Power of the GCC Elites ........................................................................98 
The Historical Background of GCC Financialization ...................................................99 
The Essence of the GCC’s Financial Power ...............................................................100 
Small Financial Sector, But Important ........................................................................106 
The GCC’s Role in Global Financial Institutions .......................................................111 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................118 
Appendix II .................................................................................................................121 
References ...................................................................................................................136 
 
viii 
 
IV. MILITARIZATION OF GCC TRANSNATIONAL SPACE:     
CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS ..............................................................139 
Introduction .................................................................................................................139 
The Pattern of GCC Military Expenditure ..................................................................142 
Militarization, Oil, and the Transformation of Elite Network in GCC .......................147 
Militarization and Conflicts among Classes in the Persian Gulf ................................150 
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: US Military Arms Sales, and GCC State    
Repression ...................................................................................................................152 
GCC State Repression and Working Class .................................................................160 
Capital Accumulation via Arms Deals ........................................................................163 
Military and Security Power as Tools of Maintaining the Hierarchy of Power in the 
Arab World .................................................................................................................165 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................172 
References ...................................................................................................................175 
V. CONCLUSION  ..........................................................................................................178 
 References ..................................................................................................................190 
 VITA ..........................................................................................................................192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE                                                                                  PAGE 
 
1. Freedom Status of GCC states .......................................................................................16 
2.  Level of Stability in GCC states  ..................................................................................17 
3. The Level of Stability in the rest of Middle Eastern States  ..........................................18 
4. The GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)   ................................................................44 
5. The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the GCC ...48 
6. Dubai Schools with Western Curricula   ........................................................................49 
7. Net Migration to the GCC Countries .............................................................................56 
8. Net Migration to the GCC Countries .............................................................................75 
9. International Oil Corporations (IOCs) in GCC ..............................................................81 
10. Important GCC Conglomerates and their Activities  ...................................................89 
11. GCC Total Oil Supply (Thousand Barrels Per Day) .................................................104 
12. Domestic credit provided by financial sectors (% of GDP) ......................................107 
13. GCC-SWF Capital Infusions into Financial Institutions ...........................................109 
14. US Oil Consumption  .................................................................................................149 
15. Arab Share of Foreign Population in GCC ................................................................161 
16. Freedom Status in Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia  .......................................................171 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
FIGURE                                                        PAGE 
 
1. Casual Interacting Variables ..........................................................................................12 
2. Trend Line of Net Migration in the GCC Countries   ....................................................57 
3. Labor Force by Sector and Origin, 1969-2009 ..............................................................58 
4. The Economic and Family Ties Between Merchant Families and Royal Families in 
GCC  ..................................................................................................................................94 
 
5. The Geographical Networks of GCC Conglomerates ...................................................97 
6. The Chinn-Ito Index for Financial Openness for GCC and World ..............................117 
7. Democracy Index .........................................................................................................117 
8. Military Deals by Persian Gulf States and The Sellers ................................................146 
9. GCC Transnationalization ...........................................................................................184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF CHARTS 
 
CHART                                               PAGE 
 
1. Percentage of Foreign Workers of Total Population in GCC in 2011 ...........................55 
2. Gulf states are increasingly—and almost completely—dependent on oil revenues for 
their national budgets .........................................................................................................84 
 
3. Amount of Contributions in NAB by Country  ...........................................................114 
4. Top Military Spenders in the World ............................................................................143 
5. US Imports of Crude Oil  .............................................................................................149 
6. Terror Attack, Annual Count by Region  .....................................................................188 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
GAB                                                                               General Arrangements to Borrow  
GCC                                                                                           Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP                                                                                             Gross Domestic Product  
HRW                                                                                                  Human Rights Watch  
IAEA                                                                         International Atomic Energy Agency  
ICC                                                                          International Chamber of Commerce 
ICTs                                                           Information and Communications Technologies 
IFC                                                                              International Finance Corporation  
ILO                                                                                International Labor Organization 
IMF                                                                                      International Monetary Fund  
IOC                                                                                      International Oil Corporation 
IOM                                                                    International Organization on Migration  
IOS                                                            International Organization of Standardization 
IWG                                                                                      International Working Group 
MEFTA                                                          Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative  
MENA                                                                                    Middle East and North Africa 
MNC                                                                                          Multinational Corporation  
NAB                                                                                    New Arrangements to Borrow  
NATO                                                                            North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NOC                                                                                            National Oil Corporation  
OPEC                                                  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries  
xiii 
 
SWF                                                                                               Sovereign Wealth Fund 
TCC                                                                                     Transnational Capitalist Class 
TCP                                                                                 Technical Cooperation Program  
TNC                                                                                          Transnational Corporation  
TNP                                                                                               Transnational Practices  
TNS                                                                                                      Transnational State 
WCO                                                                                     World Customs Organization  
WML                                                                                                World Muslim League  
WTO                                                                                          World Trade Organization  
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Much of the literature on the Middle East focuses on either institutional 
arrangements or culture.  There have been few attempts to analyze the relationships that 
Middle Eastern political and economic elites have developed with global elite networks.  
This work represents a significant departure from contemporary scholarship by analyzing 
the extent to which Middle Eastern elites within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are 
linked to the transnational capitalist class (TCC) in the rest of the world economy.  The 
TCC is composed of actors who derive their wealth and power from ownership of 
production or financial activities on a global scale.  Indeed, the argument advanced here is 
that Middle Eastern elites have been integrated within a global transnational class that has 
disproportionate power and influence within the world system.  Therefore, I will analyze 
the intersection between the transnational elites within the GCC and the TCC within a 
global social structure of accumulation. I will also show how this global structure of 
accumulation is tied to the maintenance of a repressive state apparatus in the GCC.  
One can analyze the influence of the TCC on the GCC in a deterministic way.  This 
analysis is crucial when studying the GCC not only as a model of how the TCC is 
embedded in this sub-region, but also as a methodological foundation that can provide a 
better understanding of possible impact of the GCC on global capitalism.  The following 
sections propose a systematic framework of the linkage between GCC-based elites and the 
TCC.  This study is the first of its kind in the literature on the Middle East, and it is 
especially relevant because GCC-based elites continually reflect the TCCs’ goals and 
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agendas, which are mainly those of the United States and United Kingdom.  Before 
explicating the propositions being tested in this dissertation, it is necessary to explain the 
definitions and notions pertaining to transnational elites and the TCC.   
Transnational Elites  
The recent trend in global capitalism may be understood as the integration of 
various capitalist classes into a global class – a transnational capitalist class (TCC).  This 
integration is taking place simultaneously with a fast-paced global integration in the 
financial and trade sectors that is partly facilitated by advances in information technologies.  
In his book, Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and Globalization 
William Robinson explains the significant role played by transnational and transnationally-
oriented elites, and he has coined the term transnational capitalist class to refer to those 
elites.   Robinson contends:  
“As the agent of global economy, transnational capital has become the hegemonic 
fraction of capital on a world scale. Here fraction denotes segments within classes 
determined by their relation to social production and the class as a whole. The 
new transnational bourgeoisie or capitalist class is that segment of the world 
bourgeoisie that represents transnational capital. . . .This class is transnational 
because it is tied to globalized circuits of productions, marketing, and finances 
unbound from particular national territories and identities, and because its 
interests lie in global over local or national accumulation.”  (Robinson, 2003, P. 
39).  
In this dissertation, the notions of transnational capitalist elites and Robinson’s 
TCC will serve as foundational concepts.  This dissertation will (1) synthesize the existing 
3 
 
definitions of the notion of a transnational class of elites in the literature, (2) offer its own 
account of what constitutes the current transnational capitalist elites, and (3) define 
boundaries of the TCC and the nature of its activities.   
The transnational elites of the Middle East are connected to TCC networks.  Some 
elites are part of the TCC class due to their ownership or accumulation activities; others 
belong to a political class of elites due to their functions within a repressive apparatus of 
the state.  These political elites might not own capital, but they are important for 
maintaining stability in their own domestic realm, which also helps global capitalists 
accumulate profits.  This study will attempt to show how Middle Eastern transnational 
elites are integral to the project of a transnational capitalist class that increasingly relies on 
the various repressive state apparatus within in the Persian Gulf region.   At the same time 
the transnational elites of the GCC are themselves represented as significant actors within 
the larger transnational capitalist class, profiting from this relationship through their 
participation in mutual profit-making ventures and through their membership in global 
transnational institutions.  
Overview  
The ruling class and elites of the GCC comprise important sectors of the TCC.  This 
dissertation, therefore, begins with an attempt to define and analyze what and who 
constitutes the transnational elites in the GCC, partly based on some general characteristics 
of this class as identified in the literature and synthesized in this dissertation.  Next, the 
dissertation explores the implications of the TCC, especially pertaining to the interactions 
between this class and the ruling class in Persian Gulf Arab states.  To the extent that the 
GCC’s economy and financial resources are important for Western economies, a better 
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understanding of this region’s transnational elites could lead to a better understanding of 
some of the political strategies and processes implemented in Western powers’ foreign 
policies.  As mentioned before, studying the GCC’s transnational elites sheds valuable light 
on some of the understudied aspects of today’s global economy.  
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation is primarily based on historical structuralism.  Arguably, the 
transnational elites in the GCC are connected to the TCC due to their position within a 
global structure of accumulation. Such a position is analyzed in terms of the 
financialization and internationalization of GCC capital.  Certain approaches that have 
emerged based on historical structuralism could help in terms of tracing the features and 
functions of such interconnectedness.  In the following sections, I will address those core 
insights that are useful for this research project.  In each chapter I will further elaborate by 
linking those insights to other literatures that are related to the specific argument of the 
chapter; for instance, the literature on militarization in Chapter 4.  Generally, the analysis 
in this dissertation primarily employs David Harvey’s approach to studying historical 
structuralism, in conjunction with Robert Cox’s neo-Gramscian theory of politics.  
Harvey’s approach may be understood as an example of what is called, somewhat broadly, 
neo-Marxian theories and/or neo-Marxism. Neo-Marxism, according to Cox, emphasizes 
the relationship between three factors: “social forces,” “forms of state,” and the “world 
order.”  In particular, the world order refers to the “current organization of International 
Relations,” which includes the relationship among states, international law, and 
international institutions.  More specifically, the contemporary world order has been 
organized with the establishment of a series of influential institutions including the United 
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Nations (UN), as well as those institutions that emerged under the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank of 
International Settlements.   This dissertation will also use the concept of “forms of state” 
to analyze the internationalization of GCC states based on class-based analysis.  “Forms of 
state” refers to the evolution of states through their relationship with various social forces 
released or suppressed within a capitalist system.  In this context, neo-liberalization (as a 
structure that has released certain forces in the international system) entails “challenging 
traditional forms of state sovereignty” (Harvey, 2005, P.3).  Finally, in terms of the social 
forces present in the process of capitalist production, Harvey notes that “Neoliberal 
rhetoric, with its foundational emphasis upon individual freedoms, has the power to split 
off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic 
consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice through the conquest 
of state power” (Harvey, 2005, P. 41).  All these key concepts will be employed in this 
dissertation research to better understand the role of regional transnational elites in the 
GCC.  
In terms of the financial aspect of current capitalism, this research recognizes that 
globalization, itself, has been experiencing notable transformations. One significant 
differentiating factor among the various stages of globalization has been the different 
patterns (as well as levels) of functional integration in the global economy that are 
promoted by the by the process of transnationalization.  Evidently, the pattern of functional 
integration at each time is also influenced by the existing and dominant mode of production 
at that time. The economic integration during colonialism had different characteristics from 
the globalization that emerged after the Second World War. The same may be said about 
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the Bretton Woods system and the post-Bretton Woods system within the post-War 
context.  Robert Wade has identified three important implications of the Bretton Woods 
system related to the restrictions on capital flows and the fixed exchange rate, which were 
the cornerstones of the system.  The first implication was in the realm of international trade; 
namely “[the] backing of the main international currencies by gold tended to check 
persistent trade imbalances”. Second, the Bretton Woods system was a system in which 
“private international capital flows were small,” by default and by design.  The third 
implication was that main economic parameters in the system proved to be steady (Wade, 
2006, P. 116).  
None of these three elements may be found on the same level in the post-Bretton 
Woods system; and the difference may, in important parts, be explained by various 
structures of global functional and financial integration – a structure that was shaped, inter 
alia, by collective decisions of powerful economic classes in order to "generate conditions 
more favorable to the transnational elite agenda" (Robinson, 2005, P. 13).    
The collapse of the Breton Woods system resulted in an ever-increasing amount of 
international private capital. This, in turn, has made the financial sector a significant sector 
(if not the most significant sector) in the global economy.  Accordingly, the power struggles 
of the TCC within this sector may be viewed as a new and powerful politico-economic 
phenomenon that had not existed in the earlier patterns of globalization.  Thus, in order to 
understand the notion of transnational elites and their impact on the global economy, it is 
necessary to analyze the dominant economic paradigm in terms of production, financial 
integration and trade.  In order to explore this paradigm, which constitutes the foundation 
for actions of the transnational capitalist class, this study uses two insightful analyses by 
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Robinson (on the notion of “transnational elites”) and by Cox (on the current phenomenon 
of “financialization of production”). 
According to Robinson, we have been witnessing the transformation of the role 
played by elites within the new pattern of the global economy.  While the previous pattern 
of the global economy was based on the notion of accumulation (in a nationally-oriented 
sense of the term), the new pattern of the global economy is moving towards a 
transnationally-oriented arrangement in which transnational elites play a key role.  The 
nationally-oriented context of elites’ activities often followed “policies that would protect 
local agents from global competition” (Robinson, 2010, P.1). In contrast, the new 
generation of transnational elites’ activities is based on the integration of “local circuits 
into new transnational circuits of accumulation” (Robinson, 2010, P. 1).  Partly based on 
what Robinson has identified as the key changes within the capitalist class structure, this 
dissertation aims to offer a new account of the transnational elites of the GCC that 
strategically, organizationally, and financially are more internationally-oriented than 
locally-oriented.  My theoretical framework, therefore, shares much with Robinson’s 
understanding of the evolution of transnational elites.  I borrow less from those authors 
who are sometimes called skeptical internationalists or from those who view globalization 
as a more or less consistent phenomenon over a long history.  I agree with Robinson, who 
sees:  
“. . . globalization as a qualitatively new epoch in the ongoing evolution of world 
capitalism, characterized above all by the rise of truly transnational capital and 
the integration (or re-articulation) of most countries in the world into a new global 
production and financial system”. (Robinson, 2010, P. 2) 
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The liberalization of financial markets that took place in the post-Bretton Woods 
era has been an important force in what is sometimes called an unfettered globalization. 
The qualitatively different structure of today’s financial markets is indeed a hallmark of 
post-Cold War globalization. The far-reaching consequences of these new markets, which 
will impact generations to come, cannot be overstated. As Cox argues, we have been 
witnessing the spectacle of financialization of production (mis)represented as a new mode 
of production.  Yet, the new mode of production reveals similar crises as the former ones.  
According to Cox, the financialization of production refers to:  
“[T]he extent to which non-financial transnational corporations have become 
more dependent on an accumulation of financial assets, and on relationships to 
institutional financial investors, to maintain their dominant position within the 
contemporary global production system. . . .[T]his process started aggressively in 
the U.S. but has been adopted and expanded as a model for corporate behavior 
elsewhere. As a result, today’s corporate profits are much more firmly tied to the 
financial sector.” (Cox, 2012, pp. 5, 188)  
Following a more in-depth analysis of the above theoretical frameworks, this 
dissertation aims to trace and analyze the financial connections between the Persian Gulf 
Arab states, on the one hand, and Western banking systems, on the other.  This research 
intends to offer an example of how to apply the above theoretical framework to the facts 
of a real case study, with the hope that these transnational elites and their internal and 
external financial relations are better understood.   
Thus, this research will explore evidence of an interrelationship and mutual 
dependence between GCC elites and a transnational capitalist class.  Such a crucial link 
9 
 
between GCC-based elites and TCC can be demonstrated by examining their joint 
economic and political ventures on a global scale.  The methodology that I use provides 
empirical support for clarifying such mutual dependency.   
Methodology  
In order to understand the causal relationship between the TCC and GCC-based 
elites as well as the contribution of the TCC in this significant node of the global economy, 
this inquiry applies the process tracing and historical explanation methods.   This 
methodology links the history of the formation and expansion of the GCC to changes 
within global capitalism that coincide with a growth of a transnational capitalist class.  
Through a detailed empirical analysis, this study exams the extent to which the interests of 
the political and economic elites within the GCC intersect with the interests of the 
transnational capitalist class.  In order to provide support for this assertion, it is necessary 
to find evidence that the transnational elites within the GCC are interconnected with the 
profit-making activities of the TCC, and that the TCC depends on the GCC for a significant 
flow of financial and/or productive profits and investment activities.  It may well be the 
case that the GCC is more responsive to particular sectors of transnational capital and less 
responsive to others.  If that is the case, or if the GCC is at times completely disconnected  
from  the  interests  of  the  TCC,  that  should  also  be  revealed  in  this historical narrative.  
In order to investigate the extent of the relationship between the GCC and the TCC, this 
study will use the process-tracing method as unearthed by Alexander George and Timothy 
Mckeown (1985).  Briefly, the method investigates the causal relationships that are 
contextualized within case analysis.  With process-tracing and historical explanations, the 
proposition is often tested based on "relevant, verifiable casual stories resting in differing 
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chains of cause-effect relations whose efficiency can be demonstrated independently of 
those stories" (Tilly, 1997, P.48).  Accordingly, as David Laitin points out, the process-
tracing method attempts to combine statistical explanations and historical narratives.  In 
other words, historical narratives are to "address the questions of process," while the 
statistical part "addresses questions of propensities" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 205). 
This method will provide a strong analysis for the propositions presented for two 
primary reasons. First, the process-tracing method is useful for analyzing “macro- 
historical economic phenomena.”  In this dissertation, the case study (GCC) is being 
analyzed in terms of certain domestic, regional, and international historical processes.  
Second, as it is addressed in the case-study section, the large body of the literature on GCC 
suffers from a lack of careful attention to the significant relationship between TCC and 
GCC-based elites, who indeed determine important social and political situations.  I will 
use some current scholarly work on Middle Eastern studies, but by and large, this 
dissertation takes a different approach in analyzing its case study.  According to Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennett; "process tracing is particularly useful for obtaining an 
explanation for deviant cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained 
adequately by existing theories" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 215). 
This method offers a valuable approach for tracing the consistency of the influence 
of the transnational capitalist class within different economic modes of the global economy. 
In particular, as it is described above, the struggle and agenda of transnational elites has 
been evolving.  In this sub-region, the evolution of concerns started in a strategic location 
and moved toward assuring policies to provide uninterrupted access to oil.  It still continues 
with new interests in the financial activities that revolve around secure cycles of 
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petrodollars.  In fact, such evolution is based on the evolution of the transnational capitalist 
class' struggles on the global level.  Accordingly, such historical phenomena could be 
explained by historicism and historical explanations.  However, in order to fully understand 
the dynamic of such contexts, I aim to explore key causal relationships between different 
actors/factors that are contextualized in the history of the political economy of GCC (for 
instance using certain socioeconomic parameters and the evolution of trade agreements).  
To do so, the process-tracing method is required along with historical explanations.  To 
avoid ambiguity, throughout the following section I will discuss the process-tracing 
method as it will be applied in this dissertation. 
According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett there are a variety of process-
tracing methods. One way to use process tracing is in an "atheoretical" manner or using it 
as a tactic to provide a chronic account for a "detailed narrative."  However, the possible 
concluding remarks could provide promising grounds for an emerging theory or the 
development of a theory.  The other way to use the method is to utilize "analytical causal 
explanations" within a theoretical framework. In this way, a theoretical framework is the 
starting point of research inquiry.  As another use of process-tracing method, some 
researches apply the method for a more general explanation to move up the "ladder of 
abstraction" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 210-211). 
This dissertation is theory-oriented and does not use narratives as a starting point.  
Peter Hall pays attention to the significance of "theory-oriented process-tracing."  Hall's 
proposition of process-tracing emphasizes providing a more accurate explanation when it 
is testing theories.  In other words, the process-tracing method could provide a framework 
in which theories could fit into the world where we have a variety of interactions and 
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effects.  If the analyses show inconsistencies in the theoretical framework, the theoretical 
framework will be modified or/and developed.   As a result, I do not intend to test a theory.  
Rather, I attempt to develop an approach. 
The process-tracing method tries to "identify the intervening causal process - the 
causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and 
the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett, 2005, P. 206).  In order to 
analyze the economic behavior and influence of the TCC in the GCC states as well as the 
position of this sub-region and its elites in the global economy, this dissertation investigates 
such contexts through the interaction between sets of variables that are shown in figure 1.     
 
Figure1: Casual Interacting Variables 
 
By applying the above model in this dissertation, I intend to elucidate the mutual 
dependency between GCC-based elites and the TCC.  This dependency has been largely 
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ignored by scholars who are working on the Middle East.  Accordingly, the far-reaching 
consequence of transnational elites in the GCC, and sequentially the implications of the 
current characteristics of the GCC for the global economy, are investigated through the 
interactions between the  above   variables,   including   the   pattern   of   globalization 
(mainly,  financialization  of production), agents of globalization (both state and non-state 
actors), GCC, U.S. and U.K-based transnational elites (who played an important historical 
role in the GCC and are significant part of the TCC), and domestic factors in GCC states 
(such as labor politics and trade strategies of each state), as well as domestic historical facts 
in the United States and United Kingdom (mainly those that are related to policies 
regarding petrodollars).  The above model will be fully clarified in the last chapter. 
Data and Sources 
In order to explicate the facts and process systematically, this dissertation will use 
certain sources and data for its statistical procedures. Foremost, it uses governmental 
resources such as United States Trade Representative (USTR) archives, mainly for 
analyzing trade agreements. On the other hand, this study will use international 
organizations' resources such as those that are provided by IMF, WTO, and World Bank. 
The other resources are domestic resources of GCC countries, such as "Gulf Center of 
Development Policies."  Finally, this study may use some data resources that are available 
in articles and books. 
Case Study 
This dissertation focuses on the GCC in order to study the phenomenon of 
transnational elites because the Persian Gulf sub-region appears to be among the most 
important sub-regions in terms of the world’s economy, finance, geopolitics and energy. 
14 
 
As it will be further discussed, the sub-region poses some challenges to certain mainstream 
understandings of Middle Eastern studies. Therefore, it is important to clarify the analytical 
distinction between liberalism and historical-structuralism. 
In short, advocates of globalization argue that free trade has a positive correlation 
with national and regional development and growth.  In the same vein, Bhagwati adds that 
free trade, which leads to the integration of the participating countries into the global 
economy, provides more domestic freedom as well.  Bhagwati’s pro-globalization 
approach follows closely the classical liberal faith in the efficiency of the market system.  
He writes: “[i]t is precisely the growing awareness that globalization creates a web of 
relationships that introduce such complexity, and hence prudence and pause in the policy 
choices of nation-states that has led to the charges that globalization and democracy are at 
odds” (Bhagwati, 2007, P. 8).   
Liberals argue that the deepening integration of states within global capitalism has 
the potential to make these states and societies more free.  This school of thought also 
assumes that the capitalist marketplace is organized and developed through the individual 
decisions of market players, instead of being constructed politically and economically by 
powerful class forces that rely on both economic consolidation and political coercion to 
secure their power.   Therefore, the key argument of liberals is that the problem with the 
Middle Eastern states is they are not fully integrated into the capitalist world system, but, 
instead, are governed too much by political authorities and not enough by the market.  
However, the liberal scholars could not provide an accurate explanation of the 
maintenance of this status quo in the GCC. In other words, the market economy has been 
dramatically developing and expanding in these states while they have not experienced any 
15 
 
significant changes in term of authoritarian trends of their states.  More importantly, and 
as this study will argue, such maintenance is highly protected by liberal democracies in the 
West.  In fact, the most significant factor, as historical structuralism addresses, is the role 
played by influential classes. In other words, the main issue is that the protection of the 
interest of the TCC is dependent on GCC-based elites and authoritarian development in 
this sub-region. 
Accordingly, in contrast to liberal claims, in the GCC little evidence seems to exist 
showing that a greater level of economic integration has led to greater domestic freedom.  
In other words, political coercion in the Middle East is central to global capitalist profits 
and the social structure of accumulation in this phase of global capitalism in particular.  
Arguably, the TCC has grown more dependent on authoritarian institutions in the Middle 
East over time.  Thus, economic liberalization does not equate to political liberalization but 
instead sometimes requires it’s opposite (i.e. authoritarian structures that provide 
maximum space for transnational class interests to profit). Accordingly, greater integration 
of the Persian Gulf Arab states into the global economy and the removal of trade barriers 
have solidified the position of the regional transnational elites, which in turn has stabilized 
authoritarian regimes in the sub-region. 
The issue of stability of the sub-region’s monarchies deserves closer attention. As 
mentioned before, global capital has increasingly viewed the maintenance of the status quo 
in the Persian Gulf sub-region as a primary concern.  In the words of Adam Hanieh, a key 
strategy of global capital has been “prioritizing the status quo and seeking to block any 
possibility of regime change” (Hanieh, 2011, P. 176).  This is not surprising given the 
conventionally accepted notion that capital often seeks security, without much concern 
16 
 
about what the source of that security may be.  The more-than-accidental relationship 
between the authoritarian status quo in the Persian Gulf sub-region and the highly 
globalized economic systems of this sub-region is a serious challenge to the neo-liberal 
account of global dynamics.  Table 1 below helps to illustrate the seemingly paradoxical 
situation in the Persian Gulf sub-region, if one is to accept the neo- liberal perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Economic 
Freedom 
Index 
 
 
 
Ranking 
 
 
 
PR 
 
 
 
CL 
 
 
 
Status 
 
Freedom 
Rating 
Oman 68.1 45 6 5 NF 5.5 
Qatar 71.3 27 6 5 NF 5.5 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 
60.6 
 
82 
 
7 
 
7 
 
NF 
 
7 
Kuwait 63.1 66 5 5 PF 5 
UAE 71.1 28 6 6 NF 6 
Bahrain 75.5 12 6 6 NF 6 
GCC 68.28     5.8 
 
Table 1: Freedom Status of GCC states 
(PR: Political Right, CL: Civil Liberty, NF: Not Free, PF: Partly FREE) Source: Freedom 
House and the Heritage Foundation, 2013 
 
 
In the Freedom House categorization, when a freedom rating for a country is 
between 5.5 to 7.0, the country is considered as “Not Free.”  According to Table 1, the 
Persian Gulf Arab states are among the top 24 percent of “Not Free” countries.  On the 
other hand, with the average Economic Freedom Index of 68.28, these countries are among 
the top 24 percent of the world’s free economies. It may be added that Polity IV Project 
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also categorizes the sub-region's six monarchies as autocracies (rather than constitutional 
monarchies). 
As for the issue of stability, Table 2 provides the Failed State Index for all the 
countries within the GCC.  The Failed State Index is often relied on as a relatively accurate 
indicator of the level of stability in various countries.  In 2012, this Index was measured 
for 178 countries “based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face” (The Fund 
for Peace, 2012, P. 3). 
 
 
Country 
Failed State 
Index 
 
Ranking 
 
Oman 
 
51.7 
 
137 
 
Qatar 
 
48 
 
142 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
73.4 
 
100 
 
Kuwait 
 
58.8 
 
128 
 
UAE 
 
48.9 
 
140 
 
Bahrain 
 
62.2 
 
125 
 
GCC 
 
57.16  
 
Table 2: Level of Stability in GCC states 
Source: www.failedstatesindex.org, 2012 
 
According to Table 2, the Persian Gulf Arab states are among the top 27 percent of 
the most stable countries in the world (where the lower rank means more stability).  The 
high level of stability holds true today, even despite the recent “Arab spring,” which has 
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shaken the sociopolitical structure in the rest of the Arab world.  To better grasp the 
significance of stability within the GCC, it is useful to consider the immediate neighbors 
of the GCC members and how they score when it comes to stability.   Table 3 provides the 
figures based on the same Failed State Index.  According to these numbers, the rest of the 
Middle East is among the 19 percent most unstable countries in the world. 
 
 
 
Table 3: The Level of Stability in the rest of Middle Eastern States 
Source: www.failedstatesindex.org, 2012 
 
Arguably, one of the outstanding questions concerning the nature of these 
authoritarian regimes is how they have managed to juxtapose a traditional ruling system 
with certain forces of modernization that are often considered to be causes of instability in 
non-democratic regimes. Many authors and commentators have correctly paid attention to 
 
Country 
Failed State 
Index 
 
Ranking 
Egypt 90.4 31 
Iran 89.6 34 
Cyprus 66.8 115 
Iraq 104.3 9 
Israel/West Bank 82.2 61 
Jordan 74.8 90 
Lebanon 85.8 45 
Syria 94.5 23 
Turkey 76.6 85 
Yemen 104.8 8 
Average 89.98  
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the domestic factors leading to the considerable level of stability in these six countries. Yet, 
the picture remains incomplete unless one takes into account the international factors, 
which are often channeled through the transnational elites. 
Russell Lucas observes that; “[a]mong Middle Eastern monarchies, regime-led 
state formation and nation building have produced a flexible form of rule that has survived 
the challenges of rapid development and international conflicts” (Lucas, 2004, P. 103). On 
the other hand, some scholars have pointed to the nature and composition of oppositions in 
these monarchies in order to explain their stability.  For instance Gurdun Kr¨amer argues 
that in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco, the oppositions have had goals other than the 
overthrowing of the system – or so-called regime change.  As mentioned before, however, 
domestic political structures are not the only factors at play here.  A key argument of the 
dissertation is that domestic politics of the GCC countries should not be viewed as 
deterministic factors – as it may be suggested in Innenpolitik theories. In other words, the 
domestic level of analysis falls short of offering a robust analysis of this sub-region. 
It may also be noted that, in the GCC monarchies, domestic politics have often been 
shaped in important and enduring ways by external factors. These factors have led to the 
creation of the current Social Structure of Accumulation (SSA).  Thus, the so-called 
domestic situation is deeply colored by the larger more global context.  This domestic-
international dynamic for the GCC countries goes back decades, and arguably in the case 
of a number of GCC members, to the time they became independent states.  In 1964, for 
instance, William Luce pointed out that the Persian Gulf “was inherently a political vacuum 
that must be filled by British, and perhaps U.S., power in order to remain stable” (Fain, 
2008, P. 152). 
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This is echoed by F.  Gregory  Gause,  who  argues  that  “the  success  and  failure  
of monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula in the twentieth century had more to do with the 
position of Arabian countries in the regional security picture and the international political 
economy than with their particular domestic characteristics” (Lucas, 2004, P. 110). This 
dissertation agrees with these propositions, and builds its analysis, first and foremost, based 
on the position of these six countries in the international political economy order based on 
the mutual dependency of  GCC-based elites and the transnational capitalist class. Among 
many factors that may be used for this study in international political economy, this 
dissertation focuses on the TCC in the GCC for two reasons. First, the role of TCC in 
general and the GCC transnational elites in particular is relatively understudied in the field 
of IPE.  Second,  for  the  reasons  that  will  be  further elaborated in the course of this 
study, the transnational elites of the Middle East play a disproportionally more important 
role in shaping regional and domestic politics in their countries compared to many other 
regions of the world. 
Is GCC an Indigenous Institution? 
The [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council is not an indigenous institution, resulting 
from the organic forces at works in the sub-region.  One way to analyze the creation of and 
the ensuing dynamics within the GCC is to view it as a regional bloc.  In fact, the GCC is 
sometimes described as a trading bloc.  Some scholarly works emphasize the 
domestic/indigenous contexts in the creation of regional blocs. However, in the case of the 
GCC, the domestic dynamics have not been as significant as they may be in other regional 
integration.  In other words, the creation of the GCC is more rooted in the position of this 
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sub-region within the global order of capital rather than the domestic arrangement of scale 
economies and production-sharing networks. 
In  fact,  it  is  important  to  explore  the  intersection  of  domestic  class  actors  
and transnational class actors in the creation and expansion of the GCC.  For instance, GCC 
is a response to the interests pursued by regional class actors, but those actors are 
increasingly integrated into global capitalist relationships. This would allow an 
investigation from a fresh angle of an international body that, in the words of Hanieh, has 
a position of “centrality to the hierarchies of the world market” and manifests par 
excellence the “two immanent tendencies of capitalism – the internationalization and 
financialization of capital” (Hanieh, 2011, P.177). Accordingly this internationalization 
and financialization is highly promoted and protected by the institutional, political, and 
economic connections between transnational elites of the Middle East and the TCC.  The 
regional integration of the GCC states and the international integration of the GCC are part 
of the internationalization of GCC capital. 
The internationalization of capital in the GCC is rooted in the process of how the 
transnational elites of GCC constitute both an extension of a regional class grouping and a 
transnational class faction.  Accordingly, one method to examine the GCC’s transnational 
elites (who significantly but not completely overlap with the sub-region’s ruling classes) 
is to trace the institutional facts. For instance, the active role of these authoritarian states in 
several international institutions could offer a clue to the ties between the GCC’s 
transnational elites, on the one hand, and the global TCC, on the other.  In terms of 
international trade, all the GCC members are the members of the World Trade Organization 
(with Qatar being the host for the current Doha Round of negotiations) as well as some 
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other free trade organizations and agreements.  For instance, Saudi Arabia is also a member 
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Organization of 
Standardization (IOS), and World Customs Organization (WCO). On the other hand, the 
conclusion of a “Framework Agreement for Trade, Economic, and Technical 
Cooperation,” along with bilateral agreements between the Persian Gulf Arab states and 
the United States, indicate a high level of interconnectedness between these economies and 
U.S.-based transnational elites. Moreover, the WTO membership of these countries has 
facilitated a movement towards the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA). 
In terms of military institutions, four members of the Gulf Cooperation Council - 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates - are participants in NATO’s 
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.  This military relationship in particular introduces a new 
strategic linkage between the GCC’s transnational elites and the global capital, a linkage 
that goes well beyond pure business interests. In his book, Arab Spring, Libyan Winter, 
Vijay Parshad discusses this military relationship, and he coins the term the “Arab NATO” 
(Prashad, 2012, P. 181).  Evidence of this qualitatively different angle of collaboration may 
be found in the extensive U.S. military presence in Qatar and in the words of Secretary 
Chuck Hegel, who recently promised in Bahrain that  the  Pentagon “will  better  integrate  
with  GCC  members  to  enhance  missile  defense capabilities in the region” (Defense 
News, 2013). 
However, it is important to remember that what is at stake here is not only the 
military or security aspects of the Arab NATO, but the economic relationship facilitated, 
and protected, under the umbrella of this military connection.  Such economic relationship 
is determined by the crucial position of GCC-based transnational elites in regards to the 
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transnational capitalist class. In fact, one key element of this dissertation study is to further 
investigate the economic rationale of selling very expensive military equipment on a large 
scale to the GCC states from the perspective of the region’s transnational elites, as well as 
that of the global capital. The military purchases, second only to oil and energy 
transactions, appear to be a key component of the significant business activities between 
the GCC capitalist class on the one hand, and the global TCC on the other.  According to 
Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, U.S. military intervention is a significant angle of 
American “grand strategy.”  This military intervention could be indirectly projected, such 
as in the case of the GCC militarization.  In fact, the United States’ role as a hegemon 
requires secure and reliable access to strategic resources, especially to oil resources.  As 
will be shown in this dissertation, petrodollars play an important role as the new strategic 
resource.  In fact, GCC markets operate as authoritarian vehicles for global market 
accumulation, not the same thing as "liberal  markets,"  but  useful  to  liberal  markets  and  
globalization  due  to  their  authoritarian policing of market structures. 
According to Secretary Hegel, the United States has provided its “most advanced 
fighter aircraft throughout the region” (Defense News, 2013).  In other words, some of the 
most advanced military technologies in the world have been given to these six countries.  
Yet these military transactions have long-term non-military aspects as well.  In particular, 
due to the weakness of such non-military/non-authoritarian forms of power in the Persian 
Gulf Arab states as education and national cohesion, the military ties render the GCC 
countries dependent on continuous external and technical assistance by Western powers.  
This dynamic has furthered the interdependence between the ruling elites in the GCC and 
the United States. 
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In summary, while this dissertation is clear that scholars should not neglect 
domestic factors within Persian Gulf Arab states, it focuses on non-domestic elements as 
the more influential, and yet under-studied, aspects of the regional politics in this part of 
the world. Furthermore, this dissertation contends that studying the sub-region’s 
transnational elites provides a balanced platform to analyze the international factors that 
influence the behavior and composition of the TCC as well. 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will include five chapters.  This introductory chapter introduces 
the theoretical framework as well as the central notions and propositions of the study. The 
second chapter discusses the concept of GCC transnational elite within the new phase of 
globalization in order to provide the groundwork for the third and the fourth chapters.  The 
differences between the former stage of global capitalism and the new form is discussed in 
more detail in the context of the GCC transnational elite. Although there are important 
similarities between these stages, the differences are crucial for a better understanding of 
the transnational elites.  In addition, the second chapter discusses the historical processes 
that led to the current position of the GCC sub-region petrodollars in the global market. 
The third chapter focuses on the transnational ties between GCC elites and the TCC, 
in particular the role played by the U.S. and the U.K-based transnational elites and their 
interactions with their counterparts in the GCC, institutionally and historically.  As will be 
shown in the data, the United States and United Kingdom have been and remain the most 
important partners with the GCC’s transnational elites. The fourth chapter focuses on the 
GCC in the context of international political economy and a number of domestic factors, 
including labor politics and the domestic implications of foreign direct investments.  
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Following a discussion of the GCC’s history in the context of globalization studies, this 
chapter offers a broad picture of the GCC’s transnational elites and considers their 
backgrounds and their use of power, which is an important root causes behind many aspects 
of the economic and geopolitical status quo in the Persian Gulf sub-region. 
Due to the geostrategic importance of the Persian Gulf, the state of the status quo 
in this sub-region has direct impact on the larger Middle East and indirect impact on the 
global production networks.  Two factors are important in this regard.  The first is the 
significant role played by the region’s petrodollars controlled by the GCC’s transnational 
elite in the Western financial markets.  The second factor is the visible participation of the 
GCC members in a number of influential global institutions, mainly in the area of finance 
and trade, but increasingly in military institutions as well.  Chapter Four considers the 
militarization of GCC transnational space and some of these broader global implications 
of the policies and priorities of the GCC’s transnational elite.  Chapter Five concludes the 
dissertation with a brief discussion of how the GCC national economies have been 
integrating into the global economy through the GCC transnational elites.  Using the 
findings of each chapter, it identifies the main implications of this economic integration. 
While one should not disregard domestic factors within Persian Gulf Arab states, 
this study focuses on non-domestic elements as the more influential, and yet under- studied 
aspect of the regional politics in this part of the world.  It further maintains that studying 
the sub-region’s transnational elites provides a balanced platform for analyzing both the 
international factors and the more significant domestic factors that shape the economic and 
political developments in the region. 
 
26 
 
References: 
1. Anderson, L. (2000). Dynasts and nationalists: why monarchies survive. Middle East 
Monarchies. The Challenge of Modernity, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 53-70. 
 
2. Bhagwati, J. (2007). In defense of globalization: With a new afterword. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
3. Buzan, B., & Gonzalez-Pelaez, A. (2009). International society and the Middle East: 
English school theory at the regional level. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
4. Buzan, B., &Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and powers: The structure of international 
security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
5. Chase, K. A. (2005). Trading blocs: States, firms, and regions in the world economy. 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
6. Cox, Ronald. W. (2012). Corporate power and globalization in US foreign policy. 
London: Routledge. 
 
7. Cox, Robert. W. (1996). Approaches to world order (No. 40). Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
8. Cox, Robert. W. (1993). Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in 
method. Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 26, 49-49. 
 
9. Cox, Robert. W. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international 
relations theory. Millennium: journal of international studies, 10(2), 126-155. 
 
10. Fain, W. T. (2008). American ascendance and British retreat in the Persian Gulf region. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
11. Gause, F. G. (2011). Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East (No. 63). Council on Foreign 
Relations. 
 
12. Gause, F. G. (2000). The persistence of monarchy in the Arabian peninsula: a 
comparative analysis. Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner. 
 
13. George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences. Mit Press. 
 
14. Hall, P. A. (2003). Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research. 
Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences, 374. 
27 
 
15. Hanieh, A. (2011). Finance, oil and the Arab uprisings: the global crisis and the Gulf 
States. Socialist Register, 48(48). 
 
16. Hanieh, A. (2011). Capitalism and class in the Gulf Arab states. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
17. Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. 
 
18. Kotz, D. M., & McDonough, T. (2010). Global neoliberalism and the contemporary 
social structure of accumulation. Contemporary capitalism and its crises: Social 
structure of accumulation theory for the 21st century, 93-120. 
 
19. Krämer, G. (2000). Good Counsel to the King: The Islamist Opposition in Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco. Middle East Monarchies–the Challenge of Modernity, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 257-287. 
 
20. Lucas, R. E. (2004). Monarchical authoritarianism: survival and political liberalization 
in a Middle Eastern regime type. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36(01), 
103-119. 
 
21. Prashad, V. (2012). Arab Spring, Libyan Winter. AK Press. 
 
22. Policy, F. (2012). FSI 2012| the Fund for Peace. The Fund for Peace. 
 
23. Robinson, W. I. (2003). Transnational conflicts: Central America, social change and 
globalization. Verso. 
 
24. Robinson, W. I. (2005). Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation‐State to 
Transnational Hegemony. Critical review of international social and political 
philosophy, 8(4), 559-574. 
 
25. Robinson, W. I. (2004). A theory of global capitalism: Production, class, and state in a 
transnational world. JHU Press. 
 
26. Robinson, W. I., & Harris, J. (2000). Towards a global ruling class? Globalization and 
the transnational capitalist class. Science & Society, 11-54. 
 
27. Soederberg, S. (2004). The politics of the new international financial architecture: Re 
imposing neoliberal domination in the global south. Zed Books. 
 
28. Tilly, Charles. "Means and ends of comparison in macrosociology." Comparative 
Social Research 16 (1997): 43-54. 
 
29. Wade, R. (2006). Choking the south. New Left Review, 38, 115. 
 
28 
 
30. Wade, R. H. (2002). US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over people and 
ideas. Review of international political economy, 9(2), 215-243. 
 
Other Sources: 
1. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 09/27/2012, "United States Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk Announces Agreement with Gulf Cooperation Council to 
Strengthen Economic Ties, Expand Trade and Investment Relationship", Available 
Here: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/september/ustr-
kirk- announces-agreement-gcc. 
 
2. Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Middle East Free Trade Area 
Initiative (MEFTA), Available Here: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other- 
initiatives/middle-east-free-trade-area-initiative-mefta 
 
3. Defense News, Dec. 7, 2013, "Hegel: US sell Weapons to GCC States as a Block", 
Available. Here:     
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131207/DEFREG04/312070009/Hagel-US-
Sell- Weapons-GCC-States-Block Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
25/May/1981 
 
4. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
 
5. http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
 
6. http://ffp.statesindex.org/ 
 
7. http://www.heritage.org/ 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A TRANSNATIONAL ELITE IN THE GCC 
Introduction 
During the earliest stages of the GCC’s recent economic growth consultant and 
journalist Michael Field traveled to the Arabian Peninsula.  He described his experiences 
in his book, The Merchants, The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States 
(1984).  A keen observer of socioeconomic structures, Field wrote, “[T]he merchant 
families are part of the Arabian establishment.  They dominate Arabian commercial life 
and they have been responsible for as many economic innovations as the governments.  
They have established most of the new Arabian investment banks, light industries and high 
technology service companies.  In the Gulf States, which have a tradition as trading 
communities, the merchants are the most valued constituents of the ruling families; their 
senior members are consulted on most important domestic political issues. In both 
Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Gulf  states  the  merchants  serve  the  ruling  families  in 
government” (Field, 1984, P. 11). 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the dynamics of capital accumulation 
within the current economic structure of the GCC.  One integral part of these dynamics has 
been the evolution of the relationship between the GCC states and the Western powers, 
mainly the United States and the United Kingdom.  Therefore, I use the first section of 
this chapter to examine the strategies adopted by Western powers for dealing with the 
GCC states and the emerging GCC transnational elites, and some of the reasons and 
interests behind these strategies.  The second component of this analysis deals with the 
domestic setting of the GCC states in order to explore the other side of the structure 
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of capital accumulation, as well as the role and characteristics of the GCC transnational 
elites. 
The Historical Evolution 
Major world powers have long identified the GCC as an important geostrategic 
location.  Great powers have also sought to carve out new markets for themselves, as well 
as to control important trade and military routes throughout this region.  For example, 
according to L.G. Potter, “the principal impetus for initial British entry into the Gulf was 
a combination of a search for markets and an effort to deny European rivals supremacy in 
the region” (Potter, 2009, P. 278).  In fact, the Persian Gulf and its Arab states have long 
been among the most significant geostrategic regions for great powers.  Beginning with the 
early sixteenth century, for around two centuries, the Persian Gulf was part of “Portugal’s 
Asian Empire” (Potter, 2009, P. 278). The geostrategic appeal of the region along with 
the economic interests in finding new markets attracted the Dutch and the Ottomans as 
well.  More recently, the context of the great power competition in the Middle East has 
changed from a colonial to a post-colonial one.  Even more recently, the post-colonial 
intrusion of great powers into the region has been shaped by a globalization of the 
transnational capital, in which, “a key aspect in the globalization is transnational class 
formation” (Robinson, 2001, P. 533). 
Following the demise of classical imperialism and during the post-colonial 
era the legacy of imperialism has reemerged in various informal economic activities.  A 
key feature of these economic activities is that they “are not regulated, monitored or 
controlled directly or indirectly by the states” (Routh, 2011, P. 211).  Such informal 
economic activities, partly facilitated by a series of international institutions such as the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have 
accelerated new patterns of structural involvements of the great powers in other regions’ 
affairs.  In the past few decades arguably the most noticeable economic structure that 
“informal imperialism” has manifested in its various political, social and economic aspects 
has been the “transnational space.”  Under the current mainstream process of capitalization, 
the transnational space has appeared as the most preferential climate for transnational 
capital.  For example, W.I. Robinson regards it to be “[t]he hegemonic fraction of capital 
in a world scale” (Robinson, 2003, P. 39).  This space also lends itself quite well to the 
informal economic activities, especially those that rely on cheap labor and raw materials. 
In the Persian Gulf, Great Britain was the first great power that recognized the 
usefulness of local elites for advancing its imperialist goals in the region.  This is one of 
the reasons that decades after the apparent end of the British colonial presence in the 
region, that country still exerts a strong influence on almost all of the smaller Persian Gulf 
Arab states.  From the  earliest stages  of  British  imperialism,  the  United Kingdom  
designed  the  structure  of  its relationship with the “protected” states of the GCC in such 
a way that informal imperialism was embedded in the GCC elites: 
“[w]hen Britain thought it necessary to replace a sitting shaikh, it preferred to 
work behind the scenes and within the ruling family.  In 1923, Britain engineered 
the abdication of Shaikh Isa b. Ali Al Khalifa in Bahrain and his replacement by 
his son Hamad b. Isa in order  to  institute  what  it  believed  to  be  long-overdue  
reforms  in  the  country.  In 1965, British officials encouraged members of the 
ruling Qawasim family in Sharjah to depose Shaikh Saqr b. Sultan, a thorn in the 
British side because of his admiration for pan-Arab nationalism and ties to Gamal 
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Abdel Nasser and the Arab League.  In 1966, Britain prodded Shaikh Zayid b. 
Sultan Al Nahyan to remove his long-serving brother Shakh who was clearly 
unsuitable to govern an oil-era state. In 1970, Britain encouraged young Sayyid 
Qabus b. Sa‘id to overthrow his father as Sultan of Oman.  (Potter, P. 283)  
In the early 1970s, after Great Britain reduced its military and security engagement 
in the Persian Gulf, the United States began to fill the vacuum by relying on surrogates (or 
“key allies”) to ensure that oil would be delivered to the West without interruption.  Iran 
and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia were the key U.S. regional allies during the 1970s.  
However, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 abruptly terminated Iran’s partnership with 
America, which then relied more heavily on Saudi Arabia to advance its oil interests 
(Potter, 2008, P. 295).  Following the Iranian Revolution, in a major strategic change for 
both the United States and the region, President Jimmy Carter issued the Carter Doctrine, 
in which, for the first-time, the U.S. announced that it would use its own armed forces to 
protect the “global” (i.e. the West’s) access to oil, instead of relying on the allies in the 
region.  According to Carter, “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian 
Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of 
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military 
force” (Carter, P. 27).  The Carter Doctrine paved the way for the contemporary mode of 
American militarism in the region; and due to its connection to oil from the outset, the 
Doctrine is closely tied to the deeper integration of the region into the global economy.   
Therefore, the Carter Doctrine can be viewed as a dividing line that marks the deeper 
integration of the region into the globalized structure of transnational production.  This 
integration was consistent with the familiar pattern in oil-rich regions in the global south, 
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where, according to D. and Raphael S. Stokes, “transnationalization is bolstered by 
militarization” (Stokes, 2010, P. 3).  Not surprisingly, the combination of American 
strategy and the GCC’s acquiescence with it has led to the repeated use of force and the 
strong presence of repressive state apparatus in the GCC region. 
Following the implementation of the Carter Doctrine, the level of integration 
between the West and the Persian Gulf region – with the important exception of Iran – has 
increased dramatically.  Subsequently, the nature of the integration has shifted from 
international ties to transnational ties.  In other words, there has been a deepening of 
military, economic and social ties between the two sides that took place before the end 
of the Cold War.  Even though the end of the Cold War has often been seen as a more 
dramatic transformation toward further transnationalization, the GCC region was already 
well advanced in transnationalization when the Soviet Union collapsed.  However, the 
transformation intensified after the collapse, partly due to the very fact that the Soviet 
Union no longer existed in the 1990s; therefore, it no longer stood as a barrier to the 
transformation. On the other hand, after the long-term suppression of the leftist and 
nationalist movements in the Persian Gulf, no significant domestic voices were in place 
to call for regulation of capital so that local socio-economic structures could emerge.  
Western military powers had supported the suppression of anti-capitalist voices in the 
region long before even the Iranian Revolution. In fact, as an element of the Carter 
Doctrine, the Rapid Development Force (RDF) was formed in order to protect the U.S. 
interests in the region and to fight against any threats to those interests.  The most notable 
threats identified and targeted by RDF were the leftist and nationalist movements that 
had the potential to bring about a regime change (Stokes, 2010, P. 91).   
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To counter such movements, generous military support was offered to the ruling 
elites.  For instance, Saudi Arabia, the most powerful GCC state, has remained as “one of 
the least free countries in the world, with political and economic power held by a very 
small ruling elite. Because this rule largely rests upon American military support and 
such support is contingent upon the free flow of oil, U.S. and Saudi interests have 
remained deeply entwined throughout the postwar era” (Stokes, 2010, P. 88). 
Throughout the process of transnationalization of capital an emerging tendency 
appears to be the creation of local elites w h o  have fewer and fewer   ties with domestic 
institutions.  P. Mair believes that, in this context, the ruling legitimacy will gradually 
decline while the “citizenry are becoming effectively non-sovereign” (Mair, 2006, P. 25).  
It is, in fact, the nature of transnational globalization that creates non-sovereign citizenries 
who are subjugated to transnational rulers.  Thus, it is not surprising that the resulting 
delegitimized elites need to be protected by military force, given potential socioeconomic 
unrest that ensues within such an unstable state-society relationship.  As a result of this 
scheme, the United States continues “to put significant effort into protecting the region’s 
oil infrastructure and bolstering the capacities of pro-U.S. elites to stabilize their respective 
territories and repress challenges to U.S. interests” (Stokes, 2010, P. 100).  To summarize, 
as a consequence of both deepening economic integration and geopolitical calculations, 
the role of the Persian Gulf – both as a region and as a collection of states –  remains 
crucial today for shaping the global balance of power within capitalism. Currently, the 
decisions made by the GCC states help shape the nature of global foreign trade, investment, 
and politics.  For instance, the rivalry between the United States and China over acquiring 
more and more economic benefits from the region has become a key component within the 
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overall economic and political dynamics of the region, and the positions that individual 
GCC states take in relation to this rivalry influence not only regional but also global 
economic, political, and, potentially, even military developments.  
There are two dimensions to the way decisions made by the GCC states affect 
global trade, investment, and politics.  First is the GCC states’ own economic decisions 
and behavior; second is the international economic context of those decisions and 
behaviors.  The following section discusses how the GCC states’ economic behavior, 
heavily influenced by the transnational capitalist principles, has evolved toward 
transnational economic activities. 
The Emergence of a GCC Transnational Elite 
Historically, the capitalist economic structure of the GCC states has been developed 
through the particular transnational ties between the GCC and the rest of the world 
economy.  In order  to  investigate  the  nature  and  impact  of  transnational  economic  
interactions  between Western powers and the GCC states and the evolution of these 
interactions, it is necessary to consider what, exactly, the institution of “state” entails within 
the GCC countries.  In fact, the influences of old and well-established commercial 
merchant families have been quite significant in the region’s political hierarchies from 
the before the foundation of modern states in the Arabian Peninsula. In terms of the 
historical structure and political dynamics of the societies, Lawrence Potter observes that 
the “. . .tribes were the key to forming modern states in the Arabian Peninsula, and the 
dynasties presently ruling there are all of tribal origin” (Potter, 2009, P. 2).   These tribes 
were originated based on family and blood ties.  The resulting political structure has been 
what M. Field observed some three decades ago about the significant role of merchants as 
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important actors in ruling “families.”  As a result, important families and influential 
wealthy individuals within these families have become the most significant actors in the 
interactions between the West and the GCC states.  Many of these families have been 
both merchants and rulers at the same time.  For the most part, the merchant-ruler 
combination still applies to most GCC ruling families today.   
On the other hand, unlike many other monarchies where the ruling family came to 
power by controlling a pre-existing state, the GCC ruling families themselves created 
the very institutions that govern the modern state over which they reign.  Accordingly, 
there is a quite blurred line between the institution of “royal family” and that of “state” in 
the GCC countries.  Moreover, the mode of GCC governance appears to create a 
modern/traditional dichotomy: a modern state with tribal origins. This dichotomy has 
manifested in numerous ways in the process of capital accumulation.  In particular, the 
dichotomy provides gaps and “breathing spaces” that have facilitated the emergence of 
the GCC-based transnational elites. 
One of the central arguments presented in this thesis is that the roles played by the 
transnational elites of the GCC are crucial to any analysis of the socio-economic and 
geopolitical dynamics of this region.  The GCC elites, almost all of whom come from 
wealthy, politically influential families, are by far the most important agents in the political 
economy of the GCC.  During the past few decades they have also become important 
players in global capital accumulation.  The GCC elites are directly connected to 
transnational economic activities as a “class-in-itself,” meaning that these elites are 
important for facilitating the global accumulation of profits.  In other words, in modern 
times the relationship between the Western powers and the GCC states has been 
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contextualized in the development of global capitalism and the current pattern of 
globalization of transnational capital; the relationship resembles that of intercorporate – 
rather than international – affairs, and it is highly influenced by struggles within the TCC. 
Moreover, “[g]lobal capitalism is not a collection of ‘national’ economies but the 
suppression through transnational integration of ‘national’ economies understood as 
autonomous entities related through external exchanges to other such entities” (Robinson, 
2001, P. 533).  However, the GCC transnational elites have penetrated the process of 
decision making to the extent that the class is politically subordinate to the TCC. 
It is common among many scholars who work on the GCC to regard the GCC elites 
as nationally and/or internationally-oriented actors.   It is perhaps true that, at the beginning, 
the “elites” in the Arabian Peninsula had been internationally oriented.  During the past 
two decades, however, any international characteristic of these elites has dramatically 
changed towards a transnational orientation. Arguably, what ushered in this new 
transnational character of the GCC elites was the role of oil and its commercialization in 
the region. 
Natural resources such as oil have existed for a long time in this region; and the 
ability of the local GCC elites to profit from exploiting them goes back to the time when 
these elites were international elites. What has happened more recently, however, is 
that the GCC elites have developed a much more embedded relationship with the global 
TCC through such arrangements as expanded investment linkages (especially in finance 
and oil).  Therefore, these elites no longer simply function as reliable producers of 
oil that is sold in the world markets. Instead, the GCC elites are the key piece of an oil 
production and financial supply chain that renders them partners with Western TCC firms.  
38 
 
Nevertheless, one of the most significant characteristics of these elites remains the fact that 
their economic activities have always been, and continue to be, based on the sale of oil.  
The emergence of transnational actors in the GCC region is not a phenomenon that 
happened in isolation from the general process of transnational globalization.  Neither has 
it been separated from the particular development of transnationalization that has taken 
place in the Persian Gulf.  In terms of transnational globalization, it appears necessary to 
analyze the concept based on transnational practices (TNPs) - practices that different 
actors, including states, are engaged in throughout the process of globalization.  
Understanding of the notion of transnational globalization is crucial in analyzing the GCC.  
Elaborating this conception of globalization, Sklair writes: 
“The  transnational  conception  of  globalization  postulates  the  existence  of  a  
global system.  Its basic units of analysis are transnational practices (TNP), 
practices that cross state boundaries but do not originate with state agencies or 
actors.  Analytically, TNPs operate in three spheres, the economic, the political, 
and the cultural-ideological.  The whole is the global system.  While the global 
system is not synonymous with global capitalism, what the theory sets out to 
demonstrate is that the dominant forces of global capitalism are the dominant 
forces in the contemporary global system.” (Sklair, 2000, P. 69)  
Increasingly, the GCC economy has been steered toward transnationalization, with 
the TNPs p lay ing  a significant role within this region.  TNPs are the “practices that 
cross state boundaries but do not necessarily originate with state agencies or actors” (Sklair, 
1998, P. 2).  For structural reasons, TCC interests are tied to TNPs rather than to local 
economic activities.  A significant part of the political economy of the GCC countries is 
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based on the economic activities of TNCs, rather than any domestic or national industrial, 
high-tech or service sections. The direct link between the GCC states and TCC is, 
therefore, obvious, as it is the members of TCC that control transnational corporations and 
TNPs.  On the other hand, TCC has to exert more and more power on national institutions 
in order to protect and enhance its role and protect its interests. 
The GCC states continue to play a significant role in the process of 
transnationalization.  In particular, an understanding of the notion of a transnational states 
is necessary in order to properly understand the extent and the nature of TNPs in the GCC.  
Robinson offers three (interrelated) propositions for the concept of state based on 
“historical materialist conception of state.” 
“1) economic globalization has its counterpart in transnational class formation 
and in the emergence of a transnational state (henceforth, TNS) that has been 
brought into existence to function as the collective authority for a global ruling 
class; 2) the nation-state is neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing but 
becoming transformed and absorbed into this larger structure of a TNS; 3) this 
emergent TNS institutionalizes a new class relation between global capital and 
global labor”.  (Robinson, 2001, P. 158) 
The transnationalization that has taken place in the GCC region relies on three 
historical facts.  The first is the presence of enormous oil and gas resources, which in turn 
have invited a host of transnational corporations to the region and led the politics and 
economy of the GCC to be shaped, to their very core, by transnational practices.  The 
“transnationalization” has occurred in two (related) directions. First, there are the 
transnational practices by outside entities in the GCC region, and second, there are the 
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transnational practices of the GCC elites in other regions of the world.  Meanwhile, as the 
political economy of the GCC has been increasingly shaped by TNPs, so has its 
economic culture.  Therefore, notions of production, wealth, economic activity, profit, 
labor and capital, as well as social justice, are understood (or ignored) according to the 
perspective of TNPs. 
The second pertinent historical fact is that religious extremism has become a major 
source of the legitimization of the ruling families.  In the early 1960s, the World Muslim 
League (WML), and, even most importantly, King Faysal, then-ruler of Saudi Arabia, 
concluded that nationalism and socialism, along with secularism, were significant threats 
to Islam.  As a result, religion emerged as a significant instrument at the disposal of the 
state to suppress anti-capitalist voices.  Accordingly, the nationalism of the Nasser era 
gradually gave way to various forms of pan-Islamism (Prashad, 2008, pp. 260-61).  
Therefore, only conceptualizations of nationalism that included strong elements of religion 
could legitimize the GCC capitalist classes as they tried to justify their rule over their 
traditional societies.  Religious-based conceptualizations of nationalism could,   therefore,   
remove   many   domestic   obstacles to establishing the capitalist principles that were 
necessary for global capital accumulation. 
The third relevant historical fact is the formation of a new set of class relations.  
Some four decades ago Fred Holiday predicted the collapse of these authoritarian regimes 
due to the exploitive economic relations that would trigger high level of dissatisfaction 
among the lower classes in these six states.  This prediction, however, did not materialize, 
mainly because of the formation of the current class relations.  
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The current nature of the working class in these states appears to be much more 
complicated than what the classical framework of analysis allows for.  In all GCC 
countries, a relatively high percentage of the population consists of foreign working class 
who do not have any political voices whatsoever.  These foreign workers often have 
no stable living condition, social security or economic perspective.  As a consequence the 
neoliberal labor politics that has been adopted by GCC states had led to the emergence of 
transnational labor class. In fact, the emergence of a transnational labor class could assist 
GCC- based capitalist class to defuse the pressure they might receive from local laborers.  
This would insulate the state against domestic pressure that could redirect the economic 
structure towards national objectives rather than those of the TNPs. 
At the same time, in none of these countries has the Huntingtonian prediction of the 
middle class as the engine of socioeconomic change been realized.  Indeed, a general 
analysis of the middle class is rarely an accurate way to identify the characteristics of 
society or to predict its behavior.  For instance, in terms of literacy, which is a major 
consideration for analyzing the middle class, there are many factors that can contextualize 
the process of education.  These factors impact the resulting middle class and the direction 
and strength of the “political will” they would wield to bring about democratic changes. 
The difficulty with general middle-class analyses arises, in part, from the lack of accurate 
measurement indicia.  For instance, it is unclear what level of schooling and college 
education in the GCC would be sufficient to create a viable push for democratic processes.  
On the other hand, in these countries it appears that the middle classes, by and large, believe 
that their economic well-being depends upon the ruling class. The GCC middle classes rely 
heavily on the rent channels that are provided and sustained by the royal families to 
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maintain the status quo.  This structure has been put in place over the past several decades. 
As a result, a high percentage of indigenous people in the GCC are “increasingly being 
distanced  from  the  forces  of  production  and  thus  sidelined  into  becoming  a  rentier  
class dependent on government subsidies, rather than a distinct proletariat or middle class” 
(Davidson, 2013, P. 6).  This phenomenon, of course, has been contextualized within a 
global context in which the “TNS seeks to create and maintain the pre-conditions for the 
valorization and accumulation  of  capital  in  the  global  economy,  which  is  not  simply  
the  sum  of  national economies and national class structures and requires a centralized 
authority to represent the whole of competing capitals, the major combinations of which 
are no longer "national" capitals” (Robinson, 2001, P. 167). 
The renting channels that are controlled by the GCC transnational elites could 
bring about a new class formation through a series of what I call “semi-redistribution 
policies.”  I use the term “semi-redistribution” because of the very fact that such policies 
have not decreased the gap among social classes in any notable way.  As result, we 
may refer to the GCC states as transnational rentier states. Th i s  term refers to the 
political context in which these states have been transnationalized.  The term also 
indicates the fact that, due to the rentier nature of the states, societies are prone to be 
subjugated to the decisions of the elites, including those decisions aimed at further 
transnationalization in this structure. 
GCC Transnational Space 
In the following sections I explain the “GCC transnational space” that has been 
promoted by the GCC-based transnational elites and the TCC.  To do so, it is necessary to 
understand the major components of this transnational space.  The first is the GCC 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) that are significant financial institutions (reliable sources 
for TNPs) controlled by royal families.  The second institution is GCC educational system 
that is heavily influenced by capitalist principles.  The third major component is the GCC 
labor market. 
Sovereign Wealth Funds  
 The first significant institutions are Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).  According 
to the International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds, SWFs can be 
defined as “special-purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the 
general government.   Created by the general government for macro-economic purposes, 
SWFs hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and they employ 
a set of investment strategies that include investing in foreign financial assets” (Sultan and 
et al., 2012, P. 49). 
The GCC-based SWFs is arguably a clear manifestation of the “super national 
economic and  political  institutions  that  begin  to  acquire  the  characteristics  of  a  
transnational  state” (Robinson, 2001, P. 533).  In the GCC the empirical evidence indicates 
that the conventional way of understanding SWFs may be misleading.  Foremost, the 
process of decision making in the GCC through SWFs transactions is, by and large, limited 
to the royal families.  On the other hand, the stated purpose of SWFs is to improve national 
economies by preventing the Dutch Disease or by preserving the benefits of natural 
resources for the future generations (e.g.  through  the  use  of  the  proceeds  from  those  
resources  in  improving  the economic infrastructures of the country). In the GCC, 
however, it is not clear how much of these funds are invested in infrastructural 
development.  This uncertainty arises in part from the fact that “they publish no accounts, 
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provide inconsistent aggregate asset figures to the media, and say nothing about their 
investment strategies.”  Moreover, these funds made a “very public contribution to 
propping up ailing U.S. banks during the acute phase of the 2008 global financial crisis” 
(Schwartz, 2012, P. 519).  Meanwhile, the Persian Gulf Arab states’ SWFs are controlled 
by individual actors rather than public entities.  As a result of this model of management, 
these funds appear to have become an important sources of capital for personal 
investments.  Table 4 provides some basic information on significant SWFs in the GCC 
region.  It shows the enormous financial capacity of the GCC-based SWFs. 
 
Country 
 
Sovereign Fund Name 
Assets as of 
2012 (in Billion $) 
 
Inception 
 
Origin 
UAE- Abu 
Dhabi 
 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority 
 
627 
 
1976 
 
Oil 
Saudi 
Arabia 
SAMA Foreign Holdings 532.8 n/a Oil 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment 
Authority 
296 1953 Oil 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 100 2005 Oil 
UAE- 
Dubai 
Investment Corporation of 
Dubai 
70 2006 Oil 
UAE-Abu 
Dhabi 
International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
58 1984 Oil 
UAE-Abu 
Dhabi 
Mubadala Development 
Company 
48.2 2002 Oil 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holdings 9.1 2006 Non-
commodity 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 8.2 1980 Oil & Gas 
Table 4: The GCC Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
Source: SWF Asset Allocation Report 2012, Conducted by Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute, Inc. 
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GCC-based SWFs are playing a crucial role in transnationalization of capital and 
(re)consolidation of the GCC transnational elites’ power in TCC.  For instance, in his book, 
New Post-Oil Arab Gulf, Sultan claims: 
“KIA [Kuwait Investment Authority], which was established in 1953, is well 
known on the international scene for its 7.1 percent stake in Daimler Chrysler 
dating back to 1969 and its 3.3 percent share in British Petroleum (BP).  More 
recently, KIA made headlines by becoming the largest investor in the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China ($720 million) in 2006, followed by a combined 
$5 billion investment in Citigroup and Merrill Lynch in late 2007/early 2008, 
among other investments.” (Sultan, 2012, P. 55) 
Interestingly, the mainstream centers of the transnational capitalist class have 
applauded the GCC states’ economic policies.  According to an article produced in 1997 
by the Middle Eastern Department of the IMF, “The GCC countries have already 
completed most of the crucial stages of liberalization and financial reform.”  This 
liberalization was succeeded by the creation of many SWFs in the GCC that play an 
important role in returning petrodollars into the global financial market and by reinvesting 
it in mostly Western countries.  At the same time, these funds have appeared as a reliable 
source of capital for many GCC-based financial sectors that play a decisive role in 
financing the private sector of global economy by injecting large sums of cash into the 
system, mainly during the periods of financial crisis, such as the one in 2008.  Furthermore, 
the position of the GCC elites in the TCC has been strengthened by the segmentation of 
production according to neoliberalism. T he GCC elites play a significant role in the 
global economy of oil and the financial transactions of petrodollars. 
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GCC Segmented Education System 
The second important institution is Education.  The education system is not only 
important as an institution itself.  It also provides a good case to study that manifests the 
class relations in a transnationally oriented structure of GCC.  On the one hand, many of 
the GCC elites are educated in top ranking private schools and colleges in the West. 
This is not surprising, as the TCC members have “similar life styles,” including the 
“pattern of higher education” (Sklair, 2000). On the other hand, the GCC states 
embarked on ambitious educational programs that resulted in the establishment of many 
Western-style schools and universities in the GCC. 
 It has been argued that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that 
it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959, P. 75). In other words, many scholars of 
political change believe that democracy and economic development have a positive 
correlations with each other.  They maintain that an economic development that increases 
levels of industrialization, higher education, and urbanization can help create the degree of 
national stability necessary for a democratic system to emerge and survive.  However, 
despite this mainstream theory of democratization, in the GCC states solid economic 
development, rapid urbanization and the dramatic rise in the number of educational 
institutions have produced the exact opposite result: democracy is largely absent within 
these nations, and the authoritarian regimes enjoy a high degree of stability. 
The GCC education systems that were originally designed by the TCC play a 
significant role in the survival of repressive state apparatuses in the GCC countries.  
Arguably, one of the most significant aspects of the relationship between the GCC elites 
and TCC is the educational ties between the two, which has led to further cohesion between 
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them.  The educational ties link the GCC elite firmly to the “social clubs” embedded within 
the TCC, while, at the same time, they use rents earned from their privileged status to either 
pay off, repress, or ideologically incorporate the majority of their populations. 
The  importance  of  the  non-organic  educational  system  in  this  region  
cannot  be overstated. The non-organic educational system ties the GCC elites to particular 
educational opportunities that are distinct and apart from their societies.  This artificially 
imposed educational system has been embedded and become more and more sophisticated 
in the past few decades.  To provide insight into the educational background of the GCC 
transnational elites, and how that background is irrelevant to the history and culture of this 
region, Table 5 provides some information about a number of most influential economic 
and political figures. 
In terms of the domestic educational system, there are currently many Western-
style schools in these countries.  These schools have emerged in parallel with the 
immigration of many Western nationals to the GCC for high-paying job opportunities.  
There are quite a number of formal  and  informal  affiliations  between  Western  
educational  intuitions  and  the  GCC educational institutions.  A main motivation for 
these formal and informal affiliations appears to have been economic advantage to the 
Western institutions.  Table 6 lists some of the Western or Western-style educational 
institutions in the one of the most globalized cities in the GCC, namely Dubai. 
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Table 5: The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the 
GCC1 
                                                            
1 See the expanded version of Table 5 in appendix 
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Source: Business Press and Personal Websites 
 
Table 6: Dubai Schools with Western Curricula2 
Source: DubaiFAQs guide to Dubai 
This phenomenon is not at all limited to Dubai. The spread of non-local educational 
systems in the region is yet another manifestation of the peculiar nature of the state in these 
six countries. Not only have the GCC elite, by and large, received their education from 
institutions that are geared towards the needs and interests of TCC, but the local population 
also receives a type of education that endorses, and even glorifies, the educational 
                                                            
2 See the expanded version of Table 6 in appendix  
School Name  Level Curriculum Qualifications
American International School Dubai  K-12 
Arabic, 
Canadian, US
MOE UAE, US HS 
Diploma
American School of Dubai  K-12 US AP, HS diploma
British National Curriculum School  K-12 UK
Cambridge High School Dubai  K-12 Arabic, UK A-level, IGCSE
Cambridge International School Al Quoz  K-12 UK
Cambridge International School Dubai  K-12 UK A-level, IGCSE
Cambridge International School Dubailand  K-12 UK
Cambridge International School Jumeirah Village  K-12 UK
Collegiate American School  primary US
Common Core 
Standards
Community West First School Dubai  primary UK NC, FS1-Y2
Deans International School  K-12 US AP, SAT
Deira International School  K-12 UK IB, IGCSE
Deira Private School  primary UK NC
Kings College Dubai  K-12 UK NC GCSE, A-Level
Kings School Al Barsha  K-12 UK
Kings School Dubai  primary UK NC FS KS1 KS2
Kings School Nad Al Sheba  K-12 UK EYFS, NC
Latifa School for Girls  K-12 UAE, UK AS, A-level, GCSE
Lycee Francais International Dubai  primary French
Lycee Francais International Georges Pompidou  secondary French
Lycee Francais International Meydan  primary 
Arabic, English, 
French
IB
Lycee Georges Pompidou Ecole primaire Dubai  primary French
Lycee Libanais Francophone Prive  K-12 French
Millfield School Dubai   UK
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background of the ruling elite. It is difficult,  therefore,  for  a  graduate  of  these  
domestic  western-style  institutions  to  question  the credibility of ruling elites who are 
graduates of Harvard, MIT or the London School of Economics.   
The rise of foreign educational systems in the region coincided with the shift 
towards transnationally oriented economic institutions.  The only part of the educational 
system that remains locally-oriented is the formal and informal religious education that 
the GCC transnational class uses to try to gain legitimacy for their rule.  The growing 
chasm between  these  two  styles  of  education  has  had  serious  consequences  in  various  
areas, especially the violent extremism in the region – a subject which is beyond the topic 
of this dissertation.   It is sufficient to say that the “mainstream” educational institutions in 
today’s GCC states rely on a class-based paradigm of development instead of serving as a 
sustainable and organic infrastructure for growth and production of knowledge within the 
GCC societies.  At the same time, the impact of Western-style educational institutions on 
the societies remains limited.  While in certain aspects, such as praise for Western 
technology, these educational systems have been quite successful, in other respects the 
GCC societies remain quite traditional.  This creates yet another point of contrast and 
potential friction with most of the ruling elite, who are often immersed in Western ethos. 
This kind of educational system is primarily geared towards enabling and 
protecting the interests of TCC members. As a result, it is not surprising that in many GCC 
countries what we may call an institutional dual-personality exists.  On the one hand, a 
highly modernized and impressively globalized economic system is easily recognizable in 
these countries.  On the other hand, a deeply traditional socio-political culture that 
philosophically rejects many of the tenants of modernism continues to thrive beneath 
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modern skyscrapers.  The tension between traditional and modern perspectives is arguably 
no greater anywhere than in the Muslim world.  As Barry Rubin observes, “. . . no area in 
the world resists - at least explicitly - globalization to an extent equaling that of the Islamic 
Middle East” (Rubin, 2003, Yale Global Online).  Not only globalization but also the so-
called Westernization and modernization have been the target of serious criticism by many 
traditional voices in the Muslim world.  At the same time, some of the most advanced 
institutions of the modern global economy have taken deep roots in this region’s economies 
and politics, to the extent that one may argue this institutional dual- personality is the 
essence of GCC polities.  In such a system, the most the educational systems have been 
able to do is facilitate upward mobility towards getting closer to the privileged TCC 
members (or what we may call “politics of contiguity” to the sources of power and 
wealth) rather than causing any major structural change in the socio-political status of 
these states and societies. 
In fact, the GCC’s educational systems are by design at the service of the 
transnational space rather than local economies.  Indeed, such educational systems could 
significantly raise the level of literacy within the GCC societies. Yet, this is the type of 
literacy that is not likely conducive to any democratic change; and that is why general 
middle-class analyses and assessment of the so-called “democratic indicia,” such as 
literacy, do not mean much when it comes to these peculiar state-societies. (I avoid the 
term nation-state for two reasons: first, the notion of nation in the context of this region 
is quite problematic, and it remains doubtful whether nations in the Western sense of the 
term exists there; second, in the GCC region states are by far the dominant force compared 
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to the societies.  Therefore, I will use the term state-society instead of nation-state to refer 
to these polities).   
One indication of the inefficiency of the existing educational systems in bringing 
about organic and viable changes is the fact that an increasing number of graduates from 
these educational systems ultimately migrate and seek jobs in W estern countries or in 
other capitalist economies.  This phenomenon occurs precisely because these graduates 
are first and foremost “global citizens” in the sense promoted by the mainstream 
globalization paradigm.  They feel much more at home in London and New York than they 
might in their own societies.  On the other hand, there are significant numbers of foreigners 
who are now enrolling in the GCC schools, both private and public.  For instance, “only 
15% of the 374 graduates that enrolled at King Abdullah University of Science & 
Technology [a university with one of the largest endowments in the world] were Saudi 
nationals.  Similarly, in academic year 2007-08, only 51% of Qatar Education City’s 
student population comprised Qatari nationals as opposed to  the 70-75% target of the 
Qatari Foundation” (GCC Education Industry, 2010, P. 23).  This high percentage of 
foreign enrollment in the educational institutions of the region also attests to the fact that 
these institutions are responsive to the educational needs of a “global” – i.e. TCC or TCC 
aspirant – audience, and not the needs of the indigenous populations. 
It is significant that in the same country where the King Abdullah University of 
Science & Technology, one of the world’s most technologically advanced universities, has 
been established, the anti-West voices are arguably the most vocal.  In 2012, the Grand 
Mufti of Saudi Arabia declared, “It is necessary to destroy all the churches of the region” 
(Broomhall, 2012, Arabian Business).  His declaration may not have much significant 
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impact in practice, especially in a country where there is not much freedom of religion to 
begin with.  However, the declaration indicates the religious leader’s extreme opposition 
to the mentality of those Saudi elites who are advocating one of the largest transfers of 
technology in human history from the West to Saudi Arabia.   
The traditional societies of these states are not comfortable at all with 
modernization and Westernization.  The history case of Iran illustrates another powerful 
example of this rejection of modernization by traditional religious powers.  During the 
reign of the Shah, where fast Westernization and transfer of technology spawned within 
deeply traditional forces an uncontrollable resentment towards the system, which led to 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979. There is a certain level of truth in Rubin’s observation that 
“the two factors that supposedly make globalization attractive are those of benefits and 
cultural synthesis” (Rubin, 2003, Yale Global Online).  However, the current pattern of 
globalization, at least in the GCC region, revolves around the benefits to the TCC rather 
than broader societal benefit, and it does not lead to cultural synthesis.  The absence of 
broader societal benefits can be found in some statistics reported in an EY study: 
Only 29% of employers feel that education prepares students with necessary 
technical skills and only 19% agree that it prepares young people with the right 
attitude for work…72% of young people stated that parents and family are the 
primary source of information about jobs.” (Perspectives on GCC Youth 
Employment, 2014, P. 5) 
The GCC countries offer generous social welfare systems in which education is 
free, and many other social security benefits are offered.  At the same time, these social 
welfare systems are important means for (re)consolidation of the power of the ruling 
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families and for the stability of the GCC transnational rentier states.  For instance, the 
accesses to the benefits are not equally provided to all.  Instead, different citizens, based 
on their family backgrounds and religions, have different levels of access to the 
government-distributed benefits.  This allows the state to channel its financial support 
towards parts of the society that support the royal rule.  It is not surprising that  the  
welfare  systems  in  these  countries  are  almost  completely  controlled  by  the  ruling 
families rather than an independent bureaucracy such as the de-centralized welfare 
structure of resource wealth distribution (i.e. the Nordic model).  In other words, resources 
are in the hands of the royal families who decide who should have access to it and how 
much access they should have.  Within the domestic economy that emerges around these 
transnational rentier states and their welfare systems, therefore,  it  is  not  surprising  
that,  for  young  people,  connections  are  more  important  than educational background 
in finding jobs. 
Thus, the other aspect of the GCC’s governmental design of the educational system 
is the peculiar nature and objectives of the GCC welfare systems.  Similar to the 
educational systems, the welfare systems have not been designed in such a manner that 
they would reduce the gaps among different social classes.  At the same time, the life-style 
of the ruling elites and the wealthy exacerbate the sense of social injustice among lower 
classes.   Thus, the concept of poverty becomes a relational concept rather than a certain 
economic index that can be measured based on fixed mainstream parameters, such as 
income or access to food and other life necessities. Accordingly, despite the unprecedented 
economic growth and despite the relatively positive economic indexes, the highly uneven 
economic statuses of different groups of citizens have created a cause for resentment. This 
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resentment among the lower classes, in turn, has fueled various destructive forces ranging 
from socioeconomic corruption to radicalism.  In particular, corruption has been a natural 
response to domestic economic systems where some are included in while others excluded 
from having access to the proceeds from shared natural resources. 
Labor Market 
It is important to note again, that the arrangements of social classes in the GCC 
countries are complicated. The arrangements become somewhat clearer when viewed as a 
transnationally- oriented structure rather than the traditional nationally-oriented 
framework. The following chart produced by journalist Ahmed Al Omran indicates that 
unusually high percentages of the population in the GCC countries consist of foreign 
workers. 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Percentage of Foreign Workers of Total Population in GCC in 2011 
Source: Borrowed from : http://www.timeskuwait.com/Times_Kuwait-3rd-highest-in- 
expats-numbers-in-GCC 
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The dependency of the private sector in most of the GCC countries on foreign 
workers has been dramatically increasing in the past few decades.  Table 7 below 
provides the “net migration”3 to the GCC countries from 1980 to 2013.  
  
1980-
1983 
1984-
1988 
1989-
1993 
1994-
1998 
1999-
2003 
2004-
2008 
2009-
2013 
Bahrain 3195 12899 5480 44472 143336 293196 22081 
Kuwait 102745 118980 
-
601874 125523 200174 448950 299999 
Oman 81500 9000 65500 
-
209243 106793 32567 1029938 
Qatar 101975 57517 -22453 42840 170402 857088 499998 
Saudi Arabia 1391626 538413 
-
121511 
-
876891 2197524 157126 300000 
United Arab 
Emirates 174444 259505 327575 464455 863784 3812193 514042 
GCC 1855485 996314 
-
347283 
-
408844 3682013 5601120 2666058 
 
Table 7: Net Migration to the GCC Countries 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
                                                            
3 According to the World Bank: “Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that 
is, the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens 
and noncitizens. Data are five-years estimates”. 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.NETM?page=6) 
57 
 
 
Figure 2: Trend Line of Net Migration in the GCC Countries 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) 
Figure 2 shows the trend line of net migration.  Despite the increasing 
migration of foreign laborers to the GCC countries, which has propelled the extraordinary 
economic development in the region, the living conditions of these labor forces have not 
improved.  The World Report 2014 by the Human Rights Watch cites many unacceptable 
living conditions that foreign labors have to endure in these countries, ranging from 
“unpaid wages,” “physical abuse,” “passport confiscation,” and “unsafe housing” to 
“exploitation” and “servitude” (World Report, 2014). Obviously, the extent of these 
problems differs from one country to another. However, the economic structures of all 
GCC countries depend on cheap labor: “[f]or transnational capital, working class 
immiseration is just another way to reduce cost margins as firms expand their cross-border 
investment” (Cox, 2012, P. 15). 
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Finally, population growth remains an important challenge for these countries – a 
challenge that can exacerbate the level of inequality in the future. In a project conducted 
by The Economist in 2010, it was estimated that the GCC countries will face 30% 
population growth until 2020 (The GCC in 2020, 2010, P.1). Such a rapid growth requires 
states to produce many more new jobs. As mentioned before, currently, considerable 
percentages of the GCC working class are immigrants.  (See Figure 3 below.) 
 
Figure 3: Labor Force by Sector and Origin, 1969-2009 
Source: Borrowed from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2011/1101mcd.pdf, P.5 
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Even if the GCC states prove successful in the extremely difficult task of creating 
so many new jobs, it is doubtful that these jobs will benefit the indigenous populations or 
whether these populations would agree to fill these job positions.  This is because the 
current labor politics in the GCC region favors transnational labor class - who are poorly 
paid and need not be protected by national regulations and policies.   Moreover, the GCC 
societies have benefited to various degrees from social welfare systems and from low-skill 
foreign workers for so long that it i s  quite unlikely that the indigenous populations will 
compete with foreign workers for low-paying, low-skill job openings.  Therefore, the 
transnational structure of capital accumulation that is the essence of the GCC political 
economies does not provide for the local population.  Consequently, the job market cannot 
absorb the future population growth in a way in which locals would have a standard level 
of living as good as their ancestors have had. 
Conclusion 
“My Grandfather rode a camel, my father rode a camel, I drive a Mercedes, my son 
drives a Land Rover, his son will drive a Land Rover, but his son will ride a camel” (The 
National UAE, 2010).  This observation by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the 
former vice president of UAE, illustrates how the ascendance of transnational activities 
have derailed any organic political and socioeconomic structure within the Gulf States.   In 
other words, the modern political economy of the GCC is dominated by transnational actors 
whose business activities are more compatible with the global structure of transnational 
capital accumulation rather than advancing any national (or regional) economic interests. 
This chapter has attempted to shed light on several aspects of the political economy 
of the transnational elite in the GCC states.  It is the promise of globalization that economic 
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integration as well as cultural interactions can provide a ground for sustainable economic 
development.  At  the  same  time,  many  studies of democratization  tell  us  that  
enhancement  of learning and education within societies is an important stepping stone 
towards democratic change.  However, where the middle class and the working class are 
essentially excluded from the process of decision making and the economic interactions 
are micromanaged by the ruling elites, both of the above propositions are dubious. 
In the GCC region, these elites are well-educated and successful in their 
transnational business activities. They speak the “language of the world” (i.e. West), and 
they share the “globalized (i.e. capitalist) mentality.”  But when it comes to the national 
and local levels of analysis, these elites, as loyal custodians of the interests of the TCC, 
must play the role of controllers and shock-absorbers in their societies, insulating the TCC 
from local unrest.  This, in effect, has created a “race to the bottom” for further trans-
nationalization of local economies combined with suppressive politics. What is missing, 
in the words of Robert Wade, is a “strategic management of [international] trade, so as 
to curb the race-to-the-bottom effects of export-led growth, and foster domestic industry 
and services that would provide better livelihood and incomes for the middle and working  
classes”  (Wade, 2008, P.20).  On the other hand, the image of transnational globalization 
in the region cannot be completely understood without examining the crucial role of the 
GCC-based transnational elites.  This chapter provides insight into the unusual combination 
in the GCC countries of the low level of development in the infrastructure of the local 
economies, on the one hand, and the high level of development in transnational economic 
activities. The next chapter will extend the scope of the argument advanced in this 
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chapter by analyzing  the  transnational  ties  between  GCC  transnational  structures  and  
those  of  global transnational capital accumulation. 
This chapter also considered the relationship between the amount of wealth in this 
region and the authoritarian nature of the ruling regimes.  To understand this relationship, 
one should not focus only on domestic factors.  The relationships between the GCC 
transnational elites and TCC have shaped the current domestic contexts for authoritarian 
regimes in important ways; and because the continuation of these regimes is in the 
interest of the transnational structure of capital accumulation, it is unlikely that any 
democratic change materializes in the foreseeable future. As the chapter explored, the 
GCC-based elites have been evolving from a national/international context to transnational 
context.  Accordingly, any state-centric approach or state-society frameworks that are 
based upon the mainstream understanding of the notion of “state” cannot provide an 
accurate understanding of many fundamental processes in the GCC region. 
It is important to note that one of the recurring geostrategic aspects of the Persian 
Gulf region has been the emergence of political vacuums during various historical 
periods.  In the early modern history of the Persian Gulf, this vacuum was filled by the 
British Empire.  After the British had to relinquish their power in the region in the 1950s, 
the United States filled the vacuum. In Persian Gulf in History, Gary Sick writes: 
“Throughout, U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region were simple and consistent, 
conceived from the start in global, strategic terms: first, to ensure access by the 
industrialized world to the vast oil resources of the region; and second, to 
prevent any hostile power from acquiring political or military control over those 
resources” (Potter, 2008, P. 295). 
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In the context of this political vacuum the nature of the power that the GCC states 
have is unclear.  Some scholars argue that energy resources available in the GCC region 
are the primary reason that the global economy should keep this region as stable as 
possible.  On the other hand, the geostrategic location of the GCC region is a significant 
factor.  While there are some truths in these assertions, the nature of state power in the 
GCC countries cannot be understood without contextualizing the GCC’s transnational 
elites in the TCC.   It can be argued that, with the dramatic increase in the power of the 
TCC in the GCC region over the past two decades it has been the transnational structure of 
capital accumulation that has filled the political vacuum in that region. Accordingly, one 
cannot analyze the GCC states without the significant role of its transnational elites, who 
have created in the course of many decades a number of transnational rentier states.  
These transnational rentier states have heavily influenced various aspects of the GCC 
countries’ institutional settings including the economic, political, social, and educational 
institutions. 
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Appendix I: Expanded Versions of Table 5 and Table 6 
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Table5: The Educational Background of Major Economic and Political Figures in the 
GCC
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Table 6: Dubai Schools with Western Curricula 
 
NAME TITLE ORIGIN COMPANY INDUSTRY Education
Mahmood Hashim Al Kooheji CEO Bahrain Mumtalakat Finance Staffordshire University, Henley Business School
Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim Al Thani Director General Qatar Al Jazeera Media Imperial College Business School, Tepper School of Business
Hayat Sindi Medical researcher KSA Diagnostics for All Science King's College London, University of Cambridge
Omar K Alghanim CEO Kuwait
Alghanim 
Industries
Industry New York University, Harvard Business School
Abdullatif al-Othman Governor and Chairman KSA SAGIA Finance Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sheikha Hanadi Bint Nasser Bin 
Khalid Al Thani
Businesswoman Qatar Finance London Business School, University Of London,
Mohammed Jameel President KSA
Abdul Latif Jameel 
Group
Retail Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Abdulrahman Al Zamil Chairman KSA
Al Zamil Holding 
Company
Industry University of Southern California
Bader M. Al Sa’ad Managing Director Kuwait
Kuwait Investment 
Authority
Finance Miami University
Dr. Nasser Marafih CEO Qatar Qatar Telecom Telecoms George Washington University
Dr. Khaled bin Abdulaziz Al 
Ghoneim
CEO KSA
STC - Saudi 
Telecom Company
Telecoms Carnegie Mellon University
Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem Chairman UAE DP World Industry Temple University
Dr. Sultan Al Jaber CEO and MD UAE Masdar Energy
Coventry University, California State University, University of 
Southern California 
Ala’a Eraiqat CEO UAE
Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank
Finance George Washington University
Mishal Kanoo Deputy chairman Bahrain Kanoo Group Industry University of St. Thomas, Texas, American University
Sheikha Al Bahar CEO Kuwait
National Bank of 
Kuwait
Finance
 Harvard Business School, Stanford University and Duke 
University
Maha Khalid Al-Ghunaim
Chairperson and 
managing director
Kuwait GIH Finance San Francisco State University
Dr. Naif Al-Mutawa Founder and CEO Kuwait
Teshkeel Media 
Group
Culture and 
Society
Long Island University, Columbia University, Tufts University
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE GCC 
TRANSNATIONAL ELITES AND THE TCC CONNECTIONS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyze the relationship between GCC elites/states w i t h i n  their 
own domestic and regional economies, and within the transnational capitalist class (TCC).  
I will examine the historical stages through which GCC transnational elites have 
established their positions within the TCC.  I argue that the ascension of GCC elites/states 
to global power i s  based on control of the upstream section of their oil industry.  In 2013, 
GCC states produced 24 percent of global crude oil4. In terms of the ownership power 
in oil industry, the upstream section, which consists of economic activities revolving 
around exploration and production of crude oil is more important than the downstream 
section that involves marketing and distribution activities. After the nationalization of oil 
industries, GCC elites have been able to establish themselves as important actors in the 
TCC global network by controlling the upstream section of almost a quarter of global oil 
production. 
The functional embeddedness of GCC elites/states in TCC is not, however, 
merely a result of the role of GCC transnational elites in global upstream oil section.  
GCC elites/states have also framed transnational states with an array of agents and actors 
that include, above all, the capitalist entities of other members of the TCC.  In this chapter, 
                                                            
4 Based on the data available here: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-
east/12302-the-oil-resources-of-the-gcc-states   
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I will discuss the significant role of royal families, GCC conglomerates, powerful merchant 
families, and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) to shed some light on the network 
established by GCC elites/states within TCC.  This will be analyzed in particular based 
on different characteristics of GCC capitalist network, including geographical 
connections, business connections, and family ties. This, in turn, will show that, contrary 
to widely held views, the embeddedness of GCC transnational elites in the TCC is broader 
than the GCC elites/states' role in the global oil industry. 
In order to better comprehend the relationship between the GCC transnational elites 
and the TCC one must first understand to the structural position of the GCC in the global 
structure of accumulation, especially the role of oil - and to a lesser extent natural gas - in 
the global production network.  The GCC is one of the crucial nodes of global oil supply.  
While the production of oil is a highly complicated process, I narrow the analysis in this 
chapter to an overview of the global oil production network that connects the GCC with 
oil firms outside the region.  In that regard, it is useful to discuss the upstream and 
downstream oil activities as they involve the whole spectrum of exploration, development, 
production, refining and marketing, all of which connect the GCC elites directly to Western 
oil firms—which are engaged in refining, marketing and distribution of oil.  The analysis 
of the upstream and downstream activities also allows us to examine where the oil profits 
made by the GCC elites eventually end up-i.e., the global financial and investment 
institutions where the interests of the GCC elites and the Western capitalist classes meet. 
With respect to oil, one watershed moment in the political economy of the GCC 
was the “nationalization” of the oil industries. Although the GCC transnational elites may 
not legally own the oil resources, they have extensive powers over these resources.  The 
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powers of the GCC elites over oil are similar  to the power and control the board members 
and high executives in the corporate  world  exert  over  corporate  resources,  even  though  
these  board  members  and executives too do not legally own the corporation under their 
control.  The GCC states officially control the upstream oil activities, but the profits have 
flowed freely to the GCC conglomerates which have used these profits to expand their 
economic and political power throughout the region.  Therefore the demarcation between 
GCC states and GCC private sector conglomerates is more artifice than reality. 
Nationalization of Oil and the Emergence of GCC Transnational Elites 
Nationalization did in fact increase the power of GCC elites vis-à-vis the 
multinational oil corporations in the upstream activities of global oil industry.  
Nationalization had resulted in a significant and prolonged period of conflict between the 
GCC states and the transnational oil firms who initially were threatened by nationalization.   
However, many of the IOC firms eventually adopted and profited from this new post-
nationalization relationship by focusing on control of downstream oil activities. This 
division of labor eventually led to cooperative ventures between the GCC states and the 
transnational oil corporations. Such arrangement has shaped after a period of heightened 
tension between the GCC states and the IOCs. The reason behind the uneasy transformation 
of GCC oil industries is the fact that during the 40s, 50s, and 60s, the so-called Seven 
Sisters controlled the whole chain of oil supplies, including the downstream and upstream 
activities. However, this unilateral dominant position came to an end in the 70s and 80s, 
partly as a result of nationalization movements in GCC states. The following table indicates 
the ownership structure of GCC oil industries before the period of nationalization. 
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Table 8: Ownership of GCC Crude Oil Production Before Nationalization 
Source: http://modernhistoryproject.org/mhp?Article=FinalWarning&C=8.4 
 
After nationalization of the GCC oil industries during the 70s and 80s, the GCC 
states became the “owners” of the oil facilities used for oil production. However, once 
nationalization took place in a GCC country, the International Oil Corporations (IOCs) 
were forced to move into a different level of oil industry, hence IOCs’ focus on the 
downstream section and, in particular, on the process of oil delivery to refineries. 
Nationalization of oil industries resulted in a new business arrangement between the GCC 
elites/states and IOCs: GCC states became producers of oil and IOCs were now contracting 
with those states for marketing and distribution. The accommodation between the GCC 
states and the IOCs occurred, then, after a period of tension and opposition gave way to 
greater cooperation. 
One significant historical episode that influenced the relationship between IOCs 
and NOCs in the GCC in particular was the Arab Oil Embargo. During that episode, and 
with the leadership of   Saudi Arabia, many GCC states started to use oil as a political 
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weapon. The consequences were so far-reaching and problematic for the GCC that it led to 
the realization among the GCC elites that use of oil as a political weapon is not an efficient 
policy in the long run. However, the episode facilitated the IOCs’ recognition of the new 
and significant role of GCC states in their respective oil industries. Despite the fact that the 
Oil Embargo damaged Western economies,  non-Arab producers such as Iran and 
Venezuela increased their production and eventually the global oil supply re-oriented in a 
way in which Western countries were ensured a reliable access to oil for the foreseeable 
future. It is noteworthy that, even though the Oil Embargo had been declared by 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), two of the funding members 
of OPEC-i.e.  Iran and Venezuela- did not join the Embargo. In response to the Embargo, 
the IOCs established a network of concessionaries -both in downstream and upstream 
sectors- so that if one part of the network became inactive or blocked, the other parts could 
compensate. This new pattern proved to be quite successful as the recent instances show: 
when Iran and Iraq where under comprehensive economic sanctions, Saudi Arabia 
increased its production and made the global oil supply stable. 
At the same time, however, GCC elites/states became fully conscious of the fact 
that they were powerful agents only through business cooperation within the TCC. On the 
other hand, the essential security umbrella for many GCC states and especially for the 
Saudi royal family heavily depend on U.S. support. In the case of Saudis, these ties go back 
as far as the agreement between President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud.  Furthermore, the 
historical U.S. geostrategic ties to the GCC states was eventually accompanied by greater 
ties between the GCC elites and the TCC, an accommodation that followed the initial 
conflict and tension brought on by GCC nationalization. 
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To sum up, nationalization of the GCC oil industries, the 1973 Oil Embargo, and 
the creation of OPEC created a new institutional arrangement in global oil industries where 
the IOCs lost their power as sole controller of oil prices and OPEC emerged as an important 
player. Furthermore, instead of disconnecting IOCs from GCC states, nationalization 
facilitated functional integration between IOCs and GCC elites in which the economic 
embeddedness of GCC bourgeoisie in TCC began. Meanwhile, the symbolic effect of the 
Oil Embargo on Western MNCs and the recognition of GCC’s dependency on U.S. security 
support by GCC elites/states transformed the conflictual relationship between GCC and 
IOCs to a cooperative one. 
The cooperative interaction between IOCs and GCC elites/states can be observed 
in both downstream and upstream sections.  After the nationalization of oil industries, GCC 
elites/states became the sole owners and controllers of GCC upstream oil section. Unlike 
the ill-fated Iranian Oil Nationalization that ended up in the 1953 coup, Saudi Aramco 
made a gradual transition in its ownership that reduced the potential conflicts between 
Saudi Arabia and IOCs. At the beginning of the process of nationalization, the agreement 
between GCC states (such as Qatar or Saudi Arabia) and IOCs allowed the producing 
countries to take for instance 25 percent of the share in operations, "which would rise each 
year by five percent until it reached 51 percent [with compensation] paid to the 
companies...for the “adjusted book value” of the facilities, not for the oil resources." The 
companies would also assist in marketing the oil (Marcel, 2006, pp. 28-29). Today, 
however, in places like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the upstream section of oil industries are 
fully nationalized. The Saudi state-owned oil company, Aramco, has monopolized the 
upstream oil section in that country and replaced the two global giants that had engaged in 
78 
 
the upstream section before, namely Shell and Total. With more than $7 billion in revenue 
and some seven decades of experience in the Saudi oil sector, 
Shell has been a particularly important factor in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, as a 
result of the monopolization of the upstream sector by Aramco, "Shell's efforts to become 
a part of Saudi's upstream oil segment have been frustrated and there are no signs of a 
dramatic near-term change in state policy" (BMI Company Analysis Reports, 4/2009, P. 
1181, Lexus and Nexus).In other words, the GCC oil elites have been able to consolidate 
their control over the means of production in upstream sector of oil industries. The state-
owned oil companies became a vehicle for protecting the private interests and for 
promoting the structure of capital accumulation for the GCC elites. 
In terms of downstream oil industries, some former executives of IOCs became the 
board members of Saudi Aramco.  For instance, the current board includes Sir Mark 
Moody-Stuart (former Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell), Peter Woicke (former Managing 
Director of the World Bank and Chief Executive Officer of the International Finance 
Corporation), and Andrew F. J. Gould (Chairman, BG Group plc). David Kultgen, the 
general counsel and corporate secretary of Saudi Aramco, is a U.S. lawyer, and has a key 
position in Saudi Aramco. According to Aramco’s website, Kultgen “has concentrated on 
transactional and trade law. He participated as a member of the in-house negotiating teams 
responsible for several of the company’s downstream joint- venture investments, both in 
Saudi Arabia and internationally, and was part of a Saudi Aramco team that supported the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources in the negotiation of energy-related   issues   
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during   the   Kingdom’s   successful   accession   to   the   World   Trade Organization"5. 
Involving TCC members in Saudi Aramco and other parts of GCC oil industries made a 
harmonious shift   oil industries possible in the aftermath of nationalization, as 
nationalization was replaced by gradual transnationalization and the further embeddedness 
of GCC elites within the TCC. 
 
                                                            
5 Borrowed from Saudi Aramco official website, available here: 
http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/about/governance/leadership-team/david-b--kultgen.html 
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Table 9: International Oil Corporations (IOCs) in GCC Source: Based on the information 
available here: 
http://www.virginia.edu/igpr/APAG/apagoilcompany.html 
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Unlike the upstream section in which GCC states/elites became significant players 
in the global oil industry, the downstream of the global oil industry is still dominated by 
IOCs. In addition to the strong network in marketing and distribution that had been 
established by the Seven Sisters, the technological advantage of IOCs over national oil 
industries gave them the upper hand in downstream oil industries. In the GCC, and through 
several joint ventures and concessionaires in the downstream section -which include 
marketing and refinery sections, IOCs have been the main economic actors.  Table 9 
indicates just a few important business involvements of IOCs in the GCC. 
The IOCs’ activities have been limited to the downstream part of the oil industries. 
Saudi Arabia’s dependency on IOCs is still part of the picture, although the giant Saudi 
Aramco has now started investing in the downstream section as well.  Nevertheless, the 
GCC oil industry constitutes a relatively small portion of the global downstream oil 
industry. In the transportation sector, which is considered a mid-stream sector, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait currently have three large tanker operators that are among the top 30 
tanker transporters in the world: Vela International Marine (Saudi Arabia), National 
Shipping Co of Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait Oil Tanker Co (Inkpen & Moffett, 2011, P.427). 
All in all, the GCC states are not major actors in the global downstream oil industry.  
The refinery  capacity  of  Saudi  Arabia  only  consists  of  2.9  percent  of  the  total  global  
refinery capacity. Kuwait has only 1 percent and the UAE 1.20 percent of the total global 
refinery capacity while the U.S. stands at 18.4 percent and China controls 14.6 percent of 
that capacity (BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015, P. 16).  Meanwhile the 
GCC downstream section depends heavily on the technological assistance and skilled 
workers (and mainly engineers) of foreign firms.  Without these joint ventures, GCC states 
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are arguably unable to continue their downstream activities by relying merely on their 
indigenous capabilities. 
The new economic ties between the GCC elites and the TCC transformed the oil 
nationalization movement from a “threat” to the global oil industry to an “opportunity” for 
foreign capital and the further integration of the GCC into the transnational class.  From 
the 1980s onwards, by controlling the upstream sector of oil industries the GCC elites were 
able to expand their business activities to other sectors and to create GCC-based 
conglomerates.  Nearly all these conglomerates depend on the support, skill, and 
technology of the broader global business network controlled by the TCC.  Today, these 
conglomerates are crucial nodes of TCC capital accumulation. More importantly, many 
economic activities that are considered as state economic activities are performed by these 
conglomerates.  This arrangement closely relates to the rentier characteristics of these states 
or in Hanieh's words: "The Gulf capitalist class has emerged rapidly and in “hothouse” 
fashion - from state-supported and family-based trading groups in the 1960s and 1970s to 
the domination of a few massive conglomerates in the contemporary period" (Hanieh, 
2011, P. 2).  The following part of this chapter will analyze the process by which GCC 
capital penetrated other sectors of both the GCC economies and the global economies.  In 
turn, the economic ties between the GCC transnational elites and the TCC have grown 
stronger and more complicated than before. 
Forces of Production 
In the following, I will discuss the dominant forces of production within the 
structure of capital accumulation in the GCC.  The previous parts of the dissertation dealt 
with the fact that oil has been central to the “global structure of accumulation” for the GCC 
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capitalist states.  This section focuses on the penetration of GCC capital to other types of 
economic activities in order to show the interconnectedness between the GCC capitalists, 
both within themselves and also with the TCC.  Such interconnectedness is a pre-condition 
for the cohesion of the GCC capitalist class.  In turn, this interconnectedness is the 
manifestation of the emerging role of GCC elites/states in the centralization of global 
capital accumulation by TCC through transnational economic practices. 
Oil is clearly a significant commodity in relation to global class struggles.  In 
particular, two impacts of oil should be taken into account.  On the one hand, the GCC is 
the "largest producer as well as exporter of petroleum and plays a leading role in the world 
in general and OPEC in particular" (GCC Economic Overview, Gulfbase.com).  On the 
other hand, as the following chart indicates, the national revenues of the GCC countries 
heavily depend on oil and natural gas resources. 
 
Chart 2: gulf States are increasingly—and almost completely—dependent on oil 
revenues for their national budgets  
Source: Borrowed from: 
https://www.gulfpolicies.com/media/files/Khaleej_2013_Grand_Research_Final.pdf 
(P.99, In Arabic) 
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From the 1970s onward all the GCC states have earned large amounts of petrodollar 
surplus.  Given the magnitude of these surpluses, the GCC states have not been able to 
invest or spend them within the GCC.  In turn, the GCC elites started investing in other 
economic opportunities. The two major economic sectors that the GCC elites engaged in 
have been the construction industry and the global financial sector.  Up until the end of 
2009, the GCC state- owned construction companies had been involved in 87 mega-
projects - projects worth $150 million or more - within the GCC but not in their home 
country, 40 of which involved "pan-GCC Groups." These 40 projects involving pan-GCC 
groups account for 75 percent of the total project value. In this mode of GCC capital 
accumulation, the UAE arguably plays the most active role given the number of its 
construction projects (Hanieh, 2011).  Meanwhile, the construction industry manifests the 
struggles within regional classes.  In other words, these kinds of investments have been 
growing through increasingly complex economic ties among the GCC- based elites rather 
than through the relationship between the GCC elites and TCC.  Therefore, the construction 
industry manifests the cohesion among the members of the GCC capitalist class. However, 
in many sectors within the construction industry such as communications, IT services, final 
products, and professional engineering skills the whole GCC construction industry depends 
on the technological support of Western multinational corporations.  Unlike the oil supply 
system, the GCC construction industry is not an important node for global capitalism. 
Nevertheless, with the UAE’s crucial role in the construction industry and the Saudis in oil 
industry, "[The Persian Gulf] Capital is hierarchical-structured around a Saudi-UAE axis, 
with other capital connected in a subordinate fashion to this core" (Hanieh, 2011, P. 2). 
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In addition to the revenues from the construction industry the oil revenues have 
opened another venue for the GCC capitalist class to accumulate profit.  This in turn has 
furthered the financialization of the GCC political economy.  This financialization and the 
financial activities of the GCC transnational elites are more consequential, as far as this 
research is concerned, than the GCC construction industry because, unlike the construction 
industry that has increased the regional cohesion within the GCC elites, the financial 
activities often revolve around the economic ties between the GCC elites and the TCC. As 
will be discussed in the following parts, the construction industry is controlled by a network 
of merchant families close to the royal families. When it comes to the transnational 
financial activities, however, the main actors are members of the royalty. 
Transnationalization of GCC States 
This section of the chapter aims at analyzing the nature of the relationship between 
GCC elites, GCC states and GCC conglomerates. GCC states undertake rentier activities 
but also engage in many transnational capital accumulation activities that are vital for 
global capitalism. The structure of the 'state' in the GCC is not separate from the 
socioeconomic structure of the GCC bourgeoisie.  In order to better understand the position 
in this structure of GCC merchant families (who are an extension of GCC royal families), 
it is essential to consider the notion of a transnational rentier state.  The term transnational 
rentier state used in the previous chapter to describe the GCC states is in part meant to 
disclose the structural weaknesses of the institutional settings in the GCC countries.  
Explaining the GCC states only based on their rentier characteristic, however, may lead to 
an unwarranted analytical leap.  One commonly cited understanding of the notion of rentier 
state in the Arab world is suggested by Hazem Beblawi that “the state or the government, 
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being the principal rentier in the economy, plays the crucial role of the prime mover of the 
economic activity” (Beblawi, 1987, P. 386).  Beblawi does not reject the role and existence 
of a “ruling class” when he introduces the notion of a rentier class that controls the wealth 
of the rentier state.   However, Beblawi appears to reduce the notion of rentierism to a 
social function.  In contrast, while I do not reject the rentier characteristic of GCC states, I 
argue that rentierism does not explain all the key characteristics of states in the GCC.  In 
particular, one must understand the whole structure of rentierism in association with the 
demand of the GCC bourgeoisie for securing the process of capital accumulation.  In order 
to achieve that goal, the GCC transnational elites need a secure transnational space for 
transnational capital accumulation. The result is a particular form of transnational rentier 
states. 
There is, of course, a 'rentier class' in the GCC.  This class is maybe best understood 
by viewing it as a transnational rentier class with its interests more based on transnational 
practices rather than on traditional state-centric economic activities. This transnational 
rentier class is the primary shaper and mover of the GCC economic structure.  The social 
structure that Beblawi focuses on is merely a reflection of the economic structure of 
material production of GCC transnational elites. In other words, it is above all the dynamics 
of capital accumulation by the GCC transnational elites that determines the social, political, 
and economic systems of GCC. From the 1970s onwards, many smaller businesses that 
had interaction with the oil industries merged together and became a conglomeration of 
business networks.  This process in the GCC has led to a fast growth of construction and 
service firms that are naturally the extension of the GCC elites' capital accumulation based 
on the considerable surplus value of oil revenues. These radical capitalist expansions in 
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turn have changed the balance of power among different players in the GCC and today the 
global conglomerates are part of the GCC ruling system, as Adam Hanieh sharply puts it: 
"The Gulf capitalist class has emerged rapidly and in “hothouse” fashion—from 
state- supported and family-based trading groups in the 1960s and 1970s to the 
domination of a few massive conglomerates in the contemporary period. Most 
significant—and the key characteristic of the region’s political economy 
examined in this book—is the pronounced internationalization of Gulf capitalism 
over the past decade. Large Gulf conglomerates now conceive their profit-making 
activities across the entire GCC rather than solely within its individual member-
states. They own stakes in a wide variety of industrial, financial, and retail firms 
located throughout the region." (Hanieh, 2011, P. 2) 
The following table includes some important GCC conglomerates that perform a 
variety of economic activities.  In a number of scholarly works, and especially those based 
on the rentier school of economics, these economic activities are simply considered state 
economic activities. There is some evidence to support such a view.  Most importantly, 
almost all these conglomerates are owned and controlled by the members of the GCC 
transnational elites - the same network that also created states to protect and promote its 
own interests. However, it may be oversimplifying to ignore the rising corporate power in 
the political economy of GCC.  To provide some perspective with respect to this corporate 
power, Table 10 shows ten conglomerates in GCC that monopolized many aspects of GCC 
economy. 
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Table 10: Important GCC Conglomerates and their Activities 
Source: The Official Websites of Each Conglomerate 
The above conglomerates are in essence capitalist agencies that maintain two kinds 
of social relations: they interact with the GCC capitalist class and connect the GCC 
transnational elites to TCC.  For instance, the Fakhro Group, which is owned by Fakhro 
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family of Bahrain, has business arrangements with such  global  corporate  players  as  
Dongfeng  Motor  Corporation  (a  Chinese  giant corporation), McDonalds, LG, Sony, 
OKI, Ericsson, Budget, Avaya, Aastra, Softex, MK Electric Co., Brand Rex Ltd., Morley 
IAS, Honeywell, ABB, GAC logistics, and Mobil6.    
As another example, the Kanoo International Property Broker's main economic 
activity is to provide services for global consumers who are purchasing properties with the 
"specific focus on the UK."7  One subsidiary of the Kanoo group, also based in Bahrain, is 
Maersk Kanoo, which serves as agent for Maersk group, a Danish conglomerate 
represented by Kanoo group in the GCC.  The globally oriented approach of Kanoo is 
evident on their website, which states "[m]ainline services from the United States, Europe 
and the Far East call at Jebel-Ali port every week.  The port serves as a transit point for the 
Middle East and is a dedicated feeder network that offers coverage to all ports in the Gulf."8  
In its Arabian Equipment Rentals enterprise, Kanoo Group has partnership with Sykes 
group in the United States. The largest insurance company in the GCC, AXA Gulf 
Insurance, is a subsidiary of Kanoo group.  This company is also a part of the overseas 
operation of the French multinational corporation, AXA.  Dallah  group,  which  was  
established by the Kamel  family,  is  known  as  an  “Islamic conglomerate.”  It engages 
in many Islamic economic and financial activities including Islamic banking and Islamic 
insurance. In terms of economic activities, Dallah is one the most diversified 
                                                            
6 http://www.fakhro.com/   
7 http://kanoo.com/partners/kanoo_property.aspx   
8 http://kanoo.com/partners/maersk.aspx   
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conglomerates in the region. Another conglomerate in the region belongs to the Bin Laden 
family, which is one of the merchant families in Saudi Arabia closest to the Royal Court.  
Given the atrocities and devastations that Osama Bin Laden, a member of this family, 
caused in the Muslim world and in the West, it is not surprising that controversial claims 
and allegations have been leveled against the Bin Laden conglomerate.  Some maintain 
that the family has had secret ties with the Western capitalist class despite its continued 
support for Osama Bin Laden.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 shed some light on some of the 
family’s previously quiet business ties. For instance, on October 26, 2001, Kurt 
Eichenwald published an article in the New York Times, entitled "Bin Laden Family 
Liquidates Holdings With Carlyle Group."  The article states that, "the Saudi family of 
Osama bin Laden is severing its financial ties with the Carlyle Group, a private investment 
firm known for its connections to influential Washington political figures. . . ."9  This action 
was probably taken in response to the 9/11 attacks.  
The Al-Ghurair group, based in the UAE, has spread its economic activities in four 
continents and around twenty countries.  Its economic activities include such diverse 
sectors as "Foods, Construction, Resources and Properties, with additional sector 
participation in Energy, Printing, Retail and Education."10 
Jafza, a subsidiary of Dubai World group, "is a dynamic base for thousands of 
businesses, from over 100 countries, sustaining over 135,000 jobs and attracting more than 
                                                            
9http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/26/business/bin-laden-family-liquidates-holdings-with-carlyle-
group.html   
10 http://www.al-ghurair.com/en/the-group/   
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20% of the UAE’s foreign direct investment; all the while exceeding 50% of Dubai’s total 
exports, with a phenomenal value for trade of $69 billion."11  
The Al-Futtaim family from the UAE has an interesting history.  The family’s 
business was struggling during the 1940s and 1950s. At the time it had certain political 
conflicts with Al-Makoutm family, the ruling family of Dubai. The conflict resulted in the 
exile of Hamed al-Futtaim, a prominent member of the family. However, they later 
managed to regain their economic position by cooperating with the al-Maktoum family.  
Al-Futtaim Private Company LLC, through its subsidiaries, owns and operates 
commerce, industry, and services businesses.  It uses a network of showrooms to distribute 
passenger and commercial vehicles manufactured by Toyota, Lexus, Hino, Honda, Volvo, 
Chrysler, Jeep, and Dodge.  It also sells construction equipment, and provides used car 
sale, rental, and leasing services.  The company distributes Panasonic, Toshiba, Sanyo, and 
AFTRON products that are offered through a network of re-sellers, mass merchandisers, 
channel partners, and retail outlets of branded stand-alone stores.  It provides solutions to 
the building and construction industry in the UAE and lower Gulf region.  Additionally, 
the company represents retail brands including Marks & Spencer, IKEA, ACE, Toys “R” 
Us, and Intersport, as well as offering fashion, sportswear, watches, and jewelry products 
through a network of its retail outlets. The company also serves investment banking, equity 
broking, and fund management sectors through specialist companies, joint ventures, and 
associations.  Its logistics, travel, advertising, training,  IT  and  systems,  ship  and  rig  
repair,  and  materials -testing  services  support  the company’s core business verticals.  It 
                                                            
11 http://jafza.ae/about-us/our-history/   
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also offers development, procurement, construction, and leasing services for real estate 
projects. The company was formerly known as Al-Futtaim Group. Al-Futtaim Private 
Company LLC is based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.12 
The above examples of conglomerates are all owned by prominent Arab families, 
some of which are themselves members of the royal families; the rest are connected to 
GCC royal families.  For instance, the chairman of Kingdom Holding Company, Prince al-
Waleed Bin Talal, who is dubbed “the richest Arab in the world,” is the grandson of Ibn 
Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia.  Likewise, the chairman of Dubai World is Ahmed bin 
Saeed Al Maktoum, who is the uncle of the ruler of Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the merchant families who control the significant 
GCC conglomerates have economic or family ties with the GCC royal families.  The black 
lines in the Figure represent familial ties. 
                                                            
12 http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=13011365 
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Figure 413: The Economic and Family Ties Between Merchant Families and Royal 
Families in GCC 
Sources: Based on data and information in the websites of mentioned conglomerates, 
business press, and scholarly resources14
 
                                                            
13 Most probably there are more connections than the figure is indicating. These connections are 
based on the reliable resources and sufficient to indicate the fact that GCC economy is merely a 
family business, controlled by GCC capitalist class.   
14 Rush, Alan. Al-Sabah: History & Genealogy of Kuwait's Ruling Family, 1752-1987. Garnet & 
Ithaca Press, 1987. Hertog, S., Luciani, G., & Valeri, M. (Eds.). (2013). Business politics in the 
Middle East. Hurst Publishers. Sabri, S. (2001). The House of Saud in commerce: A study of royal 
entrepreneurship in  Saudi Arabia. Sharaf Sabri. Gause, F. G. (1994). Oil monarchies: domestic 
and security challenges in the Arab Gulf states. Council on Foreign Relations.   
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The above network indicates the economic and familial ties between the GCC 
merchant families, who control the GCC conglomerates, and the GCC royal families.  The 
network does not include the economic and familial ties within the GCC royal families and 
the similar ties within the merchant families. In fact, there are many economic and familial 
ties within the GCC royal families that are rooted in the old relationships between the ruling 
tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. For instance, the Saudi ruling family of Aal Saud, the ruling 
Al- Sabah family of Kuwait, and the ruling Al-Khalifa family of Bahrain all “belong to 
Onaiza tribe and have originated from the central part of the Nejd" (Sabri, 2001, P. 22).  
Some of the key merchant families are connected to each other through both economic and 
familial ties: 
“The Hijazis merge[d] with. . .the non-Arabian. . .immigrants.  These people are 
Hindus and Indian Muslims, Persians and Hawala - 'wonderers.’  The members 
of the last group are Sunni Muslims who left Arabia several hundred years ago, 
lived in Iran and became partly Persianised and have since returned to the Arabian 
side of the Gulf.  Needless to say the Hawala, who include the Kanoo, Almoayed 
and Fakhroo families of Bahrain, are nowadays at pains to the brevity of their stay 
across the water.  They are regarded by all parts of the population as being very 
much more Arabian than the other long- standing immigrants”. (Field, 1984, P. 
75) 
Generally speaking, the religious belief and tribal background of important families 
determine their position in the hierarchy of political and economic power in the GCC.  For 
instance, the Sunni background of such groups as Kanoo and Fakhro has helped them to 
establish their business position in Bahrain.  Interestingly, the majority of Bahrainis are 
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Shia, but the ruling family is Sunni. It is true that the merchant families that control the 
GCC conglomerates have limited influence on politics. However, they have sufficient 
access to the royal families based on economic or family ties to become important part of 
GCC capital accumulation.  
The above-mentioned conglomerates also connect the GCC capitalist class to TCC. 
The generous financial and political support of the GCC royal families facilitated the 
growth of interconnectedness between GCC conglomerates and other markets all around 
the globe. Figure 5, which is based on Table 9 above, clarifies the geographical 
interconnectedness.15 
 
  
                                                            
15 For more details on GCC conglomerates economic ties with multinational and transnational 
corporations see the Appendix.   
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Figure 5: The Geographical Networks of GCC Conglomerates 
Source: Based on Table 1 
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The Financial Power of the GCC Elites 
 
The GCC’s recent state of political economy suggests a growing tendency within 
the GCC elites to promote economic diversity beyond oil - in particular, they seek to 
develop the financial sector of GCC capitalism.  Although oil remains the lynchpin, the 
clear preference is now the global investment sector.  The GCC elites have invested their 
wealth in a wide variety of businesses and with other dominant capitalist actors. Over-
accumulation along with financialization have resulted in new and strong ties between the 
GCC transnational elites and the TCC. 
These new economic ties have resulted in the dramatic expansion of local 
bourgeoisie who are quite powerful on the regional level.  The previous section discusses 
how the GCC conglomerates strengthen the economic ties between the GCC bourgeoisie 
and multinational corporations.   One result has been the growth of local, regional 
conglomerates, semi-factories and construction facilities that are completely dependent on 
the skills and technology of the foreign bourgeoisie. 
This section will look more closely at the financial activities of the GCC 
transnational elites, which manifest a new phase of economic connections between the 
GCC elites and the TCC.  To a certain extent, financialization in the GCC indicates more 
crucial and stable ties between the GCC elites and TCC.  While the important merchant 
families in the region control the GCC conglomerates, it is the royal families themselves 
who directly engage in important businesses with Western financial firms using the 
financial power of SWFs controlled by these royal families. 
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The Historical Background of GCC Financialization 
This study focuses on the financial ties of the West-GCC relationship. New 
partnerships independent from oil and gas have been developing over the past decades that 
render the significance of changes in the global energy market relatively less important. 
The growing significance of the GCC petrodollars in the “financialization of production” 
has been central to this process.  The term "financialization of production" is in part, the 
manifestation of increasing reliance by TCC firms on global financial assets to buttress 
profit margins.  The U.S. foreign policy in the GCC is colored by the economic interests 
of the U.S. capitalist class.  In turn, the common interest of the GCC elites and the TCC in 
terms of capital accumulation have led to the structural penetration of financial 
globalization into GCC’s political economy.  This structural shift has been formed by the 
dominant social strata within global capitalism and in the Arabian Peninsula, i.e., the GCC 
transnational elites. 
Accordingly, analyzing the characteristics of the GCC elites in terms of financial 
globalization is crucial to better understand the status of these transnational elites within 
the TCC. Any discussion of the GCC elites without paying attention to the rise of global 
finance would be an oversimplification.  Thus, it is important to analyze the financial 
characteristics of the GCC states themselves in their interactions with Western countries, 
the global private sector, and certain global institutions.  Using this framework, one can 
trace the position of the GCC transnational elites within the global financial system.  This 
section will also examine the GCC states’ domestic financial system and, in particular, the 
extent to which the GCC’s financial systems depend on the GCC oil sectors. 
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The Essence of the GCC’s Financial Power 
Structurally speaking, two impacts of oil should be taken into account: the need of 
industrial powers to have reliable access to oil and gas and the simple fact that extraction, 
processing and export of oil and oil derivatives bring a large amount of capital surplus.   In 
the previous section, I discussed in detail the need for industrial powers to retain access to 
oil and gas.  This section addresses the characteristics and power dynamic of the capital 
surplus, which gives considerable power to the agents who control oil.  In the case of the 
GCC states, those agents are the royal families.  (See Chart 2.) 
The GCC transnational elites have invested their considerable surpluses in the 
global financial sectors, and the rise of electronic platforms for financialization of 
production has greatly helped them in this regard. In addition to access to oil revenues, the 
structural forces that emerged  within  the  TCC  have  also  directed  the  GCC  elite  
towards  engaging  in  financial activities. 
The earlier pattern of the West-GCC oil relations was mostly about the demand for 
oil itself, where the dominant paradigm of global production was industrialization.  In the 
current phase of industrialization, petrodollars remain a substantial, if not inseparable, part 
of the new mode of accumulation, i.e. financialization of production.  A notable distinction 
between the previous  mode  of  accumulation  and  the  new  one  is  the  growing  
significance  of  financial activities of the TCC that could bypass the interests of states - at 
least the interest of states in the Realist paradigm that conceptualizes the “state” as an 
autonomous entity.  Using financial activities, the GCC has been considerably more 
successful in advancing and protecting its own business goals.  Furthermore, technological 
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changes have allowed a “digital techno-economic paradigm” rooted in Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICTs). 
For the new mode of accumulation, oil is not merely a fuel that is necessary for 
manufacturing, transportation, or providing the basic needs of human societies.  The oil 
revenues in the form of petrodollars are also used at the heart of the global private financial 
sector.   The previous chapters briefly discuss some financial transactions of oil revenues 
by the GCC, notably SWFs.  This chapter explores how petrodollars feed the global 
financial sector and private financial firms.  Before further analysis, however, it is 
necessary to consider a series of historical facts that have led to the current financial 
position of the GCC in global capitalism. 
The collapse of Bretton Woods strengthened the ability of TCC actors to expand 
their capital investments and financial ties on a global scale, with the support of states and 
at the expense of the working class.  In post-Bretton Woods era we are witnessing a process 
of state and TCC-led global financialization that was a response to a crisis of the previous 
capital accumulation regime (a persistent falling rate of profit).  In the GCC, the state had 
never functioned in a classical sense and states have been always dominated by the ruling 
classes of the region.  But the efforts of the TCC, working with powerful Western states 
led by the United States, has been deregulating the global finance that contributed to 
broader global alliances between the TCC and the GCC elites/states. State functions did 
not diminish; they were redirected for the benefit of transnational capitalist actors who felt 
that the previous Bretton Woods arrangements were too restrictive and undermined profits.  
Most TCC interests previously supported the Bretton Woods system until the 
contradictions of that system proved difficult to sustain profits.  Then they aggressively 
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lobbied states to reduce costs by policies that weakened labor, reduced regulation, and 
employed tax breaks, tax havens and the use of global institutions like the IMF and the 
World Bank, as well as U.S. state power to expand opportunities for foreign investment 
and financialization at lower costs.  The eradication of autonomous functions of states in 
the West led to the emergence of “neo-liberal states” that are supporting the embedded 
relationship between the GCC transnational elites and other capitalist states/classes. 
At the same time, the process of neo-liberal financialization has been accelerated 
by the formation of a new techno-economic paradigm that is based on digital technologies.  
New technologies have helped reduce the pressure of labor markets on the TNCs by 
making the large part of global labor market more competitive than ever.  With the lack of 
state intervention or an empowered working class, an attractive environment became 
available to the TNCs, inviting them to shift their resources to the financial sector. At the 
same time, the private financial sector had the great advantage (compared to private 
industrial sector) that states could conveniently support them without inviting the objection 
of powerful labor unions.  In the United States, one indication of this state support may be 
found during and after the recent financial crisis, where the government embarked on the 
so-called ‘national bailout’ of certain financial institutions.  According to David Harvey, 
“The term ‘national bailout’ is. . .inaccurate, because they’re not bailing out the 
whole of the  existing  financial  system  –  they’re  bailing  out  the  banks,  the  
capitalist  class, forgiving them their debts, their transgressions, and only theirs.  
The money goes to the banks but not to the homeowners who’ve been foreclosed 
on, which is beginning to create anger.  And the banks are using the money not to 
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lend to anybody but to buy other banks. They are consolidating their class power. 
(Harvey, March/13/2009, counterpunch) 
The distinction between national and global financial circuits is becoming more 
blurred and diffuse.  Therefore, state policies have transnational implications, including the 
U.S. “bailout” of financial firms, which included transnational firms and actors from a wide 
range of nationalities, such as investors within the GCC.  Thus, the GCC was becoming a 
much more integrated part of transnational capitalist activities, represented by the 
investment of petrodollars in the most globally competitive transnational banks.    
Following the 2008 financial crisis, GCC SWFs were utilized by Western banks as a 
conduit for investment.  It is especially important to note that GCC capital in primarily 
U.S. banks and in the Eurodollar market was an important countervailing source of revenue 
for U.S. banks during the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America.  In other words, the GCC 
SWFs have become significant sources of support for the TCC to alleviate the pressure of 
financial crises on global capital accumulation. 
In the GCC a similar structure emerged although with certain differences.  In this 
regard, the main distinction between the GCC states and Western capitalist states is the fact 
that there is no clear line between the state - i.e. the royal families - and the relevant non-
state actors - wealthy merchants.  As discussed before, the family-oriented states of the 
GCC has legitimized an institutional setting in which influential actors can be both 
merchant and politicians at the same time.  In contrast, in the United States, business actors 
and political actors are often connected through complex institutional channels, such as 
lobbies, power clubs and fundraising platforms. In the GCC states the connection between 
economic and political actors is often arranged around important families through ties of 
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kinships and cross-marriages.  These patterns create an easy path for development of 
‘transnational practices’ and for further capital accumulation with no significant pressure 
from the society. 
Similar to domestic dependency on oil revenues, the international economic 
activities of the GCC have pretty much been operating with the financial backbone of 
energy resources. According to the following chart, in the past few years, the GCC’s oil 
supply has been more than 20 percent of the world’s total supply.  At the same time, an 
overwhelming percentage of the GCC states’ general revenue depends on absolute and 
semi-oil revenues (82 percent of UAE’s, 90 percent of Bahrain’s, 93 percent of Saudi 
Arabia’s, 87 percent of Oman’s, 70 percent of Qatar’s, and 94 percent of Kuwait’s).16   
Furthermore, the amount of the GCC’s petro-dollars has increased “to levels greater than 
the absorptive capacity of producer national economies can accommodate" (Ehrlich, 1980, 
P. 97). 
 
 
Table 11: GCC Total Oil Supply (Thousand Barrels Per Day) 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
                                                            
16https://www.gulfpolicies.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1475&Itemid
=455, in Arabic 
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The large oil supply-see table 11- and the inability of the GCC’s economic 
structures to absorb these revenues have brought revenue surpluses to this sub-region.  
Therefore, it is important to analyze the structural responses of GCC transnational elites to 
these surpluses.  According to one of Deutsche Bank’s reports on internal GCC financial 
markets, “[i]n a global comparison, finance in the GCC has remained small” (Deutsche 
Bank, 2012, P. 9).  GCC-based financial markets are not important when compared to 
global centers of financial activities such as London or New York. The transnational 
financial activities of the GCC elites in other regions are considerably higher than their 
intra-GCC activities. In particular, the GCC elites have used their financial power to help 
maintain the hegemonic position of the U.S. dollar in the global economy.  According to a 
report produced by Deutsche Bank: 
“In the GCC economies, the overall volume of assets managed by institutional 
investors is large and compares with global institutional assets. Their total value 
stands at an estimated USD 3.6 tr, which corresponds to around 370% of GDP in 
the region, i.e. significantly above the global average of institutional assets to 
GDP of around 230%. GCC institutional assets amount to 2.5% of the institutional 
assets under management globally, two-and-a-half times the region’s share in 
global GDP.  The distribution of this very high volume of institutional assets in 
the GCC follows a pattern that underlines the continued strong presence of the 
state and wealthy families in the region: More than two-thirds of all institutional 
assets are held by state-sponsored vehicles. . .69% of the institutional  assets  in  
the  region  are  administered  by  state-sponsored  investors, including 45% held 
by sovereign wealth funds, 19% in official reserves, and 5% by other  
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government-sponsored  enterprises.”  (Deutsche Bank, 2012, P. 20, [“footnotes 
omitted”]) 
One main distinction between financial systems in the West and those in the GCC 
is the fact that the GCC financial system is heavily dependent on oil revenues, and as such 
is not a separate, independent sector of the economy.  Similar to other sectors of the GCC 
economies, the GCC states do not seem to show infrastructural diversification even after 
decades of so-called development.  All the sections of the economy are still dependent on 
oil.  Therefore, what is shifting in the GCC is not merely financialization, but along with 
the GCC investments in the industrial private sector, we observe the use of oil revenue in 
the global financial sector by GCC transnational elites. It is worth noting that both kinds 
of investments - financial and non- financial - are materialized through the economic ties 
between the GCC bourgeoisie and the TCC. 
Small Financial Sector, But Important 
The GCC does not have an independent financial sector, unlike its energy sector.  
In other words, the GCC financial sector heavily relies on the oil sector.  The other issue is 
the size of the GCC-based financial systems in contrast to the size of global financial sector.  
The GCC financial section is generally speaking small.  But, when it comes to the role of 
SWFs in TCC financial institutions, GCC finance plays a crucial role. The SWFs have seen 
a significant growth trend of investments in TCC financial institutions. To better 
understand the weakness of GCC-based financial sector, Table 12 shows the percentage of 
domestic credit provided by the financial sector in GCC, which is considerably lower than 
the total amount in the world. 
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Country Name 2013 
Saudi Arabia -7.876053 
United Arab Emirates NA 
Oman 36.155621 
Kuwait 52.841319 
Qatar 73.854542 
Bahrain 78.35019 
GCC Average 48.240334 
European Union 145.1 
OECD members 202.7 
East Asia & Pacific 149.8 
World 166.2 
 
Table 12: Domestic credit provided by financial sectors (% of GDP)17 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/topic/financial-sector 
 
Thus, the GCC financial sector is not powerful in comparison with the Western 
financial sector. However, this does not mean that the GCC is not an important player 
within financial globalization. In fact, the GCC-based SWFs that are controlled by 
individual GCC elites-royal families have been playing an important role in supporting 
                                                            
17 Domestic credit provided by the financial sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross 
basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The financial sector 
includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations 
where data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do 
incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are 
finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and 
foreign exchange companies. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS 
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Western financial institutions during difficult times such as during and after the 2008  
financial crisis. The support of non-GCC financial institutions by the GCC financial 
powers was not limited to Western firms. Instead, it seems that during this last global 
financial crisis, the GCC intended to become a significant financial player on the global 
scale.   
But despite its global motivations the GCC has not been able to improve its financial 
sector. This failure has been one of reasons why the GCC has not suffered from the 
implications of financial crisis.  On the one hand, the GCC’s petrodollar surplus has 
compensated for the deficit in economic sectors that had been influenced directly by the 
crisis.  On the other hand, there is no properly designed financial sector that could influence 
the whole economy of the GCC countries. Instead of propping up domestic economies, the 
GCC’s petrodollars were transferred to important global financial corporations. The 
following table shows important transactions involving the GCC during the financial crisis. 
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Date Target 
Company 
Sovereign Wealth Fund(s) Investment size in US $ 
(Percent stake in target) 
 
 
10/31/2008 
 
 
Barclays 
Abu Dhabi Royal Family; Qatar 
Holding; Challenger Universal 
(Qatar) 
 
 
US $11.8 billion (31.5 %) 
 
10/16/2008 
 
Credit Suisse 
Qatar Investment Authority 
(QIA) 
 
US $2.2 billion 
 
 
1/15/2008 
 
 
Citigroup 
GIC(Singapore), KIA (Kuwait), 
Prince Alwaleed bin Talal (Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
 
US $12.5 billion (9.3%) 
 
 
 
1/15/2008 
 
 
 
Merrill Lynch 
 
Korea Investment Corporation 
(S.Korea), KIA (Kuwait), Mizuho 
Corporate Bank (Japan), et al. 
 
 
 
US $6.6 billion (14.5%) 
 
11/27/2007 
 
Citigroup 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) 
 
US $7.5 billion (4.9 % stake) 
 
11/7/2007 
 
Apollo 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) 
 
9% (amount not disclosed) 
 
10/30/2007 
 
Och-Ziff 
Dubai International Capital 
(DIC) 
 
US $1.26 billion (9.9%) 
9/20/2007 Carlyle Group Mubadala (Abu Dhabi) US $ 1.25 billion (7.5 %) 
 
Table 13: GCC-SWF Capital Infusions into Financial Institutions 
Source: Barrowed from Table 2, Review of SWF Capital Infusions Into Financial 
Institutions 
(May 2006- June 2009),  
(Sauvant et. al., 2012, P. 45) 
Arguably, more important than the amounts of money transferred from the GCC to 
these financial corporations is the crucial role that has been played by the GCC elites in 
saving the process of financial globalization by exerting substantial political and economic 
power. This is parallel with what happened within the Western capitalist systems through 
the same financial institutions that the GCC had investments in.  According to Joseph 
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Stiglitz, the "political action committees and employees of securities and investment gave 
$156 million in political contributions in the 2008 election cycle.  Goldman Sachs, 
Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Credit Suisse gave $22.7 million and 
spent more than $25 million combined on lobbying in the period" (Stiglitz, 2010, P. 343; 
note that in 2009 Merrill Lynch was officially acquired by Bank of America). During the 
same election period, Barclays, Apollo Global Management and Carlyle Group spent more 
than $4.5 million on lobbying.18  While the content of these lobbying activities may not be 
all clear, one obvious outcome has been the overall support of the U.S. government for the 
U.S. financial sector, instead of placing further restrictions and regulations on financial 
activities that brought about the crisis in the first place.  The state provided generous loans 
to the private sector under the rationale that institutions such as AIG were “too big to fail.”  
As for the GCC’s involvement, it may be added that they started investing in Western 
corporations when these corporations were on the edge of collapse - that is, at a time when 
no other business actor seemed interested to invest in financial firms.  These investments 
may be explained by an interest in protecting class power and in further re- consolidation 
of the TCC and capital accumulation. 
The above-mentioned financial activities show the depth of the financial ties 
between the GCC transnational elites and TCC.  The real significance of the GCC financial 
sector is its role in protecting and promoting the interests and position of the GCC 
transnational elites - a position that can be elevated by protecting the financial interests of 
the TCC. 
                                                            
18 data are available at http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
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The GCC’s Role in Global Financial Institutions 
David Harvey describes the 2008 financial crisis "as a class event in which a certain 
structure of exploitation broke down and is about to be displaced by an even deeper 
structure of exploitation" (Harvey, March/13/2009, counterpunch). The previous 
discussion regarding the GCC’s financial involvements in the 2008 crisis suggests that 
Harvey’s description may have some merit. As Harvey had predicted the outcome of the 
crisis, neo-liberalism has successfully survived the crisis if we consider it as a "class 
project." Eventually, the financial firms could convince the necessary decision-makers 
about the validity of the discourse of "too-big-to fail." The two aspects of Harvey's 
explanation - the “class project” nature of neo-liberalism and the deeper structure of 
exploitation - are arguably manifested in the transaction between the GCC transnational 
elites and their TCC counterparts. The role of Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been 
considerable within the global financial system in a way in which Saudis' assistance to 
capitalist institutions has become crucial. 
The GCC also has a significant role within global financial institutions. Saudi 
Arabia is among the eight executive members of the IMF along with the United States, 
Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, China and Russian Federation. Compared to 
the other executive members, Saudi Arabia’s small financial sector is almost completely 
framed by external advisory groups such as the World Bank's Technical Cooperation 
Program (TCP) and International Finance Corporation (IFC).  According to an IMF report, 
"IFC is working closely with Saudi public institutions and International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) to undertake global initiatives that benefit private sector activities in 
developing countries.  So far, these efforts have resulted in obtaining commitments of over 
112 
 
US$500 million" (Staff Report For The 2-14 Article IV Consultation-Informational Annex, 
P. 4). With the leading role of Saudi Arabia, the GCC participates in some significant global 
arrangements, mostly through the IMF and the World Bank. 
In terms of the IMF, Saudi Arabia agreed to assist in implanting certain financial 
strategies such as the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and the New Arrangements 
to Borrow (NAB). Under GAB: 
“. . . member countries are enabled to borrow specified amounts of currencies 
from eleven industrial countries (or their central banks), under certain 
circumstances, at market related rates of interest. As at the beginning of 2002, the 
potential amount of credit available to the Fund under the GAB totaled SDR 17 
billion (around US $22 billion), with an additional SDR 1.5 billion available under 
an associated arrangement with Saudi Arabia”. (Shekhar, 2009, P. 479) 
As seen in to Chart 3, Saudi Arabia is the eighth contributor to the IMF among 38 
IMF members. GAB was initiated in 1962; however, its framework has been changing 
since its inception.  GAB is one of the IMF tools for stabilizing the global financial system.  
It was used particularly after the recent financial crisis.  GAB has been criticized as a 
vehicle for re-consolidating the power of the Group of Ten over the Global South.  NAB, 
on the other hand, has been established in order to increase the power of GAB, and further 
protect the hegemonic position of the G-10 within the financial system. 
According to another IMF report, "[i]n June 1995, the Group of Seven summit 
meeting in Halifax, Canada called on the Group of Ten (G-10) and other countries with the 
financial capacity to support the international monetary system to develop financing 
arrangements with the aim of doubling as soon as possible the amount of currency available 
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under the GAB."19 Because China is the third largest contributor to the IMF, it was believed 
at the time that China could "easily arrange coalitions that could block the borrowing 
facility if that was in its interests," thereby derailing the IMF efforts to rehabilitate the 
global financial system (Heep, 2014, P. 125). Saudi Arabia is not among the G10 states, 
but it is one of the G20. Saudi Arabia mad a sizable contribution to doubling the size of 
GAB (through the creation of NAB) - a contribution more than the combined contribution 
of four members of the G10, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland 
(see the following chart). This sizable Saudi contribution alleviated some concerns about 
China’s potential undermining of the IMF’s efforts. Despite Saudi's generosity, the country 
has never been rewarded with decision-making powers in global financial institutions such 
as the IMF. 
                                                            
19 https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9705.HTM 
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Chart 3: Amount of Contributions in NAB by Country 
Source: https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/gabnab.pdf, based on the data on 
page1, NAB Participants and Credit Amounts, 201 
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The   Neo-Gramscian understanding of the hegemonic power explains why, despite 
Saudi Arabia’s exclusion from the decision-making process, it has made   sizeable   
contributions   to   the   IMF.  According to Neo-Gramscian theories a mutual acceptance 
of the hierarchy of power between the global south and the global north is pivotal in the 
establishment and endurance of the hegemonic power.  The mutual acceptance of the 
hierarchy functions as a shock absorber for the inherent uncertainty within capitalism.  
Moreover, one can compare the IMF financial agreements with the Marshall Plan that 
pursued two strategic goals at the same time: political intervention and promotion of a 
capitalist system. In Soederberg's words, “it becomes clear that the NAB was an attempt to 
reproduce the political domination of the IMF in the South. . . .the NAB, like its counterpart 
the GAB, is based on a putative interstate consensus. Hence the lack of legal mandate 
attached to the NAB and the choice of wording 'Arrangement' not 'Agreement' seemed to 
replicate the imposed U.S. leadership" (Soederberg, 2004, pp. 101-102). 
It is worth considering once again the outcome of the current financial relationship 
between Saudi Arabia (and the GCC) with the IMF.  As I argued earlier, the relationship 
between the two sides remains, at its core, a class project. The financial arrangement is 
intended to guarantee the stability of the GCC authoritarian status quo in return for their 
role in stabilizing the global financial sector for the TCC (both through private channels 
and via international institutions).  The NAB, in particular, has been designed to ensure 
financial stability.  According to the IMF, "potential participants [in NAB] have agreed to 
meet once a year at the time of the Annual Meetings of the IMF to discuss, among other 
matters pertaining to the NAB, macroeconomic and financial markets developments, 
especially those that could have an impact on the stability of the financial system and lead 
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to a possible need for the IMF to seek supplementary resources.”20 NAB is particularly 
important given the powerful destabilizing forces unleashed by the new capitalist mode of 
accumulation that relies on financial globalization. We observe a new role of the GCC in 
stabilizing TCC banks through infusions of capital which link them in mutual profit-
making enterprises with the TCC. 
It is not surprising that the outcome of the interaction between the GCC and the 
West appears to undermine the mainstream claim that "there is a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between democracy, open capital flows and redistributive domestic 
social policies" (Dailami, 2000, P. 25).  As demonstrated in Figure 6, the GCC region has 
experienced relatively high financial openness during the past decade.  Financial openness 
is a particularly important analytical index because of the deepening financialization of the 
global economy that has served to tie a wide range of capitalist interests together in linked 
profit-making ventures. Financial openness is a more accurate measure than trade openness 
for examining economic openness of a country in the current phase of globalization.  
Similar to the argument made in the first chapter on the relationship -or lack thereof – 
between overall economic openness and democracy in the GCC, the high level of financial 
openness in the GCC supports the stability of authoritarian regimes. Figure 7 indicates the 
recent status of the GCC states in terms of democracy relative to the global average.  It also 
provides scores for financial openness. 
                                                            
20 https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9705.HTM 
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Figure 6: The Chinn-Ito Index for Financial Openness for GCC and World 21 
Source: http://knoema.com/bzftmbe/the-chinn-ito-financial-opennes-index 
 
 
Figure 7: Democracy Index22 
Source: http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-
2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf 
                                                            
21 "The Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) is an index measuring a country's degree of capital account 
openness. The index wasinitially introduced by Chinn and Ito (Journal of Development 
Economics, 2006). KAOPEN is based on the binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation 
of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)". Available here: 
http://knoema.com/bzftmbe/the-chinn-ito-financial-opennes-index   
22http://www.sudestada.com.uy/Content/Articles/421a313a-d58f-462e-9b24-
2504a37f6b56/Democracy-index-2014.pdf   
118 
 
Given the above scores and the documented ties of financial connections 
between the GCC and the TCC, it is reasonable to conclude that the financial openness in 
the GCC is essentially a class project to stabilize the status quo of the GCC transnational 
elites. In turn, the GCC transnational elites, primarily the Saudis, have been supporting 
both international financial institutions and the global financial private sector during 
financial crises. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed two significant components of the GCC capitalist class.  The 
first component is the GCC conglomerates that are controlled by a network consisting of 
the GCC royal families and important merchant families. The second component is the 
SWF-based financial activities that are mainly controlled by the GCC royal families.  
Therefore, the two capitalist agents in the region - the GCC royal families and the GCC 
merchant families - control the two key capitalist institutions in the region, SWFs and the 
GCC conglomerates, which are the primary shapers and promoters of the GCC 
transnational space. They have strong connections with significant multinational 
corporations and with the TCC. They control all state institutions that are used for the 
purpose of transnational capital accumulation. The GCC states play a significant role in the 
process of transnationalization. SWFs that are supposedly “state-owned” institutions are 
the nexus of transnational capital accumulation in the age of modern financial activities.  
They are private enough to provide a comfortable setting for the global capitalist class to 
protect its interests, and they are public enough to avoid the usual regulatory scrutiny 
targeting private institutions. As William Robinson puts it: 
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“. . .the TNS is a transnational capitalist state because its own reproduction is 
dependent on reproducing the circuits of transnational accumulation. This is so 
for a majority of the organs that make up the TNS network, in particular, national 
states networked into larger international forums, such as UN agencies, the G-20, 
the IMF, and the WB. (Robinson, 2014, P. 75) 
The other significant role that the GCC states play in terms of transnational capital 
accumulation is that their repressive political machines provide stability for its 
transnational actors and, above all, for the royal families. Therefore, states are in essence 
capitalist entities for the GCC bourgeoisie that maintain the current transnational space 
while giving a disproportionate power for capital accumulation to the capitalist class.  As 
a vehicle to enforce the conditions for accumulation, states repress the working class by 
militarized means, which is a classic part of the structure of global capitalism.  In the next 
chapter I will focus on the repressive characteristics of the states’ machinery within the 
GCC. 
With respect to the financial activities of GCC transnational elites, the mode of 
financialization  in  GCC  is  coordinated  with  international  corporations  that  are  
globally significant.  This phase of transnational capital accumulation dramatically sped 
up during the 2008 financial crisis. During that period, the GCC transnational elites started 
investing in failing Western financial institutions that were controlled by members of the 
TCC who were already well-connected to the GCC transnational elites.  The role played 
by the GCC transnational elites to help out their TCC counterparts during the crisis 
elevated the power of the former vis-à-vis the latter group. 
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Today, GCC’s economy is not merely controlled by family businesses, but also by 
conglomerates that are arguably the main economic actors in the region and connect the 
region to other regions and global cities. These conglomerates have many joint ventures 
with powerful foreign states and corporations. The GCC conglomerates are obviously 
dominated by the interests of the GCC royal families.  The merchant families have  
economic  and  familial  ties  with  the  royal  families,  who  play  an  aristocratic  role  in 
promoting and protecting the interests of the patron royal families.  Arguably, this sub-
class of merchant families is an extension of the core capitalist class in the GCC -- the royal 
families. 
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APPENDIX II: The Business Activities of GCC Conglomerates 
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Kingdom Holding (Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal)
 
Source: https://publicintelligence.net/kingdom-holding-company/ 
In 1991, the Prince invested $590 million in Citicorp, which merged with Travelers Group in April 1998 forming 
the world’s largest financial institution, Citigroup, with over $1 trillion of assets and around $100 billion of equity.
In 1993, invested $100 million in Saks Incorporated which operates Saks Fifth Avenue department stores, New 
York’s upscale fashion retailer, buying approximately a 10% stake.
In 1994, acquired a 50% stake in Fairmont hotel chain. A share swap in 2003 has lead to a 4.9% stake in the 
parent company of Fairmont Hotels & Resorts.
In 1994, invested around $345 million acquiring 24% of Disneyland Paris, located outside the French capital. 
Current stake stands at 17.3% of the company.
In 1994, invested $120 million to acquire 22% of the Four Seasons Hotels Inc., a Canadian luxury hotel chain. In 
2007, the Board of Directors of Four Seasons jointly agreed to the US$ 3.8 billion acquisition deal by Prince 
In 1995, acquired a 42% stake in the landmark New York Plaza Hotel for $300 million. In 2001, the stake increased 
to 50%. 1995: Jointly control with a group of international investors of Canary Wharf, the largest European real 
In 1996, the purchase of the George V hotel in Paris for $185 million and renovating it for $120 million. After 
restoring its elegance and prestige, the hotel reopened in December 1999.
In 1997, premier investment in the technology industry acquiring a 5% stake in Apple Computers Inc. for $115 
In 1997, invested $10 million in Palestine Development & Investment Ltd. Company (PADICO), engaged in 
construction and development projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In 1997, acquisition of a 27% stake in Mövenpick Hotels & Resorts. In addition to Europe, the Swiss hotel chain is 
managing and developing hotels in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. In 
In 1997, invested $400 million acquiring 5% of the preferred shares of News Corp., which encompasses Harper 
Collins, The Sunday Times-UK, Fox News, Sky, Star TV and many more. In 1999, the investment was raised to $600 
In 1997, invested $146 million for 5% of Netscape, later acquired by America Online (AOL) which merged with 
TIME/Warner creating the world’s largest media company, AOL Time Warner. Investment was raised to more 
In 1997, invested $300 million in Motorola which specializes in wireless communications, semiconductors and 
electronic systems, components, and services.
In 1998, the purchase of 100,000 acres in Tushka, Egypt, for agricultural development through Kingdom 
Agricultural Development Company (KADCO). Upon completion, total investment will reach $500 million.
In 2000, invested $400 million in Compaq Computer Corp., the world’s second largest computer company. In 
2002 Compaq merged with HP creating the world’s leading consumer technology company.
In 2000, invested $100 million in Kodak, maker of photographic films and papers for a wide range of consumer, 
entertainment, professional, business, and health-related uses.
In 2000, invested $50 million in eBay Inc., a person-to-person trading community on the Internet. Sellers use the 
company’s service to exchange personal items.
In 2000, invested $50 million. The stake was raised to $100 million. In September 2001, the shareholding was 
In 2000, invested $50 million in Procter & Gamble (P&G), a world-wide manufacturer of wide ranging products.
In 2000, invested $50 million in PepsiCo, Inc.
In 2000, invested $50 million in Walt Disney, operator of media networks, studio entertainment, theme parks and 
resorts, consumer products, Internet and direct marketing ventures.
In 2003, acquired nearly 5% of International Financial Advisors Company (IFA), a leading Kuwaiti investment 
In 2004, acquired nearly 5% of Kuwait Invest Holding Company.
In 2004, HRH Prince Alwaleed signs agreement with Dr. Mustafa Ghandoor allowing KHC to acquire a 40% stake in 
In 2004, Kingdom Zephyr is the manager of parallel Pan-African private equity funds, Pan African investment 
Partners Limited (“PIAP,a Mauritius company) and Pan-Commonwealth African Partners Limited (“PAIP/PCAP”), 
In 2005, the venture between Kingdom Hotels International, Fairmont Hotels & Resorts Inc., and Bank of Scotland 
Corporate, has completed the purchase of the Monte Carlo Grand hotel in Monaco and the property is to be 
In 2005, acquisition of a 96% interest in the 251-room Royal Palm Hotel in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, one of East 
Africa’s most vibrant economic hubs. The hotel, which first opened in 1995, is located in the business district of 
In 2005, the Kingdom Hotels International, Fairmont Hotels & Resorts Inc., and Bank of Scotland Corporate 
venture, has completed the purchase of the Savoy Hotel in London for $400 million. The property is to be flagged 
In 2006, Kingdom Hotels International and Colony Capital entered a US$5.5 billion acquisition agreement of 
Fairmont Hotels & Resorts combining it with Raffles Hotels & Resorts of Singapore.
In 2007, acquisition of 29.9% if the Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG). The publications that fall under 
SRMG include Asharg Al Awsat, Al Eqtisadiah,Arab News,Hia magazine, Al Majalla magazine, Arrajol magazine and 
Sayidati magazine. Furthermore, other entities that fall under SRMG are Al khaleejiya for Publicity Advertising and 
In 2007, Kingdom Holding Company acquired 12% of the National Air Services Company Limited (“NAS”),a private 
Saudi airline company for $100 million. The ownership percentage increased to 37% in 2008.
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Dallah Al-Baraka Group Profile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Businesses: 
Subsidiary Country 
Banque Albaraka D'algeria Algeria 
Al-Tawfeek Co. For Investment Funds Ltd. 
Cayman 
Islands 
Banque Albaraka D'jibouti D'jibouti 
Misr Arab Poultry Co Egypt 
Algerian Saudi Leasing Holding Co. France 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 
Dallah Albarak Holding Co. Malaysia 
Dallah Al-Baraka Malaysia 
Holding SDN. BHD. Malaysia 
Banque Albaraka Mauritanienne 
Islamique Mauritanian 
Sardine Canning Co Morocco 
Al-Towfeek Investment Bank Ltd. Pakistan 
Albaraka Bank Ltd. South Africa 
Albaraka Bank Sudan 
BEST Re-Insurance Tunisia 
Beit Et-Tamweel Al-Tunisi Al-Saudi Tunisia 
Dallah Albaraka U.K. 
Albaraka Bancorp USA 
 
Source: https://www.albaraka.com/, http://www.dallah.com/ 
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GCC Businesses 
 
Subsidiary Country 
Albaraka Islamic Investment Bank Bahrain 
Al-Amin Co. For Securities & Investment Funds Bahrain 
Islamic Insurance & Re-Insurance Co. (IIRCO) Bahrain 
Egyptian-Saudi Finance Bank Egypt 
International Arab Leasing and Finance Company 
France, Tunisia, Saudi 
Arabia 
Albaraka Bank Lebonan 
International Information & Trading Services 
Company NA 
Iqraa Co. for Printing and Paper Trading NA 
National Wood Works Co NA 
Albaraka Medical Clinic Saudi Arabia 
Arab Leasing International Finance (ALIF) Ltd Saudi Arabia 
Arab Radio & Television (ART) Saudi Arabia 
Arab Reach Media (ARM) Saudi Arabia 
Dallah Albaraka Holding Company for Umra 
Services Saudi Arabia 
Dallah Communications Holding Saudi Arabia 
Dallah Establishment for Contracting and 
Maintenance Saudi Arabia 
Dallah Health Service Holding Company Saudi Arabia 
Dallah Hotels and Resorts Saudi Arabia 
Dallah Human Skills Development Co Saudi Arabia 
Dallah Transport Co. Ltd Saudi Arabia 
Dallah-Dowail Co. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Digital Distribution Company Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Real Estate Maintenance Co Saudi Arabia 
Albaraka Turkish Finance House Turkey 
Emin Sigorts A.S. Turkey 
Islamic Arab Insurance Co (IAIC) UAE 
 
Source: https://www.albaraka.com/, http://www.dallah.com/ 
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SABIC 
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Source:http://www.sabic.com/corporate/en/images/SABIC-annual-report-2014-
english.pdf 
Company Location Partnership Products 
SABIC Innovative Plastics Burkville, Alabama, USA A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC LEXAN™ resin
SABIC Innovative Plastics Cartagena, Spain A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC
LEXAN™, EXTEM™, ULTEM™, and 
CYCOLOY™ resins
SABIC Innovative Plastics Mt. Vernon, Indiana, USA A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC
LEXAN™, CYCOLOY™, ULTEM™, VALOX™, 
XENOY™, XYLEX™, SUPEC™, and SILTEM™ 
resins, LEXAN™ sheet and film, and 
ILLUNINEX™ display film
SABIC Innovative Plastics Ottawa, Illinois, USA A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC CYCOLAC™, CYCOLOY™, and GELOY™ resins
SABIC Innovative Plastics Selkirk, New York, USA A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC
PPO™ resin, NORYL®, NORYL PPX® and 
NORYL GTX® resins, and high-impact 
polystyrene (HIPS)
SABIC Innovative Plastics Washington, West Virginia, USA A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC CYCOLAC™, CYCOLOY™, and GELOY™ resins
SABIC Innovative Plastics Wixom, Michigan
Exatec LLC – A wholly owned affiliate of 
SABIC
PC automotive glazing
SABIC Petrochemicals B.V. Geleen, Netherlands A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC
Polyethylene (HDPE, LDPE, LLDPE), 
polypropylene, ethylene, propylene, 
butadiene, MTBE/ ETBE, benzene, gasoline 
components, styrene, C9 resin feed, cracked 
distillate, acetylene, hydrogen, and carbon-
black oil
SABIC UK Petrochemicals Ltd Teesside, UK A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC 
Ethylene, propylene, benzene cyclohexane, 
cracked distillate hydrogen, butadiene, 
polyethylene (LDPE)
SABIC Polyolefine GmbH Gelsenkirchen, Germany A wholly owned affiliate of SABIC
Polyethylenes (HDPE, LLDPE) and 
polypropylene
SAMAC Saudi Methyl Acrylate 
Company
Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia
A 50/50 joint venture with Mitsubishi 
Rayon Company
Methyl Methacrylate (MMA), 
polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA)
SINOPEC SABIC Tianjin 
Petrochemical Co. Ltd.
Tianjin, China
A 50/50 joint-venture between SABIC 
Industrial Investments Company and 
SINOPEC (China Petroleum & Chemical 
Corporation)
Ethylene, propylene, polyethylene (HDPE, 
LLDPE), polypropylene, ethylene oxide, 
MEG, DEG, phenol, acetone, MTBE, 
butadiene, and butene-1
Saudi Kayan Saudi Kayan 
Petrochemical Company
Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia SABIC (35%), public shareholders (65%)
Ethylene, propylene, polypropylene, LDPE, 
HDPE, ethylene glycol, acetone, 
polycarbonate (PC), ethanolamines (EOA), 
ethoxylates, bisphenol A, benzene, normal 
butanol, and natural-detergent alcohol 
(NDA)
Sharq Eastern Petrochemical 
Company
Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia
A 50/50 SABIC joint-venture with a 
consortium of Japanese companies led 
by Mitsubishi Corporation
Ethylene, propylene, aromatics (BTX), 
ethylene glycol (mono, di, tri), linear low-
density polyethylene (LLDPE), and high-
density polyethylene (HDPE)
Shrouq Saudi Japanese 
Acrylonitrile Company
Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia
SABIC (50%), ASAHI Kasei Chemicals 
Corporation (30%) and Mitsubishi 
Corporation (20%)
Chemicals
SOCC Saudi Organometallic 
Chemicals Company
Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia
A 50/50 joint-venture between Saudi 
Specialty Chemicals Company and 
Albemarle Netherlands BV
Tri-ethyl aluminum (TEAL)
Specialty Chem Saudi Specialty 
Chemicals Company
Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia
Wholly owned affiliate of SABIC (Arabian 
Petrochemical Company – Petrokemya, 
99%, and SABIC Industrial Investments 
Company 1%)
Tri-ethyl aluminum (TEAL), TPO/PP 
compounds, PC compounds, ABS 
compounds, and specialty products
United Jubail United 
Petrochemical Company
Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia
SABIC (75%), Pension Fund (15%), 
General Organization of Social Insurance 
(10%)
Ethylene, polyethylene, ethylene glycol (EG), 
and linear-alpha olefins (LAO)
Yanpet Saudi Yanbu 
Petrochemical Company
Yanbu, Saudi Arabia
A 50/50 SABIC joint-venture with Mobil 
Yanbu Petrochemical Company (an 
affiliate of ExxonMobil Chemical, USA)
Ethylene, polyethylene, ethylene glycol, 
polypropylene, pyrolysis gasoline, and 
propylene
Yansab Yanbu National 
Petrochemical Company
Yanbu, Saudi Arabia
SABIC (51%), public shareholders or 
owned by others (49%)
Ethylene, propylene, ethylene glycol (mono, 
di, tri), linear low-density polyethylene 
(LLDPE), high-density polyethylene (HDPE), 
polypropylene, butene-1, butene-2, 
benzene, toluene/ xylene mixture, and 
MTBE
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Saudi Binladin Group: 
 
Source: http://www.sbg.com.sa/ 
Projects Country
Sharm El-Sheikh Airport Egypt
Hotel Four Seasons Amman Jordan
Kuala Lumpur Airport Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur Airport Malaysia
Putra Jaya Mosque Malaysia
Doha Airport Qatar
Al Shuaiba Power Plant Saudi Arabia
BCS Ready Mix Factory Saudi Arabia
BCS Ready Mix Factory Saudi Arabia
Bahra Industrial Complex Saudi Arabia
Bahra Industrial Complex Saudi Arabia
Bahra Industrial Complex Saudi Arabia
Bahra Industrial Complex Saudi Arabia
BCS Ready Mix Factory Saudi Arabia
BCS Ready Mix Factory Saudi Arabia
King Abdul Azeez International Airport Saudi Arabia
Makkah Holy Mosque Expansion Saudi Arabia
King Abdul Azeez Endowment Project Saudi Arabia
Holly Mosque Madeena Saudi Arabia
Al Qassim - Al Madina - Yanbu - Rabigh - Thuwal Express Way Saudi Arabia
Al Hada Road - Halwani Bridge Saudi Arabia
Al Mutamarat Under Pass Saudi Arabia
Hajj Terminal - KAIA Saudi Arabia
Jamarat Bridge Saudi Arabia
King Abdull Aziz Endowment Saudi Arabia
King Abullah Endowment - Madina Saudi Arabia
Internal Security Forces Housing - Jeddah Saudi Arabia
King Abdullah Financial District Saudi Arabia
Umm Al Qura University Saudi Arabia
V.I.P Military Hospital - Riyadh Saudi Arabia
Behra Industrial Complex Saudi Arabia
King Abdullah University for Science and Technology Saudi Arabia
Blaise Diagne International Airport, Dakar Senegal.
Sharjah International Airport UAE
Sharjah American University UAE
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Source: http://www.sbgpbad.ae/ 
 
Clients Country
Munshaat for Projects and Contracting Company Saudi Arabia
Rayadah Investment Company Saudi Arabia
Princess Nora Bint Abdul Rahman University Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Education Saudi Arabia
King Saud University Saudi Arabia
Egyptian Airports Company Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Defense Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Finance Saudi Arabia
Jeddah Municipality Saudi Arabia
Riyadh Military Hospital Saudi Arabia
King Abdullah Economic City Saudi Arabia
Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia
EMAAR Properties Saudi Arabia
Hadramout University of Science and Technology Saudi Arabia
Department of Civil Aviation Authority - Government Dubai UAE
EMAAR Properties UAE
Dubai Internet City (TECOM) UAE
Sharjah Airport Authority UAE
Majid Al Futtaim UAE
TECOM Investments UAE
Dubai Lifestyle City L.L.C. UAE
SAMA Dubai UAE
MIZIN UAE
Dubai Municipality UAE
Legend Middle East UAE
Roads and Transport Authority UAE
Republic of Yemen Yemen
Damascus Governorate Syria 
Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation Syria 
Majid Al Futtaim Group Syria 
Construction Products Holding Company Syria 
EMAAR-IGO Syria 
Egyptian Airports Company Egypt 
Kuala Lumpur International Airport Malasyia 
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Alfuttaim 
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Source: http://www.al-futtaim.ae/content/organigram.asp 
Client Project
Saipem Energy Services SpA
Tanker Betatank II to FPSO 
Firenze
Saipem SpA for Sonangol VLCC Magdeline to FPSO Gimboa
Saipem SpA for Petrobras
VLCC Margaux to FPSO Cidade de 
Vitoria
SBM IMODCO for Chevron VLCC Lu San to FPSO Frade
SBM Offshore N.V. and 
Sonangol for Exxon Mobil 
Corporation
VLCC Mosocean into FPSO 
Xikomba
Conventional VLCC to FPSO 
Atlantic
Conventional Crude Carrier Stena 
Contender to FSO Nkossa1
Saipem, ENI/Single Buoy 
Moorings Inc.
Conventional medium size crude 
tanker to FPSO Mystras II
Fred Olsen Production AS for 
Canadian Natural Resources 
Limited
VLCC to FPSO Knock Allan
Fred Olsen Production A.S. for 
Addax Petroleum and Sinopec
VLCC Elgreco to FPSO Knock 
Adoon
FPSOcean
Shuttle tanker to FPSO Deep 
Producer I
Red Band Inc., Fred.Olsen 
Production A.S. for Maersk Oil
World’s largest tanker T/T Jahre 
Viking to FSO Knock Nevis
Mercator Lines Tanker to FSO Prem Pride
Teekay Shipping (Norway) As 
for Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation
Shuttle tanker to FSO Falcon 
Spirit
ULCC TI Asia to FSO Asia
ULCC TI Africa to FSO Africa
BW Offshore for Murmansk 
Commercial Seaport
Tanker to FSO Berge Pioneer
FSRU
Saipem SpA for Offshore LNG 
Toscana
LNG carrier Golar Frost to FSRU 
Toscana
Suezmax conventional oil tanker 
to Shuttle tanker Navion 
Gothenburg
Aframax conventional oil tanker 
to Shuttle tanker Navion Bergen
Consortium comprising of 
Woodside Energy Ltd., Shell 
International, BHP, BP Amoco, 
Chevron and 
Mitsui/Mitsubishi
Upgrade of FPSO Cossack Pioneer
Scandic Shipmanagement Modification of Golden Arrow – I
Saipem Sp.A. Upgrading DLB Castoro 2
Torvald Klaveness
Gearless panamax bulk carrier 
Balsfjord to self Un-loader vessel
Others
Teekay Marine Service AS
FPSO
Single Buoy Moorings Inc.
FSO
EuroNav and Overseas 
Shipholding Group for Maersk 
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Dubai World (Subsidiaries) 
 
DP World  
Bussinesses Marine Terminals 
 World Crane Services 
 DP World Cargo Services 
 
Container Rail Road Services Private 
Limited 
Financial 
Partnerships 
Dubai International Financial Center 
(DIFC) 
 Dubai Financial Services Authority 
 NASDAQ Dubai 
 UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
Corporate Governance principles of the 
UK 
 Corporate Governance Code (the Code) 
 NASDAQ OMX Group 
 
Source: http://www.drydocks.gov.ae/en/portal/orfcus.ofshre.aspx 
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Istihmar World 
 
Source: 
http://www.istithmarworld.com/index/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=208&Itemid=226 
 
 
Bussiness Entity Sector Location 
AL BURJ Hospitality & Real Estate UAE
Barneys Newyork Consumer US
Bubye Hospitality & Real Estate South Africa
Cirque Du Soleil Consumer Canada
Czech Techo Park Brno Hospitality & Real Estate Czech Republic
Djibouti Palace Kempinski Hospitality & Real Estate Djibouti
Dubai Aerospace Enterprise Industrial & Business Services UAE
DW Travel Consumer UAE
FORSA Hospitality & Real Estate UAE
Gorillas' Nest Lodge Hospitality & Real Estate Rwanda
Gulf African Bank Financial Services Kenya
Hans Energy Industrial & Business Services  HK/China
IHI Plc Hospitality & Real Estate Malta
Inchcape Shipping Services  Industrial & Business Services UK
Intex Shanghai Hospitality & Real Estate China
Jock Safari Lodge Hospitality & Real Estate South Africa
Kerzner Hospitality & Real Estate Asia
Mazagan Beach Resort Hospitality & Real Estate Morocco
Nyungwe Park Hospitality & Real Estate Rwanda 
One&Only Palmilla Hospitality & Real Estate Mexico
Padaeng Industry PLC Industrial & Business Services Thailand
Pension Insurance Corporation Financial Services UK
Perella Weinberg Partners Financial Services US
Retailcorp Brands Consumer UAE
Sanbona Wildlife Reserve Hospitality & Real Estate  South Africa
Shamwari Game Reserve Hospitality & Real Estate  South Africa
Tejari Industrial & Business Services UAE
W Bangkok Hospitality & Real Estate Thailand
W Koh Samui Hospitality & Real Estate Thailand
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Economic Zones World: Jafza, TechnoPark, Dubai Auto Zone (re-exporting used 
cars to the Asia and Africa). 
TechnoPark 
Research Partners 
Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft (FhG) 
Boston University 
Arab Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF) 
Middle East Desalinations Centre (MEDRC) 
DAEDEOK INNOPOLIS 
DAEJEON TECHNOPARK 
Networking Partners 
International Association of Science Parks (IASP) 
World Association of Industrial and Technological Research 
Organizations (WAITRO) 
International Network for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
(INSME) 
International Desalination Association (IDA) 
World Technopolis Association (WTA) 
Arab Water Council (AWC) 
World Business Angels Association 
 
Source: http://www.ezw.ae/en/ducamz/dubai-auto-zone-ducamz.html 
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Kanoo Group 
 
Source: http://www.kanoogroup.com/ 
Subsidiaries Partnership Type of Economci Tie
Middle East Container Repair U.A.S.C, P.O Nedlloyd, Maersk, Hapag Lloyd and Uniglory, plus many other lines Client
AXA Gulf Axa Insurance Company Partnership
AkzoNobel Dulux, Sikkens, International and Eka Portfolio 
Freightworks Emirates/DNATA Joint Venture
BASF Kanoo Gulf MASDAR (Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company) Partnership
BASF Kanoo Gulf Elastogran Joint Venture
BASF Kanoo Gulf
The Eastern Europe, Africa and Western Asia Region (LR) changes its organizational 
structure on April 1, 2000. The major new development is that regional Business Centers 
are set up in the cities of Istanbul, Johannesburg, Dubai, Moscow and Ludwigshafen. 
BASF’s representatives in Algeria, Egypt, Dubai, Iran, Morocco and Tunisia are served by 
Business Center Dubai. BASF FZE in Dubai is founded as a service platform (sales 
company) for the Middle East and North Africa.
Hydroturf Doha Golf Course in Qatar Mega Project
Hydroturf Shangri-laâ€™s Barr Al Jissah Mega Project
Hydroturf Resort and Spa, Muscat, Oman Mega Project
Hydroturf Tower Links Golf Course, Mega Project
Hydroturf Ras Al Khaimah Mega Project
Hydroturf Doha Asian Olympic Games, Qatar Mega Project
Hydroturf Jumeirah Golf Estates, Dubai Mega Project
Hydroturf Katameya Heights and Dunes, Cairo, Egypt Mega Project
Hydroturf Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi Mega Project
Hydroturf Dubai International Airport,Dubai Mega Project
Hydroturf King Abdullah Economic City, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Mega Project
Hydroturf Madinat Jumeirah, Dubai Mega Project
Crane Industrial Services Konecranes Joint Venture
Johnson Arabia Charilaos Apostolides Joint Venture
Maersk Kanoo Maersk Line Joint Venture
Chapo Kanoo Charilaos Apostolides Joint Venture
OBAIKAN OITC group, Qatar Joint Venture
Kanoo Group (SDV) bolloré group Joint Venture
Kanoo Group (Mol, UAE) MOL Group Joint Venture
Kanoo Group Royal Ahrend Joint Venture
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Fakhro Group 
 
Source: http://www.fakhro.com/ 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MILITARIZATION OF GCC TRANSNATIONAL SPACE:  
CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
GCC militarization is rooted in the socioeconomic class structure of the region that 
is specifically  designed  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  GCC  capitalist  class  against  
internal instability and threats.  At the same time, the militarization strengthens the 
economic ties between GCC elites/states and the TCC.  To fully understand this 
militarization in its current phase, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part 
explains the military structure of GCC and how it has evolved due to a number of notable 
historical events.  The second part explains the target of this focus on military and security 
power. This focus can be analyzed based on domestic objectives, regional goals, and, to a 
lesser extent, global aspirations. 
Analyzing the militarization of the Persian Gulf region is an integral part of this 
dissertation because GCC militarization is one of the essential components of the GCC   
economic transnationalization and the embeddedness of GCC elites within the TCC.  
According to Askari et al, "[t]he Persian Gulf is, by some indicators, the most militarized 
region in the world.  Public dissatisfaction with economic and social progress and the 
absence of elective legitimacy has led rulers and governments to rely on force to maintain 
power” (Askari et al, 2010, P. 3, footnote omitted). The Global Militarization Index (GMI) 
indicates that, on average, the GCC states (except Qatar for which no data was available 
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in 2014), are among the top 17 percent of most militarized states (out of 154) in the 
world23.
 
  
In this chapter, I will attempt to explain such immense militarization based on a 
class- based analytical framework and show how this militarization is merely part of a 
broader class- based project that includes the protection of both domestic GCC interests 
and wider TCC interests in the Persian Gulf. The militarization of the Persian Gulf is based 
on a series of historical circumstances. A traditional explanation focuses on the significant 
role of oil and the demand of actors in the global political economy to have secure access 
to GCC oil supplies. Accordingly, from the early days of the Cold War the international 
energy order was organized around Middle Eastern oil production and enjoyed U.S. 
military and security protection. More recent evidence suggests that the international 
energy order is more fragmented than what the traditional perspective suggests. On one 
hand, with the rise of China and Russia the world economy is witnessing new powerful 
capitalist economies with important, albeit different, impacts on the global energy order.  
On the other hand, the other regions including the Caspian Sea region, Latin America and 
North America, and Africa are becoming more important players in the global oil supply.  
Many parts of these regions, especially in the Caspian Sea and African oil rich regions, 
have been militarized, lending support to the traditional argument that oil plays a significant 
role in militarization. 
                                                            
23 http://gmi.bicc.de/index.php?page=ranking-table&year=2013&sort=rank_asc 
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Along with these global changes, the militarization of the Persian Gulf region has 
also intensified dramatically during the past decades.  From a state-centric perspective, 
there may be different reasons for states to increase their military expenditures.  
Historically, military expenditure is believed to increase based on the level of perceived 
threats by different states (Smith, 1980). Military expenditure by one state can also be in 
reaction to the increase of military expenditure by a neighboring state or states (Dune & 
Perlo, 2003). In addition, particular cultural and/or ideological aspects of state 
policymaking also influence the level of military expenditure (Payne, 1989). Another 
significant factor is the militarization of U.S. foreign policy, a structural shift that refers to 
the use of military power instead of diplomacy in foreign policy. This shift has had 
cascading effects across the globe.  In terms of U.S. foreign policy, a large body of literature 
on militarization of the Persian Gulf focuses on the direct relationship between the U.S. 
militarization and the desire to have secure access to Persian Gulf oil (Bacevich 2013, 
Klare 1978).   
Despite the fact that the share of U.S. crude oil imports from the Middle East in 
general has constantly decreased over the past decades, the amount of U.S. oil imported 
from Saudi Arabia has not significantly changed.  In 1993, the U.S. crude oil import from 
Saudi Arabia was 467,753 thousands of barrels; in 2014 it was 423,066 thousands of 
barrels24. At the same time, around a quarter of global oil supply was still being transferred 
through the Strait of Hormuz, over which tension arises occasionally given the adverse 
                                                            
24 http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbbl_a.htm 
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relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and most Persian 
Gulf Arab countries on the other. Therefore, oil is still an important reason for 
militarization of the Persian Gulf region. So, I agree that the region’s militarization is partly 
- but only partly - rooted in U.S.  Demand for Middle Eastern oil.  However, reducing the 
current phase of the militarization of the region merely the U.S. need for secure oil supplies 
is an unwarranted analytical jump.  This chapter, therefore, aims to analyze a less-discussed 
aspect of militarization of the Persian Gulf region: the class-based dimension of the 
current GCC militarization. This class-based dimension, however, directly intersects with 
the traditional arguments briefly discussed above. 
While important scholarly contributions have been made by the traditional 
approaches, I believe that a class-based explanation of the militarization in this particular 
region would help generate a more comprehensive explanation of many other aspects of 
the phenomenon. 
The Pattern of GCC Military Expenditure 
The business ties between the GCC and the TCC through the military spending 
of GCC states protect the emerging transnationalization of capital and the repressive 
state apparatus in the region, the latter of which acts to anticipate and to counter the 
inevitable economic, political and social polarization engendered by this type of capital 
accumulation.  The GCC's military expenditure is comparable to that of the states with the 
highest military budgets in the world (excluding the exceptional case of the United States, 
of course). The below chart shows the military expenditure by state with the highest 
military expenses.  In 2014, Saudi Arabia, itself, was ranked as the fourth largest military 
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spender in the world, even though the country did not seem to face an imminent, notable 
threat to its national borders. 
 
Chart 4: Top Military Spenders in the World 
Source: Based on data available here: 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database 
Unlike other states listed in Chart 4, the GCC states seem to have more difficulty 
projecting their military power to shape external affairs.  This is partly due to the weakness 
of GCC’s soft power in general. Similar to other neoliberal economies, the GCC bloc lacks 
a strong nationally-oriented cultural or ideological base, and it is not clear what values the 
bloc represents. Two military engagements by Saudi Arabia confirm the limited reach of 
the GCC’s huge military power. The first military engagement, the so-called Gulf War, 
was led by the United States in 1990 and 1991 in response to Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait 
and the threat Iraq subsequently posed to Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. The United States 
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deployed "some 540,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and their equipment 
to Saudi Arabia" (Shrader, 2009, P. 263). In addition to the leading role of the U.S. military, 
the coalition in that war included many other states, including Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom (Tucker, 2014, P. 284). Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States were part 
of this coalition. Without the far-reaching support of the U.S. military and the broad 
coalition, there was arguably no chance for the GCC to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and 
to end the Iraqi occupation, and the West’s access to Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves would 
have remained at risk. 
The second case is the Saudi military invasion of Yemen to counter Houthi 
rebels in 2015.  The Yemeni engagement is more critical for our purpose than the Gulf 
War.  In Yemen, Saudi Arabia, after decades of purchasing some of the world’s most 
advanced military equipment, attacked one of the most underdeveloped and weakest 
countries in the world.  Nonetheless, despite its considerable technological advantages, the 
Saudi military has been relying on "U.S. help [for] planning air strikes on Houthi rebels 
in Yemen, in addition to logistical and intelligence support.25"
 
 Moreover, the Saudis had 
military support from other GCC states (except Oman), as well as from Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Senegal, and even some sections of the Yemeni military. Despite the (im)balance 
of the military powers in the Yemeni case, however, the Saudi military has failed to deliver 
                                                            
25http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-26/yemeni-bombing-led-by-saudis-is-
backed-by-u- s-logistics-spying 
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a clear and quick conclusion; and the war drags on causing considerable damage to Yemeni 
infrastructure and a drain on Saudi resources. 
The limited ability of Saudi Arabia to project its military power exemplifies the 
general state of the military industry in the GCC.  According to research on "[t]he Gulf 
Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War" conducted by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS): 
“Saudi Arabia has long been dependent on other nations for virtually all of its 
arms and military technology. . . .It can produce some small arms, automatic 
weapons, and munitions, but much of the Saudi portion of the work consists of 
assembling imported parts rather than real manufactures.26
 
. . . Saudi military 
forces are modern, high technology forces by regional standards, but manpower 
is a problem. Motivation, education, and training are, however, serious problems. 
. . ."27
 
(pp. 13-19) 
Similar to other economic and security sectors of the GCC’s political economy, the 
considerable spending of the GCC in the military sector has not created a strong national 
military power that could act as an external deterrent.   The avowed or perceived enemies 
of Saudi Arabia, for instance, do not seem to be particularly deterred by its military 
might.  Instead, the military and security power of the GCC has been fairly successful 
in protecting the status quo for the royal families - a model that the Shah had pursued in 
Iran prior to 1979 Revolution.  The GCC military and security power is to a great extent 
                                                            
26 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_saudi.pdf 
27 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_saudi.pdf 
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robust if one considers it as a protective shield for the transnational elites' class project: a 
project that aims at making the GCC an important node of transnational  capital  
accumulation  for  the  TCC  (and  also  for  GCC  transnational  elites themselves).  It 
does not matter if the considerable military expenditures do not pay off on the battlefield 
in Yemen, Syria or other places; what matters is that the high spending on weapons act 
as a powerful vehicle to keep the GCC elites as an indispensable part of global TCC.  The 
following figure shows the military-business ties of the GCC states with other countries. 
 
Figure 8: Military Deals by Persian Gulf States and The Sellers 
Source: Based on the data available here; 
http://csis.org/files/publication/150428_military_spending.pdf 
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The GCC militarization is by and large a manifestation and expansion of emerging 
ties between the GCC transnational elites and TCC. In other words, this kind of 
militarization is part of the process that has embedded the GCC elites within in the TCC.  
The following parts of the chapter will further discuss this dynamic as well as the 
challenges that it has brought up for both the GCC elites and TCC. 
Militarization, Oil, and the Transformation of the Elite Network in the GCC 
Following the discovery of some of the largest oil fields in the world in Saudi 
Arabia at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Saudi royal family soon recognized 
the many opportunities and challenges before them.  The economic ties between Saudi 
royal family, on the one hand, and Western states and multinational corporations 
(MNCs), on the other, are often traced back to the famous meeting between President 
Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia in 1945.  It was Roosevelt who 
first structured an oil-based foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia, a foreign policy that later 
served as a blueprint for dealing with other GCC states.  The key premise of this oil-based 
foreign policy is that the consequential geopolitical players in this region are the 
multinational oil corporations.  Accordingly, strategies have been devised based on these 
corporations’ interests and their business security. However, the emergence of GCC 
conglomerates and the rising power of the GCC royal families as well as that of merchant 
families also contributed to the domination of corporate interests in GCC-U.S. relations. 
One of the key aspects of the meeting between Saudi King Abdul Aziz and 
President Roosevelt was the perceived U.S. guarantee of its permanent support to secure 
the Saudi royal family's position in return for secure access to Saudi oil fields.  A pattern 
of dependency of the U.S. economy on Saudi oil began to emerge during  the 1941-1945 
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period, when Saudi Arabia provided “6 of the 7 billion barrels of oil that fueled the Allied 
forces in World War II [while] the United States consume[d] approximately 1/3 of its 
known oil reserves." (Klare, 2008, P. 7)28. 
 
There is not much information about the 
nature and details of the agreements between Roosevelt and the Saudi King; but as for the 
significance of that meeting, it suffices to quote Dick Cheney: 
“Our strategic interests in the Persian Gulf region, I think, are well-known but 
bear repeating today. . . .We do, of course, have historic ties, especially to the 
Saudis, but other governments in the region, that hark back with respect to Saudi 
Arabia to 1945, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abd al-Aziz 
on the USS Quincy towards the end of World War II and affirmed at that time 
that the United States had a lasting and continuing interest in the security of the 
Kingdom”.29 (Klare, 2008, P. 5) 
The meeting was also a starting point for strengthening the relationship between 
the GCC and TCC in the context of broader structural militarization. This structural 
militarization historically developed to protect energy security and access to oil. The 
domestic energy dependency of the West and GCC then pushed for further corporatization 
of this GCC-TCC relationship.  On the Western side, and despite all its ups and downs, the 
dependency of Western industrial power on oil has never really ended. Oil remains a 
crucial resource for all aspects of the U.S economy. The U.S. domestic economy and 
U.S.-based American TNCs heavily depend on oil.  At the same time, the US population 
                                                            
28 http://www.mediaed.org/transcripts/Blood-and-Oil-Transcript.pdf 
29 http://www.mediaed.org/transcripts/Blood-and-Oil-Transcript.pdf 
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comprises 4.5 percent of the world population, while its oil consumption accounts for 
more than 20 percent of global oil consumption (See Table 14). In addition to 
consumption within U.S. borders, U.S.-based TNCs produce oil in other parts of the world 
too, in particular in East Asian countries. This global chain of production consumes a 
considerable amount of oil each year.  Despite all discussion of moving beyond oil into an 
era of renewable energies, the global economy remains by and large dependent on oil. 
What has changed, of course, is the relative significance of the Middle East in general and 
Saudi Arabia in particular in the global energy market. 
Domestic U.S. Dependency on Oil 
 
 
Table 14: US Oil Consumption 
 
 
Chart 5: US Imports of Crude Oil 
Sources: Based on the data available here: 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy- economics/statistical-review-2015/bp-
statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-oil-section.pdf 
, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrimus1&f=a 
150 
 
According to Chart 5, from the 1970s, the United States has   aggressively and 
consistently increased its crude oil imports.  This corresponds to the beginning of the 
structural shift towards neo-liberalization and radical technological developments 
pertaining to energy.  In turn, new and strong economic ties between the GCC states/elites 
and TCC emerged.  For the TCC, these ties meant the stability of GCC states would remain 
crucial for TCC’s economic activities and global capital accumulation. 
Militarization and Conflicts among Classes in the Persian Gulf 
The position of GCC royal families has been occasionally, but notably, challenged 
from time to time.  In each of these episodes, the possible or actual threats to GCC royal 
families has led to further militarization of the Persian Gulf.  Arguably one of the most 
important of these events was the Iranian Revolution.  The regime change in Iran was an 
alarming sign for the GCC royal families.  While  the  eye  of  the  world  focused,  for  the  
most  part,  on  the  domestic implications of the changes in Iran, the GCC royal families 
anxiously monitored any potential domino effect on other Middle Eastern societies, 
especially due to the radical rhetoric of the revolutionary leaders that invited all Muslims 
to challenge the pro-Western political regimes all over the Muslim world. 
From the beginning of the 1980s, efforts to weaken the Saudi royal family have 
been part of an important, albeit not always dominant, discourse in Iranian foreign policy.  
It is worth mentioning that what happened in Iran in 1979 did not result in an anti-capitalist 
system.  The new class arrangement in Iran indicates a new model of indigenous capitalism, 
which curiously enough is not connected to Western capitalism in any significant way 
aside, of course, from the need for access to an international financial structure. Within this 
small capitalist microcosm, there is a class-based tension between the ruling elites in Iran 
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and in Saudi royal family. This is the reason why Saudi foreign policy mirrors that of 
Iran, in that Saudi Arabia embarked on an aggressive effort to isolate and weaken the post-
Revolution Iranian regime as soon as that regime was born.  
The Saudi royal family viewed the new regime in Tehran as an existential threat 
for their ruling status at home. Some of the disadvantaged and excluded minorities in the 
GCC, and especially those of Shi’i persuasion, found comfort and inspiration in Iran’s 
post-Revolution rhetoric, and perceived or actual ties between them and Tehran became a 
new challenge in states/elites’ relations in the GCC. Generally speaking, the stability of the 
GCC transnational space required a highly militarized state (elites) relationship.  According 
to Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael, "the militarization of the oil-rich South ranges far wider 
than state infrastructure protection.  Indeed, security assistance is geared more around 
active counterinsurgency.  Training and equipment programs are designed to build local 
capabilities for rapid reaction, troop mobility, intelligence networks, night-fighting, 
surveillance, and offensive tactics" (Stokes and Raphael, 2010, P. 78). 
Added to this growing conflict between Riyadh and Tehran, the fact that, after the 
Iranian Revolution, the United States lost its key, strategic ally in the region created a 
strategic vacuum that the Saudis conveniently filled.  Iran used to be the surrogate proxy 
that protected the U.S. interests in the region - or at least it was perceived as such according 
to the so-called Nixon Doctrine.  After the Revolution, however, the “Carter Doctrine” 
was added to the mix, as the Carter Administration decided to send the U.S. military 
directly to the Persian Gulf to contain Iran’s Revolution. By default, Saudi Arabia became 
the new surrogate proxy - or at least it was perceived as such. This ushered in a new era 
where the militarization of the Persian Gulf was not just through competition among 
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surrogate powers, but also through the direct U.S. military presence in the region with 
consequences far beyond what the United States had anticipated. 
Later events solidified the key tenants of the Carter Doctrine, especially in light of 
the Gulf War and the 9/11 terrorist attack. This shift could not have happened without the 
support of the GCC rulers. In the post-9/11 world, the GCC increased its military 
expenditure in response to increased securitization of the Muslim World. According to 
William Robinson, "in the post-9/1l period the military dimension appeared to exercise an 
over-determining influence in the reconfiguration of global politics. Militarization has 
involved not just the major U.S.-led interventions but the adoption by 144 countries of 
"counterterrorist" laws and the development of enhanced systems of policing, internal 
security, urban militarization, and social control to suppress dissent (and also to make 
profits)" (Robinson, 2014, pp. 150-151). Therefore, before further discussion of 
militarization of the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to have a brief discussion of how the 
notions of "counter-terrorism" and "counter-insurgency" have been translated in GCC 
states’ political discourse. 
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency: US Military Arms Sales, and GCC 
State Repression 
A conceptual starting point in analyzing “counterterrorism” is the Neo-Gramscian 
understanding of the notion of hegemony. The third world militarization is part of a broader 
structure in which a global hegemony is being established and reinforced based on 
dynamics of consent and coercion. With respect to the hegemonic power of the GCC 
capitalist class in their respective societies, some evidence suggests that the GCC 
bourgeoisie class has had considerable difficulty bringing in the consent element to 
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their hegemonic mold. This is partly due to the ongoing, and at times direct, use of military 
and security powers to control other social classes. Arguably, Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
states have never been able to fully implement a genuine "counter-terrorism" policy for 
both structural and tactical reasons. According to the United States Department of Defense, 
"[t]errorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and 
committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political"30 (Joint Publication 3-07.2 on 
"Antiterrorism", 2010, P. vii).  
If we accept this definition as a working definition (while acknowledging all 
the difficulties that arise when one is to define the loaded term “terrorism), we will be able 
to identify some of the key problems a Saudi counterterrorism policy would encounter.  
One crucial fact, of course, is that Saudi Arabia has invested significantly and for a long 
period in propagating an ideology that, accurately or inaccurately, is viewed as lending 
support to the radical groups. This ideology, often called Wahhabism, is the founding 
ideology of the Saudi Arabia and its royal family; but it is in the past few decades the 
ideology that has been aggressively exported throughout the Muslim World.  This 
expansion now goes far beyond pure ideological propagation and involves complex 
economic and financial manifestations. The economic ties are not always clear or 
straightforward indeed. For instance, Rotana Group, which reportedly controls “around 
45% of all the movie industry and around 75% of all the music” in the Middle East 
(Zendrian, 2010, Forbes), is owned by Al-Waleed Bin Talal, a Saudi prince who is 
                                                            
30 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses/operations/icdjo/resources/JP3_07X2.pdf 
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considered pro-West, but nonetheless belongs to a royal family whose very legitimacy 
comes from an anti-West ideology. Interestingly, 18.97 percent of the same Rotana 
Group’s stocks are owned by the News Corp. 
The ironies of the interaction between Wahhabism and the West are even more 
evident in the geopolitical landscape of the region. Saudi Arabia remains, for the time 
being, one of the significant U.S. allies in the Middle East, while Wahhabism is almost 
universally acknowledged as one of the founding ideologies of Al-Qaeda and, more 
recently, ISIS.  On the one hand, the Saudis, many of whom sympathize if not adhere to 
the Wahhabi ideology, are engaged in economic and military businesses with the Western 
countries, and they also make charitable donations to the American educational system (see 
the complementary argument at the end of this chapter).  On the other hand, offshoots of 
Saudi Wahabbism in the form of Al-Qaeda and ISIS espouse a strong anti-American 
position and reject Westernization and modernization altogether.  At the same time, there 
is ideological support for the radical Wahabis by such important Saudi Sheikhs as 
Mohamed Al-Arifi (The Muslim Issue, 2014).  Indeed, one would presume that a starting 
point for counter-terrorism would be removing the very ideology of extremism from 
education system. In a stark contrast, GCC states continue to invest in expansion of 
Wahhabism into other countries. For instance, a cable released by WikiLeaks tells us: 
“During recent [2008 November 13] trips to southern Punjab, Principal Officer 
was repeatedly told that a sophisticated jihadi recruitment network had been 
developed in the Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan Divisions. . . 
.Government and non- governmental sources claimed that financial support 
estimated at nearly 100 million USD annually was making its way to Deobandi 
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and Ahl-e-Hadith clerics in the region from "missionary" and "Islamic  charitable"  
organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ostensibly with the 
direct support of those governments”.31 
Saudi Arabia has also funded Wahhabi schools in Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Thailand, India and parts of Africa. Most of these schools are located in the poor 
areas where the only option for people to receive an education is in such schools32.
 
 The 
question remains how GCC states could effectively challenge the foundational ideology of 
terrorism while at the same time continuing to invest in the same ideology.  According to 
a CRS Report for Congress: 
“It is widely acknowledged that the Saudi government, as well as wealthy 
Saudi individuals, have supported the spread of the Wahhabist ideas in several 
Muslim countries and in the United States and Europe.  Some have argued that 
this proselytizing has promoted terrorism and has spawned Islamic militancy 
throughout the world.  Saudi funding  of  mosques,  madrasas, and  charities,  some  
of which have been linked to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, has raised concern 
that Wahhabi Islam has been used by militants who tailor this ideology to suit 
their political goals and who rely on Saudi donations to support their 
aspirations”.33
 
(Blanchard, CRS 4, [Footnotes Omitted]) 
                                                            
31 https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LAHORE302_a.html 
32 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islam-
terrorism_b_6501916.html 
33 Blanchard, C. M. (2007, January). The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya. 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE./ 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101756.pdf 
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Meanwhile, there are some indications that the vast military and security 
investments of GCC states primarily target certain groups and ideologies that may 
challenge the position of the GCC’s ruling families. In other words, counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency policies within the GCC is better understood by locating these 
policies within the domestic class structure of accumulation of capital that the GCC 
depends on for its regional share of global corporate profits. Counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency policies have provided more “opportunities” for the GCC to pursue its 
own regional class projects, often with supplementary funding injected by the  TCC via 
Western states.  Accordingly, the counterterrorism policies of the GCC are developed, 
constrained and informed by the links to the ruling elites of the GCC, who use 
counterterrorism as a set of tools to perpetuate their economic and political interests and 
power. This also means contradictions with the counterterrorism policy, illustrated by the 
dependence of the GCC on Wahabbism in maintaining stability. 
In addition, the policy of counterinsurgency is based on the interests of the GCC 
capitalist class. According to one U.S. government counterinsurgency guide, 
"[c]ounterinsurgency (COIN) is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts 
designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes. Unlike 
conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective elements, with 
military forces playing an enabling role. COIN is an extremely complex undertaking, 
which demands of policy makers a detailed understanding of their own specialist field, but 
also a broad knowledge of a wide variety of related disciplines" 34
 
(2009, P. 2).  
                                                            
34 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf 
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 If we use this definition as a working definition, while acknowledging the many 
caveats that accompany that definition, we can recognize many contradictions and ironies 
in U.S. and GCC counterinsurgency strategies in the Middle East. The U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy in the Middle East, for instance, manifests a neglect of many 
security threats. One painful outcome was the complete blindness of Western intelligence 
elites to the upcoming Iranian Revolution in 1979.  Before the Iranian Revolution, Iranian 
security forces and the so called SAVAK (Organization of Intelligence and National 
Security) were supposedly a part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in the region, as 
they were fighting against a wide range of leftist and nationalist movements in Iran.  Part 
of their strategy was to empower Islamist groups who were ideologically against 
communism to balance the threat of a communist revolution in Iran. The result was an 
Islamic Revolution that went under the radar of nearly every Western intelligence service. 
A similar strategy seems to have been pursued in the GCC states. The GCC 
counterinsurgency strategy focuses on repressing any local voice that can create a 
nationally- oriented political economy. In other words, a nationalization of GCC political 
economy would be viewed structurally opposed to the current GCC transnational space.  
Therefore, counterinsurgency has appeared as a tool to maintain the status quo in which 
the Western MNCs have safe and secure access to oil and other transnational practices in 
the region.  The following map is an illustration of the concentration of militarization 
around Persian Gulf oil fields. 
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Map 1: U.S military presence in the Persian Gulf region and some of the nearest oil fields 
Source: http://www.theglobaleducationproject.org/mideast/info/maps/middle-east-
military-and- oil-map.jpg 
The  above  map  shows  the  United  States  military  facilities  by  circles that 
represent U.S. Air Force bases, U.S. Navy bases, U.S. Army bases.  To help better 
understand the geostrategic significance of the U.S. military presence in the region, the 
map also shows oil and gas resources with brown stains representing oil fields, and the blue 
ones representing natural gas fields. The close proximity of U.S. military bases to the oil 
and gas fields is no coincidence; and the fact that those fields are usually close to water 
makes the placement of military bases in their vicinity more convenient, as access to the 
high seas would basically create a suitable strategic location for a military base. 
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In the case of the GCC, the security vacuum created by the U.S. counterinsurgency 
strategy and its impact on counterterrorism produced a blend of corporate capitalism and 
counterinsurgency: "multinational corporations usually become involved in 
counterinsurgency when their corporate interests (financial interests, foreign based 
personnel, or infrastructure, etc.) are threatened, or when a financial advantage is 
perceived. COIN planners will not always have the ability to influence the activities of 
multi-national corporations in an affected country, but may find that their interests 
complement the COIN effort. In particular, firms in extractive sectors (oil, mining, etc.) 
have large initial investment and long production cycles, which mean that withdrawal 
from a country could result in significant financial cost.  For such companies, investment 
in local stabilization activities (from micro-loans to security sector reform activities) 
makes economic sense"35 
  
(2009, P. 34). 
Connecting the long-term national counterinsurgency strategy of the most 
powerful military in the world with divergent and often shorter-term interests of 
multinational corporations in dealing with one of the most chaotic regions of the world 
has obviously had far reaching consequences, including, but not limited to, the collapse of 
Libya, Syria and Yemen and the dysfunctional state of the government of Iraq and arguably 
that of Egypt today. However, the current counterinsurgency strategies that protect the 
GCC royal families and TCC interests in the region are not simply a means to an end; the 
counterstrategy itself is emerging as an industry - an end in and of itself, and therefore, 
                                                            
35 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf 
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yet another economic tie between the GCC and TCC. For instance, Vindell, which is 
a private military corporation based in the U.S., has been in the business of training Saudi 
Arabian National Guard (SANG) for decades now: 
“In February 1975 Vinnell secured a US$77 million contract with King Fahd to 
train the Saudi  Arabian  National  Guard  (SANG),  the  military  arm  of  the  
House  of  al- Saud.  Today, Vinnell’s advertising depicts the firm as ‘providing 
a broad spectrum of professional and technical services to government clients in 
multiple areas of management and training.  Client requirements have led Vinnell 
to a vast array of challenges, from Malaysia to Mexico to the Middle East, often 
to the very heart of international conflict areas. Vinnell has subsidiary operations 
in Egypt, Oman, and Turkey, but the key area of responsibility remains with 
SANG.  The contract for its one thousand-plus-strong team of advisors was 
extended in January 1994 to the year 2000 at a cost of US $819 million."36 
GCC State Repression and Working Class 
The reason for employing military forces internally is arguably to guard against 
security threats to GCC elites’ interests, including their property interests.  In other words, 
there is an inherent linkage between the militarization of the GCC states, on the one hand, 
and GCC’s “controlling” and “repressing” the region’s working class, on the other. The 
repressive sociopolitical structures of the GCC find their parallels in there structuring of 
                                                            
36 Sheppard, S. (1998). Foot soldiers of the new world order: the rise of the corporate military. 
New Left Review, (228), 128.http://newleftreview.org/I/228/simon-sheppard-foot-soldiers-of-the-
new-world-order- the-rise-of-the-corporate-military 
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the transnational working class in the GCC. GCC elites have successfully restructured the 
working class transnationally at the same time as these elites were expanding their 
transnational class interests.  In other words, the repressive political architecture benefits 
both GCC regional interests and GCC/TCC transnational interests. 
Prior to the emergence of the current transnational labor class, GCC states used 
to witness frequent demonstrations within their societies, particularly instigated by 
violation of labor rights.  Just a few decades ago, a considerable percentage of the GCC 
working class consisted of Arab laborers from other Arab states.  Based on the Arab 
background of most foreign laborers, it was difficult for the GCC elites to suppress them, 
on the one hand, or to gain hegemonic power in the Arab World, on the other.  The 
demography of the GCC labor class has now changed, however, and a transnational labor 
class has been created in which Arab laborers are but a small part-see the Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Arab Share of Foreign Population in GCC  
Source: Borrowed from here; 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P02_Kapiszewski.pdf, P. 
9 
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By reducing the use of foreign Arab laborers to diminish the pressure from the rest 
of the Arab world, the militarization of GCC labor policy created a transnational working 
class in the region that is largely unprotected.  This was a welcome development for GCC 
elites: the non-Arab foreign labors spared GCC states from having to repress Arab 
people and allowing them to claim hegemonic power over the Arab World while, at the 
same time the working conditions in their countries worsened.  From the 1970s and 80s, 
the GCC actively started to create a transnational labor class by opening its local labor 
markets to global labor supplies. This shift is crucial for the purpose of understanding the 
emergence of a transnational GCC capitalist class, which depended on restructuring of the 
workforce to facilitate production and was backed up by aggressive militarization, which 
amounted primarily to internal security measures against the working class.   
Parallel to this policy, GCC states started to give generous social welfare to their 
own nationals while marginalizing them from important economic activities.  Therefore, 
the violation of human rights and labor rights became irrelevant - or less visible - since 
these states claim that the laborers who migrated to GCC states have freely chosen to 
accept the difficult working conditions. 
Today, the GCC elites/states are using a sophisticated combination of ideology, 
military power, and transnational globalization to maintain their suppressive status quo. 
Based on the data, some of which discussed in this chapter, the GCC transnational labor 
class is a key target of GCC’s repressive structure.  According to Human Rights Watch: 
“. . .[p]olice and labor authorities [of the GCC] in 2014 continued a vigorous 
campaign to arrest and deport foreign workers found in violation of existing labor 
laws, targeting workers who did not have valid residency or work permits, or 
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those found working for an employer other than his or her legal sponsor.  
According to the International Organization on Migration (IOM), Saudi Arabia 
deported 163,018 Ethiopians between November 2013 and March 2014, and 
458,911 Yemenis between June 2013 and June 2014.  There were reports that 
prior to deportation some deportees were placed in overcrowded detention 
conditions, denied adequate food and water, and physically abused by guards. 
Between December and March 2014, Saudi Arabia deported 38,164 Somalis to 
Mogadishu, including hundreds of women and children, without allowing any 
to make refugee claims.  Domestic workers, most of them women, frequently 
endure a range of abuses including overwork, forced confinement, non-payment 
of wages, food deprivation, and psychological, physical and sexual abuse without 
the authorities holding their employers to account.  Workers who attempted to 
report employer abuses sometimes faced prosecution based on counterclaims of 
theft or “sorcery.”"37 
Capital Accumulation via Arms Deals 
The security shield for GCC transnational capital accumulation has linked to 
another capitalist structure, the military industrial complex. The sale of weapons, which 
protect the structure of the capital accumulation, is, in itself, a Western-based structure of 
accumulation of capital, showing a rather unusual case of harmony among different 
capitalist trends. For instance, Adnan Khashoggi, a wealthy Saudi businessman and a 
generous donor to American universities, has been alleged to be a Saudi arms dealer.  Mr. 
                                                            
37 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/saudi-arabia 
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Kashoggi appears to have close ties with the Saudi royal family, as his father was the 
personal physician to King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud. The allegations of arms dealing against 
him are long-standing. In January 1987, for instance, Time magazine referred to him as 
a “shadowy arms trader."  The allegations go further to include old connections with the 
bin Laden family.  Peter Bergen writes "[during the 1950s] Mohammed bin Laden [the 
father of Osama bin Laden] would [jump-start] the career of another Saudi billionaire, 
Adnan Khashoggi, known in the West for his flamboyant spending, his walk-on part in the 
Iran-contra scandal, and his nephew Dodi Fayed, who died along with Princess Diana in 
the Paris car crash.  In the early 1950s, Mohammed needed some trucks for his construction 
business in a hurry.  Khoshoggi was able to make a $500,000 purchase of trucks in the 
United States, for which Mohammed paid him a commission of $50,000.  It was 
Khashoggi's first business deal" (Bergen, 2002, P. 47).  Khashoggi has also been linked 
to other controversial cases such as money-laundering activities at India38
 
and even 
terrorism39. 
The GCC elites continue to play an important role in the global arms industry. This 
role has been possible thanks to petrodollars. The GCC’s indigenous arms industries 
remain weak as the thrust of military expansion in the GCC continues to be the importation 
of advanced military weaponry and equipment while relying on foreign support and 
                                                            
38 http://indianexpress.com/tag/adnan-khashoggi/ 
39http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2001/11/six_degrees_of_adnan_kh
ashoggi_ 
part_4.html 
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training.  Military facilities that are mostly exported from the West to the GCC primarily 
function as a security assurance for the status quo forces within the GCC. The basic 
economic model can be described as using arms deals to recycle petrodollars.  Therefore, 
it would be oversimplification to view these arms deals merely as a result of security 
concerns.  Rather, in the process of decision making behind these deals lie important 
personal and power group interests.  For instance, the BBC reported in 2007 that "[t]he 
UK's biggest arms dealer, BAE Systems, paid hundreds of millions of pounds to the ex-
Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan"40
 
while then-Prime Minister 
Tony Blair prevented the investigation using a simple business logic: "I don’t believe the 
investigation incidentally would have led anywhere, except to the complete wreckage of a 
vital strategic relationship for our country.”41 
Military and Security Power as Tools of Maintaining the Hierarchy of Power 
in the Arab World 
One way to capture the class-based nature of the GCC’s military power is to analyze 
the causes and implications of GCC policies and strategies on a wider regional level across 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Historically, Saudi Arabia has aspired to 
become a leader in the MENA region. The modern history of MENA, on the other 
hand, consists of constant, and at times chaotic, changes, including the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, two Persian Gulf Wars, the Arab Spring and the collapse 
                                                            
40 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6728773.stm 
41http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/08/world/europe/08britain.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0 
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of Syria, Libya, Yemen and the rise of ISIS. This constantly changing and highly 
unpredictable environment has made it quite difficult for Saudi Arabia to design a coherent 
strategy that would secure its position as a regional superpower. Take the example of the 
Arab Spring. During the Arab Spring, there manifested a series of tensions among different 
ideologies in the Arab World, including the tension between secular and pre-secular 
worldviews, as well as tensions between socialism and capitalism.  
 Despite these tensions, the social movements in the Arab World found it possible, 
if only for a short but consequential period of time, to rally around some common causes 
and challenge the ruling classes in their respective countries. In other words, the Arab 
Spring arose from a deep collective desire to change the status quo and to create a new 
class arrangement in parts of the Arab World.  This desire and its result, the toppling of 
one status quo regime after another, put Saudi Arabia, as a self-proclaimed leader of the 
Arab world, in an extremely uncomfortable position. The main tenets of the Arab Spring 
as a sociopolitical movement posed an existential threat for the economic and political 
positions of the GCC elites/states.   
One of the strategic concerns of the GCC elites has been the fear of a decentralization 
or transformation of the current hierarchy of power via any new class arrangement in the 
Arab World.  This strategic concern manifested itself in direct and indirect interventions 
of the GCC states to contain the Arab Spring in order to hinder any radical changes in 
the class arrangement of the Arab World. The approach was not quite different from the 
containment strategies the GCC states adopted in response to the Iranian Revolution some 
three decades ago. 
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Following the collapse of President Mubarak and unsuccessful external efforts-from 
GCC and the United States to prevent a radical change in Egypt, the TCC seemed to 
favor Mohamed El-Beradei, the former Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), as the new leader of “democratic” Egypt, due to his international 
statute and networks. El-Beradei was arguably the only leading figure who could transform 
Egyptian political structure into a polyarchic system acceptable to the TCC. The GCC 
states, however, had a different vision.  It was in the strategic interest of the GCC to first 
derail the Egyptian anti-status quo revolution, dismantle the social construct that led to the 
revolution that consisted of mainly of leftists and nationalists, and finally restore a soft 
form of military dictatorship that would be a reliable ruling class that would support the 
interests of the current GCC elites/states and Arab capitalism.  The GCC scored a 
significant victory in achieving all these goals, not through foreign intrusion but by 
channeling the Egyptian people’s will to overthrow a democratically elected government 
and then voting in a military general. There is little doubt that the current military 
government could not have emerged without the support of Saudi Arabia, and without 
continued U.S. support of the Egyptian military. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other 
hand, sowed the seeds for its fall from power by excluding and suppressing many social 
groups.  The government under the Muslim Brotherhood started changing the institutional 
settings in favor of its own group interests (similar to indigenous capitalism that emerged 
in Iran after 1979 Islamic Revolution); but any such governing structure would have been 
a serious threat for TCC interests in Middle East, and importantly with respect to oil. 
The Egyptian case indicates a possible new trend in the Middle East geopolitics 
in which GCC has now adopted: a neo-imperialist regional foreign policy to lead or support 
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their regional strategies.  Saudi Arabia had indeed the general support of the United 
States in the region.  But more importantly, Saudis represented the essential interests of 
global TCC, and hence powerful economic and financial powers that supported the 
Saudis’ strategy for containing the Egyptian revolution.  According to a Congressional 
Research Service Report: 
“Egypt’s economy and national budget are slowly stabilizing, due in large part to 
the financial largesse of the Gulf Arab monarchies. Countries such as the United 
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have injected billions of dollars into the 
economy and treasury, providing cash grants, concessional loans, and fuel 
imports. Since the ouster of former president Morsi in July2013, Gulf states have 
provided government-to- government aid to Egypt possibly as high as $30billion, 
31 with billions more coming in the form of private sector investment. This 
assistance has bolstered the Sisi government and given it the confidence to enact 
some unpopular but fiscally prudent measures, such as reducing fuel subsidies 
by 30%.”42 (Sharp, 2015, P. 8) 
The economic support of the GCC - mainly by Saudi Arabia - was followed by the 
emergence of military-driven ties between GCC elites and the new dictatorship in Egypt.  
The military and economic aid by the United States to Egypt was about $1.5 billion in 
2013.43  Egyptian military leaders received the bulk of this aid.  Recently, however, a 
                                                            
42 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf 
43 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-vows-to-back-egypts- 
rulers.html?_r=0 
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shift, or at least a parallel development, may be seen.  In his 2015 visit to Egypt, Saudi 
Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman negotiated with 
President Sisi for creation of a "joint Arab military force." 44 In April 2015, according to 
the Egyptian Presidential office, "[i]t was agreed [between President Sisi and Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman] to form a joint military committee to discuss the implementation 
of a major strategic maneuver in the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with 
the participation of a joint Arab force which includes troops from Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and the [Persian] Gulf states."45 
For our purpose, the example of the Bahraini social movement that was part of the 
Arab Spring is particularly relevant.  Unlike many other Arab Spring countries, Bahrain is 
a GCC state. It is perhaps no overstatement that to Saudi Arabia, protecting the status quo 
in Bahrain was equivalent to protecting all the GCC states.  While the Saudis reluctantly 
accepted President Obama’s support for the fall of President Mubarak in Egypt, the Saudis 
conveyed their clear objection to any similar transition in Bahrain, forcing the U.S. to turn 
a blind eye on the fate of the Bahraini social movement.  Albeit, in the case of Egypt, the 
U.S. was hoping to limit and contain these changes by preserving the Egyptian military as 
powerbroker while easing out Mubarak.  As the Bahraini protestors were brutally 
suppressed by their government, Saudi troops were sent to protect the royal family of 
Bahrain.   The U.S. criticized the ruling family of Bahrain while calling for restraint.  
                                                            
44 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/saudi-arabia-egypt-sign-cairo-declaration-
150731005229377.html 
45http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/14/us-yemen-security-egypt-saudi- 
idUSKBN0N52CF20150414#3qv5LCZvw3VBU1ox.97 
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President Obama considered it sufficient to call for “respecting the universal rights of the 
people of Bahrain and reforms that meet the aspirations of all Bahrainis."  The United 
States did not follow up on this call for protection of human rights in any serious manner. 
Similar to Egypt, this case also shows considerable cooperation and “give-and-take” 
between Western TCC states and the GCC states, rather than just conflicting policies 
between the two sides. 
The GCC elites therefore, were successful in containing the anti-status quo 
forces in Egypt and Bahrain, the two countries with strategic significance to the GCC.  
Table 16 shows one index for “freedom” in Tunisia, Bahrain, and Egypt before, 
during, and after the Arab Spring, indicating the relatively successful transition of Tunisia 
to democracy, while in Bahrain and Egypt the status quo more or less survived the Arab 
Spring. In addition to the absence of strong labor unions and civil society institutions in 
Egypt and Bahrain, one key difference between these two and Tunisia was that Saudi 
Arabia did not have a strategic interest in maintaining the status quo in Tunisia, as it did in 
Egypt or Bahrain. 
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Table 16: Freedom Status in Egypt, Bahrain, and Tunisia 
Source: Freedom House 
More importantly, the labor unions in Tunisia functioned as a structural obstacle 
against such external pressures as any potential GCC-backed intervention in two ways: 
ideologically and institutionally.  In terms of ideology, Tunisian labor forces managed 
to mobilize the two competing trends within the Tunisian society, namely the secular and 
the Islamic trends.  In many other Arab Spring countries, the tension between these two 
trends proved to be one of the main obstacles in the way of democratization, if not the main 
obstacle.  With respect to institutions, Tunisian labor unions provided important indigenous 
institutional settings for sociopolitical activism, which in turn allowed the movement to go 
deeper than a mere street movement.  In the case  of  Tunisia,  the  former  dictator  Ben  
Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain Bahrain Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia Tunisia
Year PR CL Status Year PR CL Status Year PR CL Status
2000 6 5 NF 2000 7 6 NF 2000 6 5 NF
2001 6 6 NF 2001 6 5 NF 2001 6 5 NF
2002 6 6 NF 2002 5 5 PF 2002 6 5 NF
2003 6 6 NF 2003 5 5 PF 2003 6 5 NF
2004 6 5 NF 2004 5 5 PF 2004 6 5 NF
2005 6 5 NF 2005 5 5 PF 2005 6 5 NF
2006 6 5 NF 2006 5 5 PF 2006 6 5 NF
2007 6 5 NF 2007 5 5 PF 2007 7 5 NF
2008 6 5 NF 2008 5 5 PF 2008 7 5 NF
2009 6 5 NF 2009 6 5 NF 2009 7 5 NF
2010 6 5 NF 2010 6 5 NF 2010 7 5 NF
2011 6 5 NF 2011 6 6 NF 2011 3 4 PF
2012 5 5 PF 2012 6 6 NF 2012 3 4 PF
2013 6 5 NF 2013 6 6 NF 2013 3 3 PF
2014 6 5 NF 2014 7 6 NF 2014 1 3 F
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Ali  fled  to  Saudi  Arabia  where  he  was  granted protection. That being said, GCC 
supported "Islamists that have gained power" (Colombo, 2012, P. 12). 
Thus, GCC elites/states used their military and financial powers to protect the 
current socioeconomic class arrangement in the Arab World.  In case of Bahrain, they used 
direct military power to suppress uprisings.  In the case of Egypt, they empowered the 
Egyptian military to take over the state in order to stop any kind of meaningful 
democratization in Egypt at the expense of a weakened working class.  In the case of 
Tunisia, they failed to penetrate into the dynamics of the uprising and the changes that 
were going on in the country because the Tunisian working class had sufficient institutional 
power to resist the interests of the GCC, at least temporarily. 
With respect to the Arab Spring, each intervention may be better understood in 
terms of its importance to the GCC capitalist class.  One important factor in analyzing 
the Arab Spring is that  there  has  been  tension  and  conflict  between  the  GCC  
regional  interests  and  TCC transnational interests. Similar to the period of 
nationalization, when the conflict between GCC and TCC resulted in a new arrangement, 
in the case of the collective responses to Arab Spring the consequential strategic interests 
are directly connected to the broader economic (class) interests of the GCC bloc, as 
well as this bloc’s ties with the TCC. 
Conclusion 
A narrow segment of GCC society - royal families and merchant families - who 
controlled the upstream oil sector after nationalization began to establish economic 
ties with TCC business entities that were pushed to downstream sector (See Chapter 3). 
Within the current phase of transnationalization of the global economy, GCC elites/states 
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are deeply connected to the TCC.  This transnationalization and the ensuing segmentation 
imply a network of individual shareholders from different countries who control highly 
centralized modes of capital accumulation in the global oil market. Today, the primary goal 
of GCC militarization is protection of the GCC as an important part of this transnational 
globalization. 
The GCC/TCC ties regarding militarization is primarily geared towards the 
interests of the GCC bourgeoisie in terms of the current mode of capital accumulation.  As 
discussed in this chapter, the GCC class-based militarization is characterized by a series of 
challenges for the GCC bloc and TCC.  One important reason for GCC militarization is the 
non-hegemonic nature of the GCC transnational space and the highly exploited 
transnational labor class in this region. A second reason is the external threats (mainly from 
Arab Spring) that challenge the current hierarchy of power in this region.  Third is the new 
transnational ties via military deals that have empowered the GCC elites within TCC; this 
militarization endures as continuation of military business between members of TCC. A 
final reason can be found in the financial needs of Western military industrial 
complexes to petrodollars. 
The militarization of the GCC is among the functional components of the 
current global mode of accumulation of capital.  Structurally speaking, this militarization 
suppresses weaker social  classes  while  the  deals  strengthen  the  economic  ties  between  
the GCC  and  TCC.  The regional interventions of the GCC that manifest the same trend 
in that the GCC's regional concerns are based more and more on the fear of any changes 
in the hierarchy of power in the region affecting GCC/TCC corporate interests. 
The GCC has internal domestic/regional interests and transnational interests that 
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sometimes, though not always, overlap. The GCC bourgeoisie has appeared as the most 
reliable partner for the TCC in the Middle East.  Securing the stability of the GCC, which 
is a structurally fragile region, is crucial for the TCC to secure its economic activities in 
that region.  Despite the occasional tensions in cases such as nationalization and the Arab 
Spring, the outcome protects the interests of both the GCC and TCC.  This overall 
harmony is the manifestation of the embeddedness of GCC elites/states within the TCC. 
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION 
In each chapter of this dissertation I focused on certain aspects of the GCC that, 
while co- existing with each other, carried some degree of internal contradictions.  The 
cumulative result of these contradictions is a series of tensions, which in turn leads to 
further contradictions. As David Harvey maintains, “[c]ontradictions have the nasty habit 
of not being resolved but merely moved around” (Harvey, 2013, P.4).  This pattern of fluid 
contradictions and ebbs and flows of social tensions in essence summarizes the 
socioeconomic dynamics of the GCC countries in the past several decades and provides us 
with a sense of what to expect in the near future. 
The nature of transnational elites, their relations, and their struggles within and 
without their groups are related to the essential characteristics of today’s globalization.  
This dissertation has examined the extent to which GCC elites have been integrated into 
the TCC.  It also discussed how this particular segment of the global structure of capital 
accumulation depends on a repressive state apparatus.  Generally speaking, and in order to 
better understand the new patterns of global capitalism contextualized in the new 
socioeconomic arrangement of contemporary globalization, it is crucial to explore the 
critical, regional roles played by transnational elites. 
The key contribution of this dissertation is to add to the expanding literature on the 
far-reaching consequences of transnational elites in various regions of the world by 
shedding some light on one of the important blocs of TCC’s global structure.  Various 
strands of argument here are primarily drawn from Neo-Gramscian schools of thought, 
in particular, Robinson 2003, Robinson and Harris 2000, and Sklair 2001. Accordingly, 
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the core inquiry has been to understand the dominant forces within GCC capitalism as 
an extension of TCC’s global capitalism that comes at the expense of states. 
With respect to the field of Middle Eastern studies, the methodology used in this 
dissertation has been what is called the “process-tracing method.” (See Chapter 1.)  For 
reasons discussed earlier, this method allows us to better understand the embeddedness of 
the GCC elites within the TCC based on historical narratives and direct data.  Importantly, 
this theory-oriented process-tracing method revealed no significant inconsistencies in the 
notion of GCC transnational elites between that of Neo- Gramscianism and the findings of 
this dissertation. 
As discussed in the first chapter, this dissertation contributes an under-used mode 
of analysis based on Neo-Gramcianism to Middle Eastern studies which typically 
emphasizes understanding the institutional setting and arrangement of regime structure in 
Middle Eastern monarchies.  These settings and arrangements include state building and 
the legacy of colonialism on various state institutions. (See, for instance; Fandy 1999, 
Herb 1999, Kechichian 2001, Kostiner 2000, Massad 2001, Tetrault 2000, Lucas 2004, 
Anderson 1986, Posusney & Angrist 2005).  
Another significant part of Middle Eastern studies literature focuses on the notion 
of rentierism.  (See, for instance, Mahdavi, 1970 and Beblawi, 1987). However, the 
heterodox approaches, such as historical structuralism that was partly used in this 
dissertation are more or less based on classical class-based explanations (Hanieh 2011, 
Prashad 2002). Following these latter approaches, this dissertation recognizes the 
importance of class-based analysis; but it also applies it to a transnationally-oriented class-
based context.  In other words, this dissertation suggests that analyzing GCC transnational 
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space and its actors should be the starting point for studying the political economy of 
GCC.  The embeddedness of GCC elites within the TCC also explains the repressive 
state apparatus and the highly exploitive economic structure in which the GCC 
transnational working class lives. 
According to Robinson, on the global level, the TCC is “[a] class group that has 
drawn in contingents from most countries around the world, North and South, and 
has attempted to position itself as a global ruling class.  This TCC is the hegemonic 
fraction of capital on a world scale” (Robinson, 2014, P. 2).  In order to avoid ambiguity 
with Robinson's theory, it is important to  clarify  how  the  terms elite  and  capitalist are  
employed  in  this  analysis. Following Robinson, in this dissertation, in regards to the case 
study, I have used the terms elites and capitalist class interchangeably. According to 
Robinson: 
“[B]y "elites" I mean dominant political, socioeconomic, and cultural strata and, 
in particular, capitalists and landlords, along with top-level managers and 
administrators of the state and other major social institutions and leadership 
positions in the political system. Capitalists are elites who own or manage means 
of production as capital.  Elites who are not necessarily capitalists occupy key 
decision-making positions in institutions, whether in private corporations, the 
state, political parties, or culture industries”. (Robinson, 2014, pp. 43-45) 
As I described in chapters 2 and 3, GCC states have always been dominated by the 
ruling classes of the region.  In the GCC the ruling and merchant families are by design 
capitalists; but they are also elites who are well-educated and well-positioned in the 
political system of GCC states.  The core part of GCC capitalist class, including its elites, 
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has been crystallized around family ties. In other words, in GCC the elites are necessarily 
members of a capitalist class.  The nature of ownership and capital accumulation, such 
as activities conducted by these elites through SWFs and various GCC conglomerates 
have, along with their Westernized cultural education and life style rendered the GCC 
transnational elites “natural” members of the TCC. 
Development of Capitalism and the Crisis of Freedom 
As Robinson points out: “A 2011 analysis of the share ownerships of 43,000 
transnational corporations undertaken by three systems theorists at the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology identified a core of 1,318 TNCs with interlocking ownerships.  
Each of these core TNCs had ties to two or more other companies, and on average they 
were connected to twenty. Although they represented only 20 percent of global operating 
revenues, these 1,318 TNCs appeared to own collectively through their shares the majority 
of the world's largest blue chip and manufacturing firms, representing a further 60 percent 
of global revenues - for a total of 80 percent of the world's revenue" (Robinson, 2014, P. 
23). 
Transnational globalization and the accompanying destruction of national and 
local economic entities have, under the banner of "increasing economic freedom," led to 
the rising power of oligarchs at the expense of weakening the working class. This 
dissertation analyzes the GCC transnational space and its repressive state apparatus.  The 
repressive nature of politics that has emerged in the GCC is by no means limited only to 
GCC transnational space. Generally speaking, the new mode of capital accumulation that 
relies on transnational economic activities is based on an exploitive and inherently 
unbalanced hierarchy of power on a global level. This transnational mode of accumulation 
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functions through economic and political ties that exist among various capitalist classes 
who, in turn, benefit from Western state institutions and a Western-oriented global 
hegemonic order. Meanwhile, the societies in the global South are excluded and 
controlled, in some cases, by economic statecraft and, in other cases, by brute military and 
security power. This economic oligarchy on the global level is an integral part of the 
structural power of TCC.  
The highly exploitive nature of transnational activities requires, from time to 
time, the use of force by capitalist classes to control the exploited working classes and 
weaker states in the matrix of international relations. Force can be employed on different 
levels and can take different forms. On the global level, for instance, force may be used via 
an institutional setting against those states that are not willing to accept the new mode of 
capital accumulation.  On a domestic level in the global South force is simply employed as 
naked authoritarianism. The rise of underlying authoritarian trends in the global South is 
nothing more than the reverse image of current transnational globalization.  In many 
regions of the global South, such as Latin America or China, the structure of authoritarian 
power is far more sophisticated than the authoritarian trends we observe in the GCC. 
On the global level the underlying rise of authoritarian trends is based on the 
use of force by economic statecraft and putting pressures on those states that are not willing 
to open up their economies to neo-liberal entities. T he neo-Gramscian understanding of 
the notion of hegemony reveals that the global North countries maintain a certain level of 
mutual acceptance of the hierarchy of power.  This acceptance extends to the interactions 
and tensions between Nordic model and neo-liberalism, and it results from the fact that 
use of military power is not the primary or strategic tool for the process of transnational 
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globalization.  On the other hand, the GCC has used its military and security powers as an 
indispensable tool of its capitalist strategy against both domestic and regional anti-status 
quo players. 
While in periphery and semi-periphery countries the use of naked force may be 
more visible, in countries with advanced economic powers the so-called "Kremlin Bailout 
Technique" prevails.  As Simon Johnson puts it, this technique is "[t]he assumption of 
private debt obligations by government" in which ordinary taxpayers repay the debt of 
corporations (Johnson, 2009) Economic recovery strategies in which governments   bailout   
large financial institutions and multinational corporations at the expense of working and 
middle classes - often under the justification that they are "too big to fail" - are the familiar 
future of the deregulated financial world of today. These strategies, in their very essence, 
are nothing but oligarchic solutions for re-consolidation of neo-liberalism. 
Another, somewhat similar authoritarian trend in advanced economies i s  what is 
sometimes called the Chinese development model. Through the engagement of foreign 
corporate powers, China has assumed a central position in the “global supply chain” 
facilitating further “transnational accumulation” (Cox, 2012, P. 31).  At the same time, the 
emerging Chinese market clearly reveals the impacts of neoliberal globalization.  In 
other words, China has used “authoritarian upgrading” in which an authoritarian regime 
has tried to consolidate its power through economic reform within the “context of 
contemporary globalization.” (Cox-2012). The result has been the deteriorating situation 
of the labor class and rising inequalities that could eventually entail the use of force by the 
state, hence rendering the Chinese model of development unsustainable. 
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The historical economic development of the GCC has conflated economic and 
social inequalities contextualized in the repressive presence of the state. To some extent, 
this situation is similar to the pattern of development in China. In contrast to China, 
however, the GCC transnationalization by and large ignores national infrastructures.  While 
Chinese authoritarian development relies on foreign investment in manufacturing with a 
nationalistic theme, the GCC model has focused on transnational investments and its oil 
industry. Despite the differences, the GCC is struggling, like China, to position itself at 
the core part of the global supply chain. 
The GCC Model 
 
Figure 9: GCC Transnationalization 
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The above figure shows the key analytical elements of this dissertation.  The white 
arrows indicate a more or less aligned relationship while the gray arrows indicate 
some degree of tension between the elements.  As discussed before, we believe that the 
embeddedness of GCC elites is an extension of a broader evolution of global capitalism.   
To oversimplify somewhat, this evolution, called the transnationalization of economic 
practices, serves as a new mode of capital accumulation. In this part of the model, the TCC, 
along with institutional agents of globalization (such as IMF) facilitated the growing 
positions of GCC elites within the global economy.  However, in terms of domestic GCC 
politics there is a tension between TCC and GCC elites/states as the TCC's preference in 
this region is a polyarchy different from the Saudi version of oligarchical/nepotism model 
favored by the GCC elite.  However, similar to the tensions between TCC and GCC elites 
that arose throughout the processes of nationalization, the new arrangement has not 
jeopardized the broader coalition of economic interests between the GCC and TCC.  (See 
chapter 4.) 
The second part of the above model depicts the connection between the GCC elites' 
embeddedness within TCC and certain domestic factors in the GCC. The predominant 
structure of transnational rentier states that exist in the GCC has provided a considerable 
level of welfare to the GCC rentier middle class. Ironically, however, the same structure 
has also resulted in alienation of the middle class, who have been excluded from of the 
process of decision making in their countries. 
Furthermore, this paradoxical capitalist structure has also paved the way for anti-
status-quo movements to gain currency. As the leftist and nationalist movements were 
aggressively suppressed under the banner of "fighting against anti-Islamic" groups, the 
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only opposition groups that remained active have been the transnational terrorist 
organizations that follow the ideology of the Saudi royal family, namely Wahhabism. 
This terrorist countermovement has two primary aspects. The first aspect is that 
the ideology of Wahhabismin has  different shades that appeal to people excluded from 
the GCC mode of capital accumulation, as well as those who are members of the GCC 
bourgeoisie but nevertheless have ideological sympathies with Wahhabism.  The aspect is 
that GCC capitalism uses the notion of "terrorism" to suppress almost any anti-status quo 
voices, ranging from Islamic leftists to religious and ethnic minorities.  The global 
condemnation of terrorism provides a comfortable context for GCC elites to demonize any 
opposition by labeling it as terrorist.  As a recent example, one may consider Saudi Arabia’s 
execution of a Shia clergyman, Sheikh Nimr al-Namir, in 2016, which it justified as an act 
of counterterrorism.  Although Sheikh Namir, a relatively marginal Shi’a leader in Saudi 
Arabia, was a staunch supporter of Iran’s model of theocratic political system and an 
unequivocal opponent of the Saudi royal family, many observers raised doubt as to whether 
classifying him as a terrorist was appropriate.  The irony becomes somewhat more visible 
when one considers that the underlying ideology of terrorism, Wahhabism, has from its 
very early days positioned itself in opposition to Shi’a Islam, which Wahhabi leaders 
continue to view as a heresy.  M any reformers in Saudi Arabia have been arrested under 
the pretext of the "anti-terror law." According to a report by Amnesty International, 
"hundreds of people have been arrested for demonstrating, while the government  has  
drafted  an  anti-terror  law  that  would  effectively  criminalize  dissent  as  a "terrorist 
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crime” and further strip away rights from those accused of such offences."46 The 
skillful management of this second aspect of "terrorism" - the states’ use and misuse of the 
concept - is one of the primary concerns of GCC states/elites.  As discussed elsewhere, far 
from trying to contain the spread of more radical strands of Wahhabism, the GCC has 
been investing in “exporting” those extreme ideologies to the rest of the Muslim 
World, supposedly under the assumption that by exporting extreme ideas and people to 
other places, the ruling elites would have less to be worried about domestically.  This 
explains the last part of the model that depicts the real targets of the GCC security and 
military powers: the working classes as well as a wide range of reformists voices. 
While there are significant tensions and paradoxes between GCC societies and 
Western societies, GCC transnational elites have established their ties in Western societies 
through a sophisticated network of lobbyists as well as generous and strategic investments 
in Western academia.  That being said, the culture of GCC transnational elites, which has 
been influenced by the culture of the TCC, is a Western-oriented culture in its roots.  This 
is despite the fact that important sections of the GCC societies still follow a pre-secular, 
religious, and anti-Western traditions, some of which are espoused by Wahhabism.  Again, 
this severe tension between the elites’ worldview and that of the masses creates a fertile 
ground for the rise of violent extremism. 
                                                            
46 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/01/reform-activists-saudi-arabia-must-receive-
fair- appeal-hearings/ 
 
188 
 
The transnationalization has also increased the authoritarian tendencies in global 
governance. On the one hand, the oppositions against this transnationalization has 
justified the current and steady increase in militarization. On the other hand, the evidence 
suggests that such militarization has failed to solve the root problem or even alleviate the 
current human catastrophes in the Middle East caused by terrorism and transnational 
crimes. More than a decade after 9/11 terrorist attacks, and after spending enormous 
amounts of resources on counterterrorism, the blight of terrorism has consistently and 
considerably increased in the region as the following chart shows. 
 
 
Chart 6: Terror Attack, Annual Count by Region 
Source: Borrowed from; 
Https: //www.atkearney.com/gbpc/detail//asset_publisher/0cePdOWatojD/content/global-
trends-2015-2025-divergence-disruption-and-innovation/10192 
189 
 
Final Note 
The embeddedness of GCC elites within TCC came with the decentralization of 
capital accumulation along with centralization of those who benefit from the current mode 
of capital accumulation, i.e. the TCC.  The GCC offers an important case study for 
analyzing the structure and consequences o f  the current phase of globalization.  It 
clearly shows the significant role of the TCC as a force in shaping the global economy.  
The TCC’s impacts, however, may differ from one region to another.  This dissertation is 
a humble contribution to the larger assessment of the role played by transnational elites in 
the GCC and of the regional and global consequences of their power struggles.  The 
findings suggest that the transnational elites of the GCC, as one of the important nodes of 
global market economy, are members of the TCC, a group whose decisions have far-
reaching impacts on the regional and global economies. However, the current suppressive 
mode in the GCC is an outcome and an essential part of GCC transnationalization.  This is 
partly due to the profitable military deals between members of the TCC, on the one hand, 
and the level of violence in the Middle East, on the other.  The Middle East, as one of the 
most militarized regions in the world, is the only region where systemic violence has 
been simultaneously, and at points paradoxically, directed against modernization, 
Westernization, and globalization, because the GCC elites represent all three at the same 
time. 
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